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ABSTRACT 
The discipline of modern economics has been categorized as based in mathematics and 
thus dealing only with facts. Religion, on the other hand, is considered one of the primary 
institutions in society that engenders different values. The stark separation between these 
two fields is typical of the modern fact-value distinction. The goal of this project is to 
provide, relying heavily upon Peter L. Berger, a detailed analysis of the value-laden 
social functions of religion and consider whether economics, specifically capitalism, also 
carries out these functions. The thesis blurs the lines between economics and religion by 
showing that capitalism engages in one of the primary social functions of religion, 
namely the promulgation of a theology. The research has revealed that capitalism, though 
it eschews any role in producing value-laden beliefs, actually manufactures its own 
unarticulated theology, establishing certain values through doctrine. This theology of 
capitalism is displayed by evaluating economic literature produced by three different 
schools of capitalism. Comparing this economic literature to three standard doctrines of 
Christian theology has uncovered pieces of capitalism’ s own theology heavily involved 
in shaping specific values. By shedding light on capitalism’ s theology, this thesis has 
revealed that economics carries out the same social functions as religion and 
consequently problematizes the modern fact-value distinction. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
But apart from this contemporary mood, the ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more 
powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, 
who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back… it is ideas, not vested interests, which are 
dangerous for good or evil. 
 
 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
 
 
 
I. A Modern Divide 
 
The topic of economics and religion has been percolating in my mind for 
sometime. Nearly five years ago, I returned to my home in Montana for the summer 
where I worked as a sales tax intern at the corporate office of a national propane 
company. It was my first introduction to office life, and the work was mundane and 
prosaic, often just inventorying files, searching for business licenses, and warding off 
paper cuts. My summer was largely dominated by the task of researching specific sales 
tax laws regarding different uses of propane. While there are limited uses for propane 
(though you would be surprised at some of them), what made the task arduous, to put it 
lightly, was that each specific use of propane had to be researched many, many times 
over. More directly, each topic had to be researched for nearly every state. I started in the 
“A’ s,” Alabama, Alaska… and slogged through the alphabet, ending in the “W’ s” … 
Washington, Wyoming. In the hours, days, and weeks of carrying out this task, many 
distinctive differences between the laws in different states struck me. From those 
differences emerged a notable cultural aspect to these sales tax laws.  
2 
For instance, South Carolina had a unique tax exemption for propane used in 
barbeques. Such a law could not be more irrelevant in Montana, where the weather is 
only warm enough to barbeque three weeks out of the year, or so it seems. These laws did 
not just materialize out of thin air. Just the opposite, they are deeply embedded in a 
particular context. Each state’ s laws reflect specific interests and values connected to 
regional identities. What happens when seemingly value-inert laws, begin to be viewed 
with a lens that recognizes their relationship to the culture and values of a society? 
For me, a series of questions regarding the relationship between economics and 
culture, more specifically religion, began to barrage me incessantly. For example, what 
effect does economics actually have? Does it, at times, perform similar social functions 
as religion? Does economics act like religion? Does it have its own theology? How does 
economics define who we are as human persons, what kind of world we live in, and how 
we interact with that world? Does economics establish a visionary hope for the end of 
time? Has economics shaped our understanding of what community is? Do any of these 
questions even really matter? Each of these inquiries suggests that economics may be 
acting in a way that influences far more than the purely economic arenas of life. These 
questions have driven me to research the interaction between economics and religion. 
This essay will work through these questions, attempting to provide adequate responses 
to these important probes.   
Continuing consideration of the above example regarding South Carolina’ s tax 
exemption for propane used to barbeque, one need not ponder this issue long before a 
puzzling question emerges. Does the exemption for the use of propane in barbequing 
exist because barbequing is popular, or is barbequing popular, at least in part, due to the 
3 
exemption? This question regarding the interaction, and direction of causality, between 
the field of economics and culture is one to which much time and devotion has been 
given. Karl Marx’ s theory in the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for 
understanding culture and religion, like everything else, to be the result of modes of 
production. This reductionistic theory views religion as a determined effect of economic 
causes. Religion and culture are perpetually defined by economic systems, having no 
formative effect of their own upon economics.1  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber challenged Marx’ s view 
through his thesis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. His thesis was that 
Protestant Christianity, especially the ascetic Protestants, helped to instill the culture and 
value system necessary, and consequently responsible, for the success of capitalism in the 
modern West. Rather than Marx’ s model where religion was determined by economics, 
in Weber’ s model, the causation had shifted. Religion was just as capable of affecting 
economics, as economics was of affecting religion.2 The Weberian thesis, while over one 
hundred years removed from its first publication, is still vital to any work that engages 
both the fields of religion and economics. Much debate, however, still surrounds Weber’ s 
                                                 
1Consider as an example the following quotation of Marx and Friedrich Engels where they say, 
“the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth 
of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the 
will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by 
the economical conditions of existence of your class”; see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto (London: Pluto, 2008), 58. 
2This aspect of Weber’ s thesis is evident from the beginning of his landmark work where he 
summarizes the first problem that he will address, “the influence of certain religious ideas on the 
development of an economic spirit, or the ethos of an economic system.” He describes this as “only one 
side of the causal chain,” and points out that later he will examine the effect of social stratifications so as to 
examine “both causal relationships”; see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’ s Sons, 1958), 27.  
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identification of ascetic Protestantism as the ethos in which capitalism was grounded.3 
The goal of this thesis is not to provide another evaluation of the Weberian thesis. Rather 
it will explore the effect that Weber has had on twentieth century analyses of economics 
and religion based upon his structuring of the relationship between these two fields. 
Weber’ s thesis undoubtedly provided the space for consideration of a dialectical 
relationship between religion and economics, whereas for Marx, religion was always the 
dependent variable that only changed as a result of a shift in the independent variable, 
economics. Despite Weber’ s overcoming of Marx’ s reductionism, his dialectic 
explanation still resulted in a stark binary that has governed the conversation regarding 
the interaction between the fields of economics and religion. The two arenas, thus, 
whether they are interacting in a simple one-directional causality (Marx), or one that is 
far more complex (Weber), remain perfectly distinct from each other.4  
The distinction between these two fields implies a qualitative differentiation of 
the two. The dichotomy between these two fields can be characterized by what D. 
Stephen Long calls “the modern fact-value distinction” that is foundational to Weber’ s 
analysis.5 Economics works in the realm of facts while religion only provides suggestions 
regarding values. The categories of “facts” and “values” can be illuminated by Weber’ s 
                                                 
3For instance, Weber’ s thesis has been criticized for his interpretation of doctrine and historical 
data, though many still support Weber’ s thesis in general. Christian Etzrodt provides a short summary of 
some of Weber’ s major detractors, though he himself supports Weber’ s thesis showing both the importance 
that Weber still holds as well as the disagreements over his conclusion; see Christian Etzrodt, “Weber’ s 
Protestant-Ethic Thesis, the Critics, and Adam Smith,” Max Weber Studies 8 (Jan 2008): 49-78.  
4Gregory D. Alles describes both Marx and Weber as members of what he calls the classical 
period of analysis of the relationship between economy and religion. The classical period is typified by this 
adherence to maintaining separate arenas for economy and religion, leaving open multiple possibilities for 
how the two arenas interact, but always leaving the two fields clearly separate; see Gregory D. Alles, 
“Economy,” Revista de Estudos da Religião 4 (2005): 37-8. 
5Stephen D. Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (New York: Routledge, 2000), 3.      
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analysis of different types of social actions. Economic “facts” are closely associated with 
the category of instrumentally rational actions. In contrast, religion relates to the domain 
of “values” and value-rational actions. This connection of religion to value-rational 
actions will begin to illuminate a definition of religion as used in this essay.6 The 
understanding of religion established through this discussion will be expanded and 
specified in chapter one. However, turning to Weber’ s types of social actions will 
illuminate the distinction between economics and religion that has governed their 
relationship and how analyses interface them.  
While Weber proposes four types of social actions, two are most important for 
this discussion; they are “instrumentally rational” actions and “value-rational” actions.7 
Both categories involve actions that rationally attempt to achieve some end. The 
distinction occurs in how one decides which end to pursue. Value-rational actions are 
“determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, 
                                                 
6My definition of religion will not attempt to describe what religion is, only what it does. More 
will be said about that distinction in chapter one. Also, this definition does not make the claim that religion 
does anything, or performs a social action, that is entirely unique. Rather, I will focus on a category of 
actions in which religion falls that teases out a theme that can be traced from Weber to Peter Berger. 
Attempting to define religion in a way that distinguishes it from all other social institutions, including 
parsing out its distinctions from other institutions that perform similar actions, is, at best, difficult, and at 
worst, impossible. Instead, by pointing to actions that characterize religion, I will avoid the definitional 
enigma of religion while at the same time providing a clear description of religion that has caused it to be 
viewed as distinct from economics.  
7The other two types of actions are “affectual,” which are governed largely by feelings and 
emotions, and “traditional,” which are “determined by ingrained habituation.” I have chosen to focus only 
on the two rational types of actions since both are encapsulated by a self-consciousness of the ultimate 
goals, according to Weber. This paper will use economic theorists, who rely heavily on a cognitive aspect 
that lands them within the sphere of actions that are at some level rational. Focusing on the two rational 
actions then makes the most sense. There is, in my opinion, space for an analysis of “traditional” actions as 
they are exhibited by people functioning as economic persons in ways that are “ingrained” in them and thus 
not even rationally considered. However, since my research is grounded in discourse and theories, rather 
than observations of physical actions, it most effectively speaks to the instrumentally and value-rational 
actions; see Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, vol. 1 (New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968), 25. 
6 
religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success.”8 The 
measurement of the “prospects of success,” however, is the sole factor of consideration in 
determining the ends in instrumentally rational actions.  
Instrumentally rational actions are defined as those actions “when the end, the 
means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed.”9 In 
other words, all possible means and ends are considered, and the best action, as judged 
from a rational, or calculated, standpoint is selected. These actions do not presuppose any 
ends as more desirable than others. Rather, attempting to choose between “alternative and 
conflicting ends” is done through the use of “the principle of ‘marginal utility.’ ”10 A 
decision based upon “marginal utility” is typified by economic decisions, which aim to 
maximize what one can receive from limited means. Actions taken through this rational 
calculation can be evaluated to determine whether they did, or did not, optimize their 
potential worth. A factual claim can be made regarding whether a rational action was 
taken or not. Economics is thus characteristic of instrumentally rational actions as it 
                                                 
8Weber, Economy and Society, 25.  
9Ibid., 26.  
10Wolfgang Schluchter suggests that for Weber economic activity centers around efficiency. 
Efficiency “epitomizes instrumental action, which, in its most rationalized version or form, follows the 
principle of marginal utility”; see Wolfgang Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A 
Weberian Perspective, translated by Neil Solomon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 453-4. 
The principle of marginal utility was an important economic concept at the time of Weber. It was grounded 
in the recognition of scarcity of resources and the laws of diminishing returns. Thus actions could be 
calculated to optimize the allocation of one’ s resources in order to acquire as many other goods as possible. 
Adhering to the principle of marginal utility then serves as a way to optimize one’ s resources through 
rational, or calculated, means. Success is judged not by whether one achieves any specific end, but whether 
one achieves the maximum possible ends given one’ s scarce limited resources. Examples that could be used 
to describe this are the actions an engineer decides to take in building a bridge in the most efficient way 
possible. Also, young people who are attempting to achieve the possibility of gaining as many material 
possessions as possible might recognize a connection between high paying jobs and a college education so 
they will pursue college degrees; see Frank W. Elwell, Industrializing America: Understanding 
Contemporary Society through Classical Sociological Analysis (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 18.  
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rationally guides actions, in order to optimize the allocation of resources, without 
intrinsically valuing any specific ends.  
Economic actions epitomize the domain of facts because they can reduce a 
decision between conflicting ends to a matter of calculated utility. Gerard Debreu has 
noted this “mathematization of economic theory” especially in the last half of the 
twentieth century, which grounds the field in numerical calculations.11 The increased 
reliance upon math shows the pervasiveness of the belief in how “numbers… epitomize 
the modern fact.”12 Instrumentally rational actions, which are typified by economics, then 
correspond to the domain of facts, for they are ultimately calculations that can be reduced 
to numbers. 
Value-rational actions, however, differ from instrumentally rational actions in a 
significant way. As mentioned above, they rationally consider the best means to achieve a 
certain end, however, the ends of value-rational actions are not rationally calculated. 
Value-rational actions function out of the belief in the value of some end for its own sake, 
whether it maximizes one’ s means according to the principle of marginal utility or not. 
Value-rational actions may require sacrificing the optimization of one’ s limited resources 
in order to achieve the end that is valued as, or believed to be, a worthy goal in and of 
itself.  
Weber describes examples of “pure value-rational orientation” as “the actions of 
persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their 
                                                 
11Gerard Debreu, “The Mathematization of Economic Theory,” American Economic Review 81, 
no. 1 (March 1991): 1.  
12Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth 
and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), xii.  
8 
convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a 
religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some ‘cause’  no matter in what it 
consists.”13 Value-rational actions engender a set of beliefs to act in ways, and aspire for 
ends, that cannot be supported through rational, or calculated, means. Stated differently, 
actions of this type are governed by a value-laden assumption of what telos is good. This 
category of actions is typified by religion, which establishes certain ends to which 
adherents should aspire. These goals are unrelated to “marginal utility,” and thus cannot 
be evaluated as facts. They can only be evaluated based upon the beliefs that inform the 
value of specific ends.14 Establishing values is a foundational characteristic, or social 
function, of religion. Chapter one will further specify this characteristic of religion, but 
the current classification of religious actions within the category of value-rational actions 
helps to explain the distinction that has been held between religion and economics.  
Religious traditions are driven by a particular vision of the good life. Religious 
actions, or actions resulting from theological beliefs, are not instrumentally rational and 
thus fall outside of the domain of facts. The decision of an individual to give large sums 
                                                 
13Weber, Economy and Society, 25.   
14Another example of the division between instrumentally rational and value-rational actions as 
they relate to the modern-fact value distinction can be found in Long’ s Divine Economy. Long discusses the 
factual framework that ensues from analysis deriving from marginal utility, or the related concept of 
opportunity costs. He says, “Mrs. Harris spends an hour preparing a meal. However, she is also a 
psychologist in private practice, and can obtain $50 per hour for her services. Thus, we must ask: what are 
the opportunity costs involved in her preparing the family meal? This seems a harmless enough question. 
The situation is a nice way of explaining that for every action chosen, another opportunity is sacrificed. The 
facts seem incontestable. No matter what our values might be concerning family, work, religion, politics, 
etc., when Mrs. Harris makes dinner she foregoes the opportunity of generating $50”; see Long, Divine 
Economy, 4. Based upon the facts derived by marginal utility, it can be clearly determined if Mrs. Harris 
has chosen to optimize her possible utility. A factual determination can be made based upon an 
instrumentally rational analysis of her actions. However, if she decides that due to some value that she 
holds dear, that she would prefer not to maximize her opportunity costs, she is acting in a value-rational 
way as she is sacrificing the “prospects of success” in order to gain some end that she values as good in and 
of itself. Value-rational actions of this sort are always irrational from an instrumentally rational perspective 
as she sacrificed the possibility of maximum output based upon a value, or belief, that cannot be supported 
by any rational, or calculated, basis.   
9 
of money to the religious institutions, or their charities, without any benefit to herself is a 
value-rational action. It requires sacrificing other potential opportunities, or ways to 
optimize resources. The action can only be understood through the correspondence of her 
values to the religious goals of the institution supported. However, from a purely 
instrumentally rational perspective, giving the large sum of money is not rational because 
it has precluded the possibility of that individual receiving the optimal return on her 
resources. That is why Weber says that from the viewpoint of instrumental rationality, 
“value-rationality is always irrational.”15 Economic’ s inhabitation of the fact realm as 
opposed to religion’ s own home in the domain of values has situated the two in quite 
distinct categories.  
Weber complicated the relationship between religion and economics with his 
thesis regarding the Protestant Ethic proposing two-way causality. However, he still 
assumed that the value system provided through religion, the Protestant Ethic, is 
something that capitalism could not provide for itself. Capitalism cannot conjure up its 
own spirit or ethic. It is but a mechanical system that grinds out the facts of marginal 
utility. The values of individuals within capitalism must derive from a different 
institution. Economics is value-neutral and imposes no specific values upon its adherents. 
It is value-inert. Thus the relationship between economics and religion for Weber is 
framed by a qualitative distinction between the two fields.  
                                                 
15Weber, Economy and Society, 26. Elsewhere Weber also describes the irrational aspect of 
religion relating it to the increased rationalization of the world. He says, “[t]he general result of the modern 
form of thoroughly rationalizing the conception of the world and of the way of life, theoretically and 
practically, in a purposive manner, has been that religion has shifted into the realm of the irrational”; see 
Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Galaxy, 1946), 281. Long summarizes the role of religion in this system by saying that “Weber 
demonstrated that with the rise of capitalism [as an example of a rationalizing system] theological forays 
into economics were increasingly viewed as irrational remainders that described those things for which the 
mathematical facts could not account.”; see Long, Divine Economy, 29.  
10 
Standing upon the shoulders of Weber, the task of uncovering the relationship 
between religion and economics has continued with fervor in the twentieth century. Peter 
L. Berger is one sociologist who has built upon the dialectical relationship between the 
field of economics and the fields of religion and culture, analyzing, with increasing 
complexity, the relationship between them. Berger, in true Weberian fashion, has 
described his task as articulating “[a]n ‘economic culture’  theory of capitalism (or, for 
that matter, of any other economic phenomenon).”16 Berger’ s description of the category 
of an “economic culture” reveals that he sees this value-laden culture as distinct from 
something that is purely economic. The fact-value distinction is thus still implied here.    
Weber’ s analysis came on the heels of the Industrial Revolution, which 
transformed Western society in unprecedented ways. His attempt to discern the cultural 
aspect of capitalism was spurred by this re-formation of society. The economic world of 
Berger’ s time, however, has been much different. For while Berger has watched 
capitalism expand around the world, for example, to Asia, following World War II, the 
world was increasingly divided between capitalist and socialist countries. Not only was 
the conflict between economic systems a prominent aspect of the Cold War, but the 
conflict between these systems also had vital implications for the material realities of 
numerous developing countries.  
If Weber was attempting to understand the modern world shaped by the Industrial 
Revolution, Berger was trying to grasp the effects of the globalization of multiple 
                                                 
16Peter L. Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality, and 
Liberty (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 7. The phrase “economic culture” reveals Berger’ s attempt to 
uncover the culture that is both affected by economics as well as making different economic systems 
possible. A culture is developed due to economic realities, but the culture also affects the economic 
structure present in a particular context. The dialectical relationship established by Weber is still present.  
11 
economic systems throughout the world. With two powerful economic systems 
disseminating to the ends of the earth, there were few pat answers readily accessible to 
explain the ramifications of economic forces at play. Just as the Industrial Revolution 
transformed the modern world in unprecedented ways, so too has the process of 
globalization. And just as a re-evaluation of economics, religion, and culture was needed 
in the face of the revolutionary new industrial world, so too a re-examination of the 
integration of all of these fields has again been necessary on the heels of globalization. 
Berger has been one of the leading interpreters of this social shift, exploring the results of 
the restructuring effects of this phenomenon. 
One of the most important themes addressed in Berger’ s analysis of economics 
and culture was the tension between socialist and capitalist economies through the 1970s 
and 80s. Berger, who himself hails from the borders of Eastern Europe, which was under 
socialist control at this time, became a public policy advocate. His explorations into the 
sociology of economics consequently were infused with urgency as he was addressing 
current realities. The world was seemingly teetering on a balance between the dominion 
of socialist systems or the establishment of free markets.  
Berger’ s undertaking, quite apparently, advocates capitalism as the better of the 
two options. He sought to provide evidence that capitalism was the best avenue to 
achieve economic success throughout the world (a hypothesis, that given the data he 
presents, is hard to dispute). While Berger’ s interest in the connection between the 
economic realm and the realms of culture and religion has perhaps not diminished, his 
publications on the topic in the past twenty years have. This points to the attachment of 
12 
Berger’ s work to the immediacy of the conflict between capitalism and socialism that 
was playing out on the world stage in the 1970s and 1980s.17 
Fast-forwarding around twenty-five years to the present world, there is no 
mounting tension between socialism and capitalism that typified Berger’ s world while he 
was writing about economics. My reason for writing this thesis is thus rooted in entirely 
different concerns. Without the pressing concern of whether the economic system under 
which I reside is going to be overthrown by another system, my attention can turn to 
questions other than which system I find best. While I could dispute Berger’ s own work 
and postulate what the world might look like had socialism become the more widespread 
economic system, that is not my intention. In fact, my thesis is not rooted in historical 
and social analysis like Berger’ s own work; therefore, I will not be questioning the 
conclusions that he draws from those methods. 
The question being posed by this thesis can be relayed by considering Michel 
Foucault’ s statement that “[p]eople know what they do; frequently they know why they 
do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does.”18 Quite clearly in 
the current western world, people are capitalists, or said poorly, they do capitalism. And 
                                                 
17The world economic environment shifted drastically by what Berger called “the cataclysmic 
events that have shaken the socialist world since the spring of 1989”; see Berger, The Capitalist Revolution, 
vii. The subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the collapse of the most formidable socialist 
presence in the world. While other socialist powers, such as China, still remained, the shift of many former 
socialist countries toward more market driven systems signaled a decrease in the immanent tension 
between the two systems. Berger undoubtedly watched as the new democratic systems transitioned toward 
capitalism. In his second introduction (written in 1991) to The Capitalist Revolution (originally written in 
1986), Berger marked out some of the countries he was closely watching. He suggests in this second 
introduction that despite many descriptions of socialism as now being “discredited” that he would not be 
surprised if socialism could again “gain credibility” within ten years. The fact that socialism on the whole 
continued to decline in its scope in the world economy affirms that the project of comparing the systems of 
capitalism and socialism was no longer nearly as pressing an issue moving into the 1990s and onward.   
18Michel Foucault, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., ed. Hubert 
L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983) 187. 
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while tweaks and shifts to the capitalistic structure are constantly demanded, people tend 
to find the capitalist system more or less amenable. The rise of socialism in the twentieth 
century brought to the fore the question of why people do capitalism. It was that question 
that Berger’ s work most directly answered, providing grounded evidence for why 
countries are better off under capitalism rather than socialism. The questions raised in this 
project are, 1) What exactly are the effects of the capitalist system, which, given 
globalization, now structures the economic configuration of the majority of the world?, 
and 2) What effects does what capitalists do actually have? 
The answer to this line of inquiry moves beyond a detailed analysis of the current 
economic production around the world. In short, the effects of capitalism cannot be 
simply quantified and answered with a string of facts and numbers. In order to truly 
respond to this question, we must challenge the fact-value distinction that has framed the 
analysis of economics and religion. This thesis, thus, contends that the fact-value 
distinction in which the study of the interface of religion and economics has been so 
firmly ensconced is a false construction. That is to say, the entirety of capitalism’ s 
workings cannot be measured while still maintaining such a distinction. Capitalism works 
just as much in the arena of value-laden activities as it does in the realm of facts. 
Maintaining the view that capitalism functions exclusively in an instrumentally rational 
fashion leaves society blind to some of capitalism’ s most vital effects. These must be 
recognized and investigated in order to see the full consequences of capitalism on society.  
This paper will attempt to deconstruct the fact-value distinction that has been so 
closely adhered to since Weber (and arguably before). Tearing down the divide between 
these two neat categories will reveal that when we do know what what capitalists do 
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does, it will not eventually lead to the question of how capitalism affects, or is itself 
affected by, religion. Rather entirely different questions are posed. Quite simply, In what 
ways do the effects of capitalism resemble what religion typically does? Or, How does 
capitalism function to engender a set of beliefs that establishes a view of what ends are 
good, or desired?19 These questions refuse to acquiesce to the assumption that 
capitalism’ s activities unfurl in a neatly defined dominion of facts. They open up the 
possibility that economics is transgressing this fact-value divide and is active in value-
laden arenas. Social functions that are normally assumed to fall under the purview of 
religion are actually carried out by economic systems, including capitalism.  
 
 
II. The Form and the Content 
Recently other scholars have been drawn to similar questions. For instance, in his 
work The Economy of Desire, theologian Daniel Bell Jr. examines how people’ s desire is 
affected, or shaped, by capitalism. Bell proposes a shift from asking the question, “Does 
capitalism work?” perhaps the exact question that Berger was intent upon answering, to 
asking, “What work does it do?”20 Bell’ s questions are helpful for framing the arguments 
in this essay as he examines three possible structures of the relationship between 
economics and values that have been proposed. First, the economy is value-neutral. 
Second, the economy does not supply its own values but rather arenas outside of the 
economy provide values for economics. Third, the economy is value-laden, and religion 
                                                 
19This question relates to the way that religion has been defined as a value-rational social action. 
Other specific functions of religion will be revealed in chapter one. Whether or not capitalism fulfills those 
same functions will be explored there as well.  
20Daniel M. Bell Jr., The Economy of Desire: Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2012), 84. Bell actually has scholars such as Berger in mind when proposing 
this shift in line of questioning.  
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should subordinate its values to the economy.21 This thesis, like Bell, rejects the first two 
assertions. Bell rejects the third one as well by developing a confessional theology of 
what true Christian desire should be and how capitalism has deformed such desire. This 
thesis will neither attempt to judge the merits of economics and religion as value systems 
nor will it suggest one’ s subservience to the other. Instead, it will simply attempt to draw 
out similarities and differences between the social functions of both value systems.  
Another fascinating study that engages the effects of economic structures in a 
fruitful fashion is theologian Vincent Miller’ s Consuming Religion. In his work, Miller 
examines how the economic practice of commodification has led to the commodification 
of all aspects of culture, including religion. The most striking and germane insight made 
by Miller is the profound impact of the shape of capitalism’ s consumer culture on the 
formation of society. Miller states that consumer culture “is primarily a way of relating to 
beliefs – a set of habits of interpretation and use – that renders the ‘content’  of beliefs 
and values less important.”22 While much of Miller’ s work is extraneous to this project, 
Miller’ s point here is crucial to this essay. Economics has a powerful effect upon 
structuring forms and shaping the realm of possible actions in society. Forms are often 
considered innocuous to the task of imposing certain values. More attention is typically 
given to the content (sets of beliefs, theological doctrines, etc.) than the form when 
considering values. Miller is suggesting, however, that the content is actually reduced in 
importance in the light of the form, or structure, which shapes habits, practices, etc. The 
                                                 
21Bell, Economy of Desire, 27.  
22Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture 
(New York: Continuum, 2003), 1.  
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ability of economics to shape the form or to structure society should be regarded as an 
important avenue by which it can shape beliefs.  
While Miller does not himself make the connection between his point and Pierre 
Bourdieu’ s concept of body hexis, the two complement each other quite nicely. For 
Bourdieu, the notion of hexis relates to “motor function, in the form of a pattern of 
postures that is both individual and systematic.”23 That is to say, hexis relates to the very 
physical movements, positioning, and habits that shape the behaviors of individuals. 
Much like Miller’ s focus upon the form of consumer culture, rather than its content, 
Bourdieu notes how the shaping of bodily practices (i.e. one’ s gait, gestures, facial 
expressions, tone of voice, use of tools, etc.) is crucial for the training of children because 
this body hexis is “charged with a host of social meanings and values.”24 The content thus 
actually comes through the form, or the body hexis. Bourdieu notes that this embodiment 
has the ability to instill “a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political 
philosophy,” and one might add a theology as well.25 This thesis will posit, that in a 
similar fashion, capitalism’ s structure has the ability to shape the habits and behaviors of 
individuals in ways that can ultimately inculcate entire belief systems.  
Not only is Bourdieu’ s hexis notable as a point of connection between Miller’ s 
description of the effect of practices upon beliefs, but body hexis is important because it 
also points to the power of the establishment of ideas and beliefs through unarticulated 
means. In other words, embodied practices can instill systems of belief that are “beyond 
                                                 
23Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 87. 
24Ibid.  
25Ibid., 94.  
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the grasp of consciousness.” An entire cosmology can be infused without ever having to 
be articulated. This “implicit pedagogy” transfers the meaning and beliefs, the content, 
through the formation of the body rather than articulated instruction. The form, thus, 
determines the content, or at the very least, the content that is possible.26 
The notion that entire systems of belief can be transferred without being 
articulated is a foundational aspect of this thesis. (In fact, chapters two, three, and four 
will compare specific Christian theological doctrines that correlate to similar theological 
tenets in different economic schools.)27 From the very beginning, Christianity’ s adherents 
have attempted to articulate their beliefs. However, economics, maintaining ostensible 
residency in the realm of facts, has eschewed anything resembling the propagation of 
theological beliefs. Just because capitalist theory does not have a neatly packaged 
theology does not mean that it is not fraught with its own implicit theological pedagogy. 
The goal of the latter chapters is to reveal this implied theology hidden amidst value-
neutral economic formulas. 
This thesis thus takes a germ of Miller’ s analysis of the structure of consumer 
culture and its effect upon religion and combines it with Bourdieu’ s theory. In other 
                                                 
26Ibid.  
27My use of Christian is quite generic. It can thus be defined by using Webster’ s New World 
Encyclopedia which says that Christianity is a “world religion derived from the teaching of Jesus in the first 
third of the 1st century”; see Webster’ s New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Christianity,” 244. While many 
different branches of Christianity exist, the generic use here refers to the major doctrines arising from 
Jesus’  teachings that have remained central and agreed upon by the majority of adherents. Three specific, 
central doctrines suggested by Berger will be further examined below and comprise the general structure of 
the beliefs of Christianity as used throughout this paper. 
A brief reference to Robert Nelson’ s definition of theology provides an explanation of the term 
until it is discussed more thoroughly at the end of chapter one. Nelson defines theology saying that, “[m]ost 
people have a set of foundational beliefs that both explains the place of human beings in the world and 
guides their lives, and the intellectual articulation of these beliefs in a formal way becomes a theology”; see 
Robert Nelson, New Holy Wars: Economic Religion Versus Environmental Religion in Contemporary 
America (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2010), xi.  
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words, I will build on Miller’ s suggestion that structuring forms often become more 
important than the ostensible content of beliefs. Bourdieu’ s hexis parallels this emphasis 
on the importance placed upon structuring systems, specifically the body. It also 
illuminates how focusing upon the form rather than the explicit content can reveal how 
whole belief systems have been inculcated without ever having to be formally articulated. 
This essay will attempt to articulate a comprehensive theology of capitalism that, despite 
its content having never been explicitly delineated, has been expressed through 
capitalism’ s structuring effects. While neither Miller nor Bourdieu have dealt with quite 
the same subject matter of this thesis, their theoretical foundation is central to my 
argument. 
If the above sources are vital for the theoretical framework of this thesis, there are 
others who have dealt more closely with similar subject matter. For example, economist 
Deirdre McCloskey has provided invaluable works that chip away at the façade of 
economic’ s value-neutral status. Her work, The Rhetoric of Economics, for example, 
takes up the task of revealing how convincing economic work is contingent more upon 
the argument’ s rhetoric, rather than its mathematical neatness. McCloskey has also begun 
a multi-volume project dealing with capitalism’ s positive effects beyond just the realm of 
economics. The Bourgeois Virtues, the first volume in this growing set, argues that 
capitalism has helped to instill virtues in society. McCloskey’ s playful style and wit is 
evident as she points out economic’ s and theology’ s similarity saying that, “[e]conomics 
is the doppleganger of theology.”28  
                                                 
28Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 196.   
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The most notable other works that have pointed to this resemblance between 
economics and theology are by Robert Nelson, Reaching for Heaven on Earth and 
Economics as Religion. In the first of his works, Nelson, a formally trained economist, 
attempts to show that not only have modern economic debates come to resemble 
theological debates, but that many of the modern economic debates mirror theological 
debates from Christian history. He posits that the foundational disagreements that have 
led to theological disputes are also at the center of current economic arguments. This 
work thus traces two lineages: one from Aristotle to Adam Smith and John Maynard 
Keynes and the other from Plato to Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx, with many more 
along the way. Smith and Keynes in this sense become a modern incarnation of the 
theological beliefs, which are deeply seated in the Roman (Catholic) tradition, while 
those such as Spencer and Marx represent a Protestant theological perspective.29  
Nelson’ s second work Economics as Religion focuses more closely upon the 
economists of the twentieth century, particularly Paul Samuelson as well as the Chicago 
School. At its root Nelson argues that economics has its own “powerful value system.”30 
He points, for example, to a new set of Ten Commandments established by the Chicago 
School. The values drawn out by the economists are measured by the highest of all 
economic values, efficiency. The primary social role of economists then, according to 
                                                 
29Nelson provides charts summarizing the lineages of what he calls the Roman and Protestant 
traditions; see Robert H. Nelson, Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The Theological Meaning of Economics 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1991), 20-1. 
30Robert H. Nelson, Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 50. 
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Nelson, is “as preachers of a religion with the special character that it acts to uphold the 
normative foundation required for a rapidly growing modern economy.”31  
Nelson, however, never adequately addresses what religion is, or even what it 
does. My own tack throughout this thesis begins with this task and then, necessarily, 
traverses a different line of argumentation, though I share the sentiments of McCloskey, 
Nelson, and others that economics is undeniably theology. Chapter one will embark on 
the initial task of the present project, which is to establish a more defined comparison 
between economics and religion.  
The fields of religion and economics are both enormous, thus any comparison of 
them must be limited aggressively in its scope of time, place, etc. This issue will be 
resolved by homing in on the work of one individual in both fields, that is Peter Berger. 
His sociological work within the Weberian tradition has provided his corpus with the 
breadth of dealing sociologically with both economics and religion in a way that makes it 
possible to compare the two. The comparison will also include a refinement and further 
clarification of the definition of religion that has already been started. 
Berger will thus be a foundational figure throughout the entirety of the thesis. It 
may be odd that in a thesis dealing with religion and economics the key figure is a 
sociologist. However, what makes Berger invaluable is that he has engaged both of these 
fields through the same lens, that of a sociologist. He has approached the two fields with 
the same methodologies attempting to garner similar insights from both. His work allows 
for a single method and viewpoint from which to begin comparing these different fields. 
                                                 
31Ibid., 8.  
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Beginning with either a theologian or an economist would give one discipline home field 
advantage. Utilizing Berger avoids this. 
 
 
III. Whose Theology? 
Berger’ s economic analyses, as mentioned above, hinge significantly on 
differentiation between socialist and capitalist economic systems. Berger himself holds a 
mixed opinion on whether economics resembles religion or not. His opinion is contingent 
upon whether it is a socialist or capitalist system. Socialism, according to Berger, can be 
easily compared to religion. Capitalism, on the other hand, is firmly established in the 
value-neutral domain. The comparisons of fields in chapter one will thus take Berger to 
task, arguing that it is not just one strand of economics, namely socialism, but all of 
economics, including capitalism, that are strikingly similar to religion.  
The aim of the remainder of the thesis will be to support this critique of Berger 
that capitalism functions similarly to religion. Focusing on capitalism should not be 
misinterpreted as viewing socialism as dissimilar from religion, and as a result, 
suggesting that socialism is a better economic system than capitalism. The same 
argument that is made about capitalism could apply to socialism. Indeed, Berger has 
made similar arguments elsewhere.32 
The arguments of chapters two, three, and four, in fact, borrow from one specific 
location where Berger does describe socialism as a secularized theology. Berger depicts 
how a Christian theological schema could be imposed upon socialist (specifically Marxist 
                                                 
32Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 197, 199; Peter L. Berger, “The Socialist Myth,” Public Interest 
44 (Summer 1976): 8-9.   
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socialism) beliefs. He briefly develops some of these thoughts with comparisons to 
Christian theological tenets:  
Marxism can also be understood as a peculiar secularized version of the classical 
biblical view of history as consisting of a fall from grace, a set of redemptive 
events embodied in a human community, and as leading up to a great climax that 
will bring ordinary history to an end. Marxism has substituted private property 
and its ‘alienations’  for original sin, the revolutionary process for the kairoi of 
God’ s redemptive activity, the proletariat (and later, with Lenin, the party as the 
‘vanguard of the proletariat’ ) for the church, and the attainment of true 
communism of the advent of the Kingdom of God.33   
 
What Berger has done in this fascinating excerpt is to establish the bare bones of a 
systematic theology of socialism. The claims made in his passage would likely be widely 
accepted leaving no need to expand on his theology of socialism. Rather, in challenging 
the dichotomy between economics as purely factual from the value-laden realms of 
religion and theology, the final three chapters of the thesis will establish a systematic 
theology of capitalism. For even Berger, who acknowledges socialism’ s value-laden 
theology, adamantly maintains capitalism as a system of facts. Each of these chapters will 
deal with a different tenet of a systematic theology.  
The systematic theology of capitalism will be based on a comparison to a 
Christian theology. I say “a” Christian theology in acknowledgement of the fact that there 
is no single Christian theology. One cannot simply refer to “the” Christian theology as if 
there is one monolithic theology upon which all Christians agree. So, to which Christian 
theology am I referring throughout this thesis?  
I have chosen not to use just one single individual’ s theology. Though that 
provides clear distinctions and boundaries, it did not seem to be the most effective route 
for this project. I have attempted rather, in my selection of both Christian theology and 
                                                 
33Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 197.  
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economic literature, to cast my net broadly. This was done so that the conclusions drawn 
could not be written off as the result of giving inordinate focus to one theologian, or one 
strain of economics. One can always find outliers in any field of study and command that 
they bow to one’ s own exegetical wishes. I have attempted to avoid this possibility by not 
narrowing in on one particular theologian. Instead, I have attempted to capture the ethos 
of a classical Christian theology. The word “classical” is used in the sense of a shared 
metanarrative that encapsulates the majority of Christendom. I refrain from demanding 
significant detail from this Christian theology, focusing far more on the broad strokes that 
are contained within a standard narrative.34  
Thus, while the doctrinal tenets of Christianity that are espoused here may not be 
a perfect representation of particular strands of Christendom, it encapsulates the basic 
Christian narrative of history. Even as Berger is criticizing Marxism for its similarity to a 
secularized Christianity, he acknowledges the presence of this shared Christian narrative. 
He describes Marxism as a “secularized version of the classical biblical view of 
history.”35 Berger, who as a sociologist is keenly aware of the diversity within 
Christendom, recognizes the overarching ethos of a classical Christian narrative. He 
unpacks this narrative by pointing to three primary aspects: “a fall from grace, a set of 
redemptive events embodied in a human community, and… a great climax that will bring 
ordinary history to an end.”36  
                                                 
34There are still nevertheless some doctrinal tenets to which there exist criticisms or strong 
disagreements. I attempt to acknowledge these criticisms throughout the project as they come up but refrain 
from the task of meting out the merits of each view.   
35Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 197; emphasis added.  
36Ibid.   
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These three portions of this classical Christian narrative correspond to each of 
three theological doctrines that will be explored in the chapters two, three, and four. 
Chapter two will engage with an origins narrative in general which includes a “fall from 
grace.” Chapter three will focus on the “great climax” engaging with the task of 
eschatology. The final chapter will be described as a pneumatology and will deal 
primarily with the community shaped by the early church. A full explanation of the term 
pneumatology will be provided at the beginning of chapter four. 
While relating Christian theology to Berger’ s description of the overarching 
Christian narrative may seem arbitrary, I believe that it is effective to connect economic 
theology to this foundational Christian narrative. It was these connections that drove 
Berger to view Marxist socialism as a secularized religion. Focusing on the same 
narrative provides the ability to pull from a broad swath of the Christian tradition, rather 
than being overly narrow in focus. 
For some, these chapters may appear to be out of order. After all, eschatology 
should come at the end, right? The ordering of these chapters, while unusual, is 
appropriate given the larger argument being made. Chapters two and three will uncover 
numerous similarities between economics and these Christian narratives. These chapters 
will establish that not only do capitalism and Christianity both have theologies but that 
they are also similar. Since all of the economists used in this project are from the Western 
world, it could be suggested that the similarities between the values undergirding 
economics and Christianity is related to the pervasive role of Christianity in shaping the 
modern West. Thus the final chapter, focusing on a pneumatology, will seek to highlight 
contrasts between the theology of capitalism and Christianity. Thus it will be revealed 
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that capitalism and Christianity are instituting their own overarching narratives, which at 
times overlap, but at times diverge and conflict with each other. In this fashion, the final 
chapter concludes the argument as a whole, though it causes the theological doctrines to 
be ordered unusually. The argument will be clear though. Capitalism functions similar to 
religion and in doing so promulgates a theology. That theology is not simply a parroted 
version of Christianity’ s theology; rather, both capitalism and Christianity are originators 
of unique theologies and narratives that are formidable in the modern West. 
 
 
IV. Which Economics? 
One more important methodological note must be made before moving to the 
argument’ s core as outlined above. Just as an overly narrow focus on one Christian 
theology would not be beneficial, neither would a narrow sampling of economic literature 
be best suited for this paper. Due to this, three “schools” of economics that span a period 
of over two hundred years and include both Europeans and Americans will be relied upon 
throughout the paper.37 These schools, which will be called “classical,” “progressive,” 
and “Chicago,” provide a broad swath of capitalist theory. Vehement disagreements exist 
between these schools on some points, while in other areas they find common ground. 
Each school, however, falls under the umbrella of capitalism based upon a definition 
provided by Berger. Berger describes capitalism as “production for a market by 
enterprising individuals or combines with the purpose of making a profit.” This is 
                                                 
37Undoubtedly, despite attempting to engage a broad amount of economists, the schools 
represented are solely comprised of those from Europe and the United States. A study in the interaction of 
economic theories of Europe and the United States to those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and their 
relationship to different theological tenets would be fascinating given the global economic environment that 
is developing. However, despite this, the focus of this thesis has been limited to Western economists due to 
limitations in space.  
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distinguished from socialism where “private ownership is to be replaced by public 
ownership and market mechanisms by (putatively more equitable) mechanisms of 
political allocations.” The distinction between economic systems is based upon whether 
“economic processes are to be governed by market mechanisms or by mechanisms of 
political allocation.”38 
In any field it is difficult to classify the end of one school of thought from the 
beginning of another. There are never sharp breaks in thinking that just occur overnight. 
They are gradual and ill-defined. The field of economics is not unique in this respect. The 
divisions of different schools of economists often serve as a function of “historiography” 
where economists make subtle statements regarding certain theorists through their 
classifications. The categorization of schools in this paper is far more pragmatic. The 
schools selected simply attempt to narrow who will serve as interlocutors while 
maintaining engagement with a broad sampling of economists. The classification of these 
three schools then should not be viewed as a subtle theoretical statement about the history 
of economic thought. Nor should these three schools be viewed as entirely inclusive of 
every significant economic school of thought in the past two hundred plus years. These 
three schools serve as a diverse sampling from this enormous field. 
The classical school will focus particularly on Adam Smith. While there may be 
brief mentions of his contemporaries, Smith has provided a large enough corpus to stand 
on his own. Smith is an ideal example of the slow evolution of thought that is unfolding 
in history. Even though his Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is typically viewed as a 
landmark book in the field of economics, Robert Heilbroner notes that there is nothing 
                                                 
38Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 19-20.  
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truly “original” in Smith’ s work. It is rather a compendium of thoughts drawn from the 
all of the thinkers of his time.39  In fact, some categorizations of the classical school of 
economics place Adam Smith toward the latter half of the period.40 While the classical 
era is not fully encapsulated by Smith’ s work, for the purpose of this essay, Smith 
provides an adequate sampling of the era. 
While the second and third schools utilized in this thesis both fall in the twentieth 
century, important economic developments occurred in the nineteenth century. Again, 
while there is controversy about classification, there is undoubtedly a notable ethos that 
marks the economists of the mid- to late-nineteenth century and sets the stage for the 
twentieth century. Jürg Niehans marks the end of the classical era in 1830, beginning 
what he calls the marginalist era that runs through 1930. This period was epitomized by 
an “optimization calculus” and an increased mathematization of the economic field in 
general.41  
Other historians have categorized this time period differently. Mark Perham and 
Charles R. McCann Jr., for example, suggest that the classical era stretched until 1870 (a 
more common view) and was followed by the neo-classical school that continued through 
                                                 
39Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great 
Economic Thinkers, 7th rev. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 51. Heilbroner suggests that Smith’ s 
observations are reliant upon John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, and others.  
40Jürg Niehans, A History of Economic Theory: Classic Contributions, 1720-1980 (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1990), v. Jürg Niehans notes that his classification of the classical era from 
1680-1830 falls in line with Karl Marx’ s vision of the classical era. More commonly the classical era has 
been viewed to begin with Adam Smith and continue until 1870. Notably, Joseph Schumpeter omitted 
Adam Smith completely from the classical period, beginning the period instead around 1790; see Niehans, 
A History of Economic Theory, 10. 
41Niehans, A History of Economic Theory, 160. Weber was writing during the same period of 
time. His emphasis upon marginal utility and rational calculation fits well.  
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John Maynard Keynes.42 Despite the different classification, Perlman and McCann also 
note the shift to more empirically driven analysis. Thus, the nineteenth century was 
crucial for establishing economics upon the numerical modern fact. 
Both the progressive school, and the Chicago School, are deeply indebted to this 
increased empirical methodology. The progressives, for instance, would actually fall in 
the latter portion of time that Perlman and McCann classify as neo-classical. Niehans, on 
the other hand, marks the 1930s as the beginning of what he calls the “Model-Building” 
era, which is typified by an even further modern bent toward not only empirical analysis 
but also “prov[ing] theorems.”43 In either case, the mathematical foundation is central to 
the progressive school.  
The other crucial feature of those within the progressive school is their suggestion 
that more government intervention is needed in the market system in order to ensure that 
it runs smoothly. It is by no means a market that is centrally controlled, but rather, the 
government can aid the market to ensure that it runs at fully capacity. When it is at full 
capacity, a laissez-faire approach can be reinstituted. This combination of government 
course correction without entire government control is what Paul Samuelson called the 
“neoclassical synthesis.”44 The two primary economists that will be exemplary of the 
progressive school are John Maynard Keynes and Paul Samuelson. Keynes was a 
dominant figure in economics especially during the interwar period in Britain. Samuelson 
was an American who was perhaps the most influential economists during the 1940s and 
                                                 
42Mark Perlman and Charles R. McCann Jr., The Pillars of Economic Understanding: Ideas and 
Traditions (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), xii-xiii. 
43Niehans, A History of Economic Theory, 314.  
44Ibid., 316.  
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1950s. His introductory textbook has become a mainstay to the field and has now 
appeared in nineteen editions. Again, while two figures cannot represent an entire school 
of thought, Keynes and Samuelson will serve as sampling of the progressive school. 
The final school of economics is the Chicago school. The school of Chicago 
represents the locus of thinkers who have been affiliated with the economics department 
at the University of Chicago, which since the 1960s has become the “focal point for 
American economics.”45 The primary representatives of Chicago that will be used in this 
thesis are Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and Richard Posner. Even amidst the Chicago 
school there are disagreements. On the whole, however, their theories are characterized 
by similarities with each other and are portrayed by the sampling selected.  
While Niehans includes certain members of the Chicago school (Kenneth Arrow 
and Milton Friedman) in the same Model-Building era in which he places Keynes and 
Samuelson, the Chicago school also provides a useful contrast to the progressives. 
Though these two schools are chronologically much closer than the classical school, what 
makes these two schools diverse, and thus useful for this analysis, is their opposition to 
each other with regard to government policy. The progressives could be labeled as 
proponents of the social welfare state, advocating government influence over the 
economy. The Chicago school represents a community committed to a market free from 
government interference. Using these two schools gives further breadth to the economists 
engaged. It cannot be stated that the findings of theological underpinnings in each of 
these three schools represents a selection of one-sided theorists who all agree with each 
other. The close chronological proximity but policy disagreements between these last two 
                                                 
45Nelson, Economics as Religion, 17.  
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schools provides heightened contrasts that helps establish a rounded sampling of 
economists represented by the three schools of economics used in this paper. 
This brief outlining of the different schools of economics will make it possible to 
reference each throughout the entirety of this work with a degree of clarity of who is 
being referenced. These schools should aid in narrowing the scope of economists, while 
still maintaining adequate breadth. With any classification, the grouping may seem 
arbitrary at points, however, the similarities within schools and the distinctions between 
them mark meaningful differences that warrant the divisions being made.  
 
 
V. The Opening Bell 
 
The bell is tolling. It is the sound of beginnings. It is the resonant bell that calls 
members of the Christian community to their weekly service. One can imagine a 
charismatic meeting that follows. As the service commences, members shoot to their feet. 
Eyes are lifted heavenward and their hands are stretched in the same direction. The noise 
of corporate shouting fills the room as there is a palpable spirit of expectancy and 
excitement. This liturgy however is not one that takes place on Sundays. It is a weekday 
gathering. This is the church of Wall Street.  
The divide between the world of economics and the world of religion is far 
thinner than has been widely held. The similarities, however, run much deeper than just a 
description of Wall Street that highlights its own liturgical elements. This thesis attempts 
to provide a detailed comparison revealing that the modern distinction between facts and 
values that divides religion and economics is unfounded. Despite economic’ s claim to 
value-neutrality it has underlying it a full-blown theology. Resting upon the work of Peter 
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Berger, economics and religion will be compared, revealing the similarities in their social 
functions. A major function of both of these is their establishment of theologies. Thus, a 
theology of capitalism, which is typically left unspoken, will be articulated below. The 
bell is now chiming at my workstation, which means that the time for introductions has 
passed. The time to embark upon the endeavor laid out above is here. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE MYTH OF CAPITALISM 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The primary task of this initial chapter is to provide a structure for understanding 
both religion and economics in a way that makes the comparison of the two useful and 
meaningful. While depicting Wall Street as resembling church toys at the thin veil 
separating the two fields, some heavy lifting is required in order to provide a theoretical 
argument that the two fields really are similar. Moving past vagaries, this chapter will 
focus on Peter Berger’ s analysis of both economics and religions. His sociological 
approach to both makes for neat comparisons that uncover true similarities.  
In the introduction, I briefly explained a working definition of religion that hinged 
upon Weber’ s value-rational social actions. This chapter will identify specific actions of 
religion that have value-laden social functions. The first section will examine the social 
function of legitimating as described by Berger. This legitimating function has been 
classically performed by religion, but the first section will explore ways that capitalism 
performs the same function. Thus the definition of religion will continue to be clarified 
while comparing capitalism to religion.  
The second section will carry out these same two tasks of clarifying the definition 
of religion and drawing a comparison to capitalism. The major social-utility, or social 
function, of religion focused upon in the second section will be grounded in the concept 
of myth elucidated by Georges Sorel. The concept of myth is attached very closely with 
religion and is relied upon frequently by Berger. Investigating whether capitalism can be 
depicted as a Sorelian myth will provide another parallel of capitalism to religion.  
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With a clearer picture of religion’ s social role emerging from the first two 
sections, the final section will relate the definition of theology to religion’ s social 
functions. This section will serve as a capstone for this chapter as it will reveal how the 
definition of theology, as used throughout this thesis, closely relates to the arguments 
made in the first two sections of this chapter. It will set the stage for the remaining 
chapters of the project that will engage in constructing different portions of a theology of 
capitalism. This chapter thus creates the framework in which the following chapters fit. 
 
 
II. Legitimating the World 
 
In a discussion on the definition of religion, Berger indicates his reliance upon 
Rudolf Otto’ s “category of the sacred.”46 Berger distinguishes this from a definition 
provided by Thomas Luckmann, who co-authored a book with Berger. Luckmann defines 
religion as “the capacity of the human organism to transcend its biological nature through 
the construction of objective, morally binding, all-embracing universes of meaning.”47 
While undoubtedly Berger would agree with Luckmann that religion does this, Berger 
does not see this process of cosmization as enough to warrant the title of religion. It must 
contain a “sacred mode,” otherwise a definition akin to Luckmann’ s is unhelpful as it 
“equates religion with the human tout court.”48  
What is clear from these aspects of Berger’ s definition of religion is that finding 
an adequate definition of religion that satisfies everyone is nearly impossible. Thus, 
                                                 
46Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1969), 177.  
47Ibid., 176.  
48Ibid., 25, 177.  
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instead of delving into the (seemingly unresolvable) debate as to what religion is, this 
study will continue to focus on what religion does. By focusing on this latter topic, 
Berger and Luckmann were able to sidestep their own definitional differences in co-
writing The Social Construction of Reality. This essay too attempts to establish specific 
functions of religion, or its social-utilities, regardless of their “sacredness.” The first 
crucial function of religion to be examined then is its role as a form of legitimation.  
The world presents itself as “a taken-for-granted ‘reality,’ ” or a coherent system, 
according to Luckmann and Berger.49 However, the process by which that reality comes 
to exist as self-evident is more complicated. The coherent systems of the world, or social 
orders, do not exist on their own. Instead, these social orders are “a human product,” 
which hold no special ontological status but are “produced by man in the course of his 
ongoing externalization.”50 As these social orders, or institutions, are externalized, they 
are passed down and transmitted to new generations. The distance between the original 
externalization and the institutionalized, or established order, which is passed down 
“thickens” or “hardens” the perceived objectivity of these institutions.51 The institutional 
world, through this process of objectivation, is now “experienced as an objective 
reality.”52 The origins of the social order, which were constructed through the 
externalization of meanings by previous generations, become naturalized, or accepted as 
the natural order of things. 
                                                 
49Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 3.  
50Ibid., 49.  
51Ibid., 56.  
52Ibid.  
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The process, or cycle, of social construction is concluded as the world that has 
been externalized and then objectivated is finally internalized. When the “taken-for-
granted quality is internalized,” any attempt to deny these objectivated institutional 
programs would result in the denial of “being itself.”53 Internalization, thus, completes 
the cycle and ensures it success. Berger, for example, points to the way in which sexual 
mores in a society are externalized. As these mores are projected outward and become 
widely accepted they are objectivated. In turn, they are internalized. At this stage those 
standards become more than just utilitarian and moral guidance but rather “an inevitable 
expression of ‘human nature.’ ”54 Sexual behaviors that transgress societal norms are 
shocking, not only because they may be “morally reprehensible,” but, even more 
importantly, because they challenge the existing structured reality. 
There is a clear point of connection here between Berger’ s theory and that of 
Pierre Bourdieu. Briefly considering some of the nuances of Bourdieu’ s theory will 
further illuminate Berger’ s. Bourdieu states that “[e]very established order tends to 
produce… the naturalization of its own arbitrariness.”55 For Bourdieu this process and 
self-evident aura of the world is a crucial component in the ability of the dominant in 
society to maintain their dominance.56 The dominant need not even rationalize their 
privileged status; it is simply assumed to be the natural order. Thus, the three-step cycle 
of externalization, objectivation, and internalization delineated by Berger parallels the 
process found in Bourdieu’ s habitus where “structured structures [are] predisposed to 
                                                 
53Berger, Sacred Canopy, 24.  
54Ibid.  
55Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 164.  
56Ibid., 165.  
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function as structuring structures.”57 While the habitus has been socially created, or 
structured, it imposes an objective, or natural, reality upon those within it that has a 
structuring effect.  
The naturalization of reality can be reaffirmed in the social order through both 
articulated and unarticulated means. Bourdieu describes the naturalization of the limits of 
reality with the term doxa.58 Doxa refers to an established social order and limits that are 
collectively adhered to despite having never been articulated. Thus “what is essential 
goes without saying because it comes without saying.”59 There is a natural order to the 
world that remains above questioning, and thus, need not even be articulated. Berger 
describes this unarticulated naturalization as self-legitimation (the first of four levels of 
legitimation that he presents). This occurs when “the facticity of the social world” needs 
no further justification.60 
Both Bourdieu and Berger recognize, however, that this unarticulated social order 
will at some point be challenged, and the support for the naturalization can no longer 
remain in its unarticulated form. The structure of the social order must be explicitly 
explained and justified. Bourdieu distinguishes unarticulated legitimations, doxa, from 
articulated legitimations, which he calls orthodoxy.61 While Bourdieu lumps all 
articulated legitimations into this one category of orthodoxy, Berger describes three 
different articulated levels of legitimation that go beyond the first, unarticulated level of 
                                                 
57Ibid., 72.  
58Ibid., 164. 
59Ibid., 167.  
60Berger, Sacred Canopy, 31.  
61Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 168.  
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legitimation. The most basic, articulated level, is comprised of “proverbs, moral maxims 
and traditional wisdom.”62 When these no longer suffice, then the next two levels of 
legitimation are needed: theories comprised of “specialized bodies of ‘knowledge’ ” and 
the establishment of symbolic universes.63 The symbolic universe serves as an 
interpretative key, or “matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real 
meanings.”64 The rising levels of legitimation are increasingly complex, but each level is 
tasked with the same goal of normalizing the established social order. They become the 
justification for why the world exists as it does in its present state.  
Legitimations, regardless of their complexity, are crucial for their ability to 
execute the process of “world-maintenance.”65 This process of “world-maintenance is 
similar to the function of myths as defined by Bruce Lincoln.66 Lincoln describes the 
authority within a myth to “evoke sentiments out of which society is actively 
constructed.”67 The type of authority described by Lincoln, which can “maintain society 
in its regular and accustomed forms,” is the exact type of authority ascribed to 
                                                 
62Berger, Sacred Canopy, 31.   
63Berger, Sacred Canopy, 32; Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 88.  
64Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 89.  
65Berger, Sacred Canopy, 59.  
66Lincoln describes four genres of narratives that draw out the importance of legitimations. 
Lincoln examines fables, legends, histories, and myths. These four narratives, according to Lincoln, are 
distinguished by the presence, or absence, of three characteristics: truth-claims, credibility, and authority. A 
fable has none of these characteristics, while a myth has them all. Legend only has truth-claims, and history 
only has truth-claims and credibility; see Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: 
Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23.   
67Lincoln, Discourse, 23.  
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legitimations by Berger.68 Legitimations, at any of Berger’ s four levels, display their 
authority by their ability to define and justify the present state of reality. The stability of 
social structures and ability of the world to be accepted as is relies upon these 
legitimations.  
Note how the functions of legitimations and Lincoln’ s category of myth clarify, or 
serve as examples of, the function of religion provided in the introduction. Legitimations 
and Lincoln’ s myth serve as examples of the possible results of an institution that can 
engender specific sets of beliefs that establish how things are valued. Society is thus 
structured, and maintained, through these underlying beliefs.  
Religion, in fact, is one of the principal sources of legitimations, according to 
Berger. Berger sees this legitimating role as one of the primary characteristics of 
religions. In Berger’ s definition of religion he says that it is “the establishment, through 
human activity, of an all-embracing sacred order, that is, of a sacred cosmos that will be 
capable of maintaining itself in the ever-present face of chaos.”69 There are two key 
aspects to this definition. The first crucial aspect is his allusion to the sacred, which since 
it relates most closely to what religion is, rather than what it does, will receive no further 
consideration in this thesis. The second key aspect is the legitimating role of religion, 
which combats chaos in its never-ending project of “world-maintenance.” Legitimations 
provide the underlying values necessary to either form, or to maintain, society in a 
                                                 
68Lincoln, Discourse, 23. The largest distinction between Berger’ s legitimations and Lincoln’ s 
category of myth is that Berger does not demand that legitimations contain the specific characteristics of 
truth-claims or credibility as Lincoln’ s category of myth requires. Rather, the second level of Berger’ s 
legitimations (the first articulated level) that contains proverbs and maxims could also be folklore. Folklore 
need not make any claim to be actual history, nor be considered a credible retelling of history; it only needs 
to be authoritative to function as a legitimation. 
69Berger, Sacred Canopy, 51.  
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specific way. Thus, they imbue certain social structures as good, or desired. Not only is 
the social function of legitimation central for Berger, but this specific social-utility 
connects quite clearly to, and provides further detail about, the social function of religion 
established in the introduction.  
In the midst of thriving theories of secularization, Berger saw legitimation being 
carried out by many institutions other than religion. However, he notes that legitimation 
was “the classical task of religion.”70 Historically, Berger characterizes religion as the 
“most widespread and effective instrumentality of legitimation.”71 Undoubtedly, 
according to this theory of a socially constructed reality, each person individually, and 
society collectively, must justify the structure of their society as well as their place within 
that structure. Whether a person is endowed with a place of power or a place of struggle, 
religion helps to justify both.72  
Religion moves beyond just the justification of social standing, however, 
conjoining it with meaning and significance. Berger, in fact, notes, “religion is the 
audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly significant.”73 
Religion has the ability to harmonize the inner longings of individuals with the outer 
                                                 
70Ibid., 134.  
71Ibid., 32.   
72Berger, Sacred Canopy, 59. This point regarding the social justification echoes Bourdieu’ s 
connection of social justification to theodicies. He claims that “theodicies are always sociodicies”’ ; see 
Pierre Bourdieu, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field,” Comparative Social Research 13 (1991): 
16. Berger and Bourdieu are both influenced by Weber on this point. Weber makes a the statement that 
religious adherents can be taken “as the ideological carriers of the kind of ethical or salvation doctrine 
which rather readily conformed to their social condition”; see Weber, Economy and Society, 512. 
73Berger, Sacred Canopy, 28.  
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structure of the universe in a way that gives the world meaning.74 Encountering the world 
and accepting its reality as both natural and meaningful is a primary effect of religion. 
And while there may be other legitimations, religion provides meaning for the universe as 
a whole and an understanding of why each individual exists in her given place.  
Religion is not the only institution that serves as a major source of legitimation. 
Capitalism performs the same social function. While capitalism provides a very practical 
solution for economic problems, it also provides justification that the “arrangement is 
morally just or proper,” clearly a value-laden conclusion.75 Capitalism is often portrayed 
as devoid of any role in making moral statements, since it is not value-laden, however, a 
closer examination reveals that it does, in fact, provide moral justification for its system. 
One of the ways these moral standards are established in capitalism is through the 
process of naturalization. Berger describes how Adam Smith “believed that the economic 
system he was describing … was, quite simply, the natural ordering of society.”76 Note, 
however, the pattern of life (that contains a moral aspect) that is being naturalized in the 
following famous passage of Smith’ s. Smith frankly asserts that it is not out of the 
“benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest.”77 There is an indirect appeal to moral justification for 
one’ s action in this passage. Indeed, there is no direct justification for why one should be 
more concerned with her own self-interest than for anyone else’ s. Rather the moral 
                                                 
74Ibid., 33.  
75Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 194; Berger is not himself indicating that capitalism is a 
legitimating system in this passage. He is, however, pointing to the importance of moral justification by 
legitimations in general.  
76Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 205.  
77Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003), 23-4.  
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justification of self-interest is made through its naturalization. An economic system based 
upon everyone’ s concern with her own self-interest is morally just because that is the 
natural order of things. Georges Sorel makes this same observation when he says, 
“economists for a long time asserted that the conditions created under the capitalist 
regime of competition are perfectly just, because they result from the natural course of 
things.”78 Capitalism thus naturalizes itself to calm any moral uneasiness with its tenets 
in the same way that religion morally justifies actions. 
Robert H. Nelson describes modern economists (especially those from the 
progressive school) as performing a “priestly” function as they attempt to justify the 
moral acceptance of self-interested behavior in the economic realm, despite is moral 
unjustifiability in other arenas of society.79 Self-interest in the economic arena must be 
naturalized. One way this is done is through the elevation of other “virtues” such as 
efficiency. Efficiency becomes the most valued “good,” and all actions are justified in 
their ability to increase market efficiency. The argument, of course, is that the market is 
most efficient when it runs in the most natural fashion. Thus, efficiency can become a 
moral standard as “that which is good is now what is efficient; conversely, evil is defined 
to be that which is inefficient.”80 The appeal made by capitalism to an established, natural 
order is laced with its own moral code, or value-laden vision of what ends are good. The 
social order (and the morals within it) becomes legitimated based upon the market’ s 
natural order. 
                                                 
78Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth (1906 repr., Glencoe, IL: 
The Free Press, 1950), 43.  
79Robert H. Nelson, Economics as Religion, 9, 51. Nelson refers to this moral conundrum as the 
“market paradox.”  
80Nelson, Economics as Religion, 76.  
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While other examples could be provided of the moral justification of specific 
actions by capitalism, this comparison of capitalism to religion through its role as a 
legitimation must also consider the description that Berger gives to higher-level 
legitimations.81 The third level of legitimation, as mentioned earlier, is one that involves 
the development of “specialized bodies of ‘knowledge.’ ” Economics, especially modern 
economics of the past century, is an erudite field that is nearly impenetrable to those not 
formally trained in it. The use of symbols, equations, and its comparison to physics 
immediately sets economics apart as a specialized field of knowledge.  
The fourth level of legitimations is one that constructs a symbolic universe that 
can serve as a way to understand everything in society. One of the aspects of the 
capitalist market that is highly flaunted is its ability to solve the dilemma of how to value 
seemingly unrelated items. Within a market system, any item can be valued, and thus, 
ultimately compared to any other item. Long notes this particular attribute of capitalism 
as “it can give a value unit to everything, never assuming the incommensurability of 
things.”82 Thus, the entire universe is ordered and structured in a seemingly rational 
fashion that helps maintain its taken-for-grantedness. Capitalism functions perfectly as a 
way of ordering the entire universe. It can thus function at even the highest levels of 
legitimations delineated by Berger. 
                                                 
81Other examples could include the practice of valuing human life based upon an hourly wage. It 
does not seem self-evident that one can value a human life with a monetary unit, yet hourly wages and 
salaries assert and naturalize that reality. Another example is that capitalism’ s markets are touted as the best 
way to allocate scarce resources. However, stating that there are not enough resources to fulfill everyone’ s 
desire makes certain implications regarding human desires. Any claim regarding human desire is far from 
the realm of “objective facts” and undoubtedly dips into the arena of morals. 
82Long, Divine Economy, 29.    
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It is clear at this point that, according to Berger’ s theory, the world needs to be 
legitimated in order to maintain its appearance as an objective reality. And while Berger 
points to religion as one of the original institutions to perform that role, capitalism itself 
functions to legitimate the world in much the same way. However, Berger points in his 
writings, especially on capitalism and socialism, to a specific form of legitimation called 
a myth. A discussion of the characteristics of a myth, which distinguish it from other 
legitimations, followed by a brief discussion of whether capitalism holds these 
characteristics is now in order. 
 
 
III. Mythic Potency 
 
The topic of myth for Berger is most importantly related to socialism.83 In the 
penultimate chapter in The Capitalist Revolution, a book that attempts to empirically 
display the beneficial distinctions of capitalism against socialism, Berger takes up a 
discussion of myths. His argument can be summarized as saying that the “sheer facticity” 
of capitalism’ s success cannot be questioned, and the only reason that socialism has 
maintained its ability to rival capitalism is that it is endowed with a mythic quality, which 
legitimates it, that is entirely absent from capitalism.84 The phrase “sheer facticity” seems 
to reveal that Berger sees capitalism as functioning in an entirely value-neutral realm, and 
                                                 
83The use of myth by Berger seems to undergo some development as he points to the “myth of 
growth” and the “myth of revolution” found in capitalism and socialism, respectively; see Peter L. Berger, 
Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1974), xi-xii. His 
article, two years later, focuses on the specific characteristics of socialism that endow it with a special 
mythic potency; see Berger, “Socialist Myth,” 1-16. He builds upon this latter representation of myth as 
ideally suited for the system of socialism in The Capitalist Revolution in 1986, where it is utilized with its 
most significance; see Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 194-209.  
84Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 208. Berger summarizes his position on this point with the 
following two propositions. “Socialism is one of the most powerful myths of the modern era,” and 
“[c]apitalism has an intrinsic incapacity to generate legitimations, and it is particularly deprived of mythic 
potency”; see Berger, Capitalism Revolution, 215. 
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its success can be measured in purely empirical, or factual, fashion.85 Socialism cannot 
stand upon the pure “facts” of its system like capitalism can; its success rather can be 
traced to its ability to use myth as a way of venturing into value-laden realms in order to 
gain support despite its failure in the realm of facts. 
So, just what is this mythic quality that Berger draws from Georges Sorel? Sorel’ s 
discussion of myth is related to the workers’  strikes in the early twentieth century, and he 
says that “[a]s long as there are no myths accepted by the masses, one may go on talking 
of revolts indefinitely, without ever provoking any revolutionary movement.”86 The 
mythic quality of a movement then endows it with something that is supra-rational, or 
beyond rational explanation; it garners a level of sacrificial commitment that provides the 
necessary impetus to incite violence.  
Berger describes socialism as “suffused with values, with moral passion, in many 
cases with profoundly religious hope – in sum, with precisely those characteristics which 
permit speaking of a socialist myth.”87 These values, moral passions, and religious hope 
all seem to establish a connection to something transcendent. In fact, this transcendent 
quality of myths is something that Berger notes, saying that “[f]or Sorel, a myth is any set 
of ideas that infuses transcendent meaning into the lives of men.”88 
                                                 
85This type of empirical measurement would be likely grounded in the same principle of 
“marginal utility” to which Weber referred to in his discussion of instrumentally rational actions. 
Capitalism thus holds its place in a realm of pure facts separate from religion, or even socialism, which is 
heavily value-laden, according to Berger. 
86Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 57.  
87Berger, “The Socialist Myth,” 5.  
88Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, 17.  
45 
There are thus two main characteristics of a myth: its ability to invoke sacrificial 
commitment and an aspect of transcendence. Those two traits lead to the third key 
characteristic. Myths cannot be disconfirmed or falsified. The archetypal myth is a 
religion that incites extreme commitment and appeals to the transcendent, and as Sorel 
says, “religious convictions are unaffected by criticism.”89 An adherent to any myth then 
is best compared to a religious believer. Following their “conversion” to a myth, they 
cannot be persuaded of its falseness with facts, they can only be “de-converted.”90 Myths 
play an important role for socialism, according to Berger, otherwise socialism would 
have been falsified as a viable economic system much earlier. Despite its “factual” failure 
it is able to invoke belief preventing any “de-conversions.” The category of myth, just as 
legitimations, serves as further specification and clarification of the initial description of 
religion as a value-rational action. Myths create specific transcendent ends that are sought 
after despite the possibility that the commitment to these goals might require sacrifice.  
For Berger there is an unmistakable religious quality to myths, and he does not 
hesitate when describing the socialist myth to depict it as a secular religion.91 The 
description of any institution, movement, or way of thinking under this definition of myth 
thus, necessarily, becomes a comparison to religion. Berger is adamant that socialism 
functions like religion and provides convincing evidence to support his claim. However, 
                                                 
89Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 59.  
90Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 205.  
91Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 197, 199; Berger, “Socialist Myth,” 8-9. Categorizing something 
as a secular religion is somewhat problematic. However, Berger’ s definition of religion helps to unpack this 
concept. As discussed above (pages 33-4), Berger holds that there are institutions that carry out the same 
functions as religion but do so without the “sacred.” The absence of this “sacred” quality is what makes 
causes them to be categorized as secular for Berger. Thus, a secular religion, as it appears Berger is using it, 
is something that is not “sacred,” yet still carries out some identifiable social functions of religion.  
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he is equally resolute that capitalism is void of any mythic potency. It is this second claim 
that must be questioned.  
The remainder of this section will be devoted to depicting capitalism as a myth. 
Capitalism’ s ability to incite deep, or revolutionary, commitment, appeal to 
transcendence, and to avoid disconfirmation will reveal its mythic quality. The depiction 
of capitalism as a myth furthers the comparison of capitalism to religion, which Berger 
considers an archetype of the category of myth. It also reveals how capitalism functions 
to shape desired ends. 
For Sorel, and subsequently Berger, socialism has a quality about it that can 
inspire people to move from discontent to revolution. This commitment can cause 
communities to rise up and resort to violence. And while capitalism is often pictured as 
the status quo against which socialists revolt, Berger himself challenges this passive 
description of capitalism. The phrase “capitalist revolution” implies dynamism and 
transformation, according to Berger.92 Adherents to capitalism, in this light, are 
committed to their own “revolution.”93 Daniel Bell Jr. points to the revolutionary aspect 
of capitalism saying,  
Berger and those who share his opinion of capitalism are absolutely right: 
capitalism does indeed mark a cataclysmic change, a revolution, that reaches far 
beyond the narrowly economic. Indeed, capitalism is nothing less than a 
theological revolution, involving radical changes not only in the circulation of 
material things but also in the nature of desire and its relation to its supernatural 
(spiritual, theological) end.94  
                                                 
92Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 3.  
93Arguing that one’ s commitment to capitalism is not sacrificial seems to imply that it is not 
sacrificial because capitalism will undoubtedly improve one’ s life, unlike socialism, which will require 
sacrifice but give nothing in return. This, however, is merely begging the question. The only distinction 
between the commitment to socialism and capitalism in this line of reasoning is the presumed success of 
one over the other.  
94Bell, Economy of Desire, 84.  
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There is also a sacrificial component required in this capitalist revolution. A direct 
example of the sacrificial requirement comes in Berger’ s Pyramid of Sacrifice, which is 
based upon the premise that both socialism and capitalism present theories of 
development for underdeveloped countries that call upon people to suffer in hopes of 
eventual improvement.95 Capitalism’ s “myth of growth” requires the loss, or sacrifice, of 
an entire generation before improvements will be seen. In his later works, which are more 
poignantly critical of socialism, Berger avoids this point that capitalism requires the same 
degree of sacrifice and commitment as socialism, however, he does not suggest that it is 
not still true.  
The second key characteristic of capitalism’ s mythic potency is its appeal to 
transcendence. Transcendence explains the world in a way “that den[ies] its human 
production,” as Berger says that “[t]he fundamental ‘recipe’  of religious legitimation is 
the transformation of human products into supra- or non-human facticities.”96 There is 
clearly a supra-human facticity within capitalism that even Berger recognizes. Consider 
his comment on Smith’ s invisible hand, “I think the phrase [invisible hand] indicates an 
important feature of capitalism: once established, it appears to ‘run’  on its own, following 
its own inherent logic, like an engine that has been turned on; very often it is difficult for 
the people who are supposed to be in the charge of it to control it or even understand 
it.”97  
                                                 
95Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, 8.  
96Berger, Sacred Canopy, 89.  
97Peter L. Berger, “The Serendipity of Liberties,” in The Structure of Freedom: Correlations, 
Causes, and Cautions, ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1991), 8.   
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The invisible hand, as described by Smith, is able to ensure the best for society as 
a whole, something that surely every individual wants, but the invisible hand, or markets, 
can do so without any person having to consciously concern herself with the task. Berger 
here is recognizing not only the transcendent capabilities of the invisible hand but also 
that it works in a fashion that is at times beyond human control or understanding. Society 
is thus better off if controlled by the invisible hand of this transcendent figure than if left 
in the hands of the individual members of society.  
The invisible hand, the enduring image of capitalist markets, exists outside and 
beyond the human. It transcends the entire social order, structuring it in a way that is not 
humanly possible. Attempts to systematically depict the workings of the invisible hand 
lead to descriptions of the “immutable laws” of the free market. The term “immutable 
laws” carries with it a transcendent aura. The invisible hand is thus depicted as a new 
branch of “mathematical physics.” This “axiomated, mathematical political economy” is 
described with ahistoric and decontextualized “laws” that exist outside and beyond 
human control.98  
Economic laws, which are an attempt to understand the workings of the 
transcendent market, are comparable to Mircea Eliade’ s attempt to compare religious 
practices from a broad array of geographically and temporally diverse practices in order 
to find an ahistorical and decontextualized aspect. Eliade posited that what is uniquely 
religious, or sacred, transcends any specific contexualization.99 Likewise, the market 
                                                 
98Duncan K. Foley, Adam’ s Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 157.  
99Consider, for example, one of Eliade’ s discussions of the sacred; see Mircea Eliade, Patterns in 
Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1968), 1-4.  
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transcends any specific space or time. Its laws are immutable, which endows it with a 
unique ontological status that supersedes humanity. The transcendent characteristic of 
capitalism then is evident, and with its appeal to this authority from above comes the 
third trait of a myth, its evasion of falsification. 
The fact that economists are attempting to articulate the laws of the market as if 
the market exists inherently apart from human participation leaves open the possibility 
that any economic “law” that is proven wrong can simply be dismissed as an inaccurate 
description of the market. The assumption that the market, or invisible hand, exists 
outside of human control means that the failure of any economist can be viewed as the 
inability to encapsulate and render accurately the market power from on high. There is no 
process by which one can show that the market does not work.  
The result of this is that capitalism, with its ability to eschew any role of humanity 
in its construction, becomes naturalized and taken-for-granted. Its naturalization is so 
successful that it becomes endowed “with the aura of ‘natural laws,’ ” and is studied as an 
attempt to understand the rationale of the world.100 Its denial of the role of humanity in its 
construction places capitalism’ s invisible hand on an ontologically unique plane of 
existence that transcends humanity. This transcendent being is capable of bestowing 
blessings upon all of society without any individual’ s effort in aiding that task. 
Capitalism’ s transcendent system has succeeded in both engendering strong commitment 
and maintaining an air of unfalsifiability.  
In light of these three attributes contained by capitalism, Berger’ s claim that 
capitalism is devoid of any mythic quality falls flat, and his depiction of socialism as a 
                                                 
100Foley, Adam’ s Fallacy, 157.  
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secularized religion due to its mythic-potency seems apt for capitalism as well. This 
present discussion clearly displays that capitalism is capable of performing the same 
legitimizing and mythic tasks as religion. What is more, is that the mythic qualities, 
particularly of transcendence, reveal that capitalism mirrors religion not only in what it 
does, but also in how it is doing it.  
The previous two sections have outlined a clear comparison between capitalism 
and religion. The first section began by revealing the important social function of 
legitimation, which was classically carried out by religion, but has become a process 
carried out by other social institutions as well, including capitalism. The second section 
compared capitalism to Sorel’ s category of myth. Despite Berger’ s refusal to categorize 
capitalism in this fashion, good reasons for doing so have been offered. With these two 
arguments in place the final section will address how legitimations and myths are linked 
to the use of the term theology throughout this thesis.   
 
 
IV. Myths, Theologies, and Other Narratives 
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis will attempt to articulate the beginnings of a 
systematic theology of capitalism. Before embarking on that task, the connection between 
such a project and the core argument made so far must be clarified. The following 
chapters, while wrapped in theological rhetoric, are foundationally extensions of the 
arguments made in the two previous sections of this chapter. The following explication of 
three theological doctrines of capitalism serves to exemplify the way that capitalism is 
functioning as a legitimating and mythic institution. 
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With that in mind, a concise definition of theology will be offered. My definition 
of theology is one taken from Robert Nelson, who has engaged in describing what he 
calls economic theology. He describes the term by saying, “economic theology offers a 
set of principles and understandings that give meaning to, define a purpose for, and 
significantly frame the perception of human existence.”101 The connection of theology to 
the notion of underlying principles that “define a purpose” or “give meaning” expands 
the idea of theology beyond the tradition task of describing God and mirrors very closely 
the role of legitimations which also provide meaning and significance.  
The focus of each of the following theological doctrines then will not be primarily 
on any particular doctrine of God, but rather, will be based upon an overarching narrative 
that is critical for world-maintenance. These narratives function, as described by Lincoln, 
as formative for the present. They become the foundation for one of religion’ s primary 
functions, giving “purpose” and “meaning” by “attempt[ing] to conceive of the entire 
universe as being humanly significant.”102 Nelson elsewhere says that, “[m]ost people 
have a set of foundational beliefs that both explains the place of human beings in the 
world and guides their lives, and the intellectual articulation of these beliefs in a formal 
way becomes a theology.”103 Economic theology thus is exemplified by its ability to 
produce foundational narratives that structure and guide the lives of individuals. While in 
the field of economics, these beliefs are typically not formally articulated, my articulation 
of those beliefs, or implied narrative, becomes the task of writing an economic theology. 
                                                 
101Nelson, Reaching for Heaven, xxv.  
102Berger, Sacred Canopy, 28.  
103Nelson, New Holy Wars, xi.  
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It will become clear that economic theories are filled with their own implicit attempts to 
construct foundational narratives. These narratives shape the lives of individuals in a 
manner far removed from instrumentally rational actions.  
This explanation of theology should make clear that theology’ s ability to “define” 
and “give meaning” relates closely to Berger’ s suggestions about religion’ s sociological 
functions. My use of theology throughout the rest of my thesis serves as a way of 
describing the arguments earlier in this chapter. For if religion has been classically able to 
shape foundational beliefs through its own theology, the ability of an economic system to 
hold the same measure of sway in establishing formative narratives can also be revealed 
in its own theology. Both religion and economics, as they engage in the task of theology 
then, are carrying out the social functions highlighted above.  
The focus on theology does not shift the attention away from the realm of social-
utility. The theologies that follow avoid hanging upon any category of the “sacred” and 
remain engaged in the social functions of the underlying beliefs and narratives 
constructed. The foundation of each theological tenet then is the formative effect that the 
narrative, or set of beliefs, has on the present reality. Theology, both Christian and 
economic, is socially significant due to its role as both a legitimation and a Sorelian 
myth, which engender beliefs that guide value-rational actions.  
If the argument in the previous two sections is true, that economics performs the 
same function as religion, then based upon the above definition of theology, there must 
be an economic theology. The remaining chapters serve as thorough examples of the 
doctrines of a capitalist theology, which add force to the argument that has already been 
laid out. Economics, including capitalism, does not function in a value-neutral realm, but 
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is actively engaged in espousing its own foundational beliefs that form and guide 
people’ s actions and behaviors. Comparing theological tenets in the following chapters 
from the classical Christian narrative to unarticulated beliefs in economic literature will 
draw out similarities in the narratives revealing an economic theology.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established the theoretical framework for the remainder of the 
project. Through a close examination of Peter Berger, it has drawn a meaningful 
comparison between religion and economics. The focus has landed not upon what 
religion is, but what it does. This chapter added clarity to the working definition provided 
in the introduction that highlighted the fact-value distinction that has caused economics 
and religion to be viewed as qualitatively distinct. In revealing more specific social 
functions of religion it has become clear that capitalism shares many of those same 
functions. Both serve as systems of legitimation as well as Sorelian myths. They serve as 
foundational for the task of meaning-making and “world-maintenance.” This task has 
been connected to the term theology as it will be used for the remainder of this paper.  
The goal of the remaining chapters will be to provide further evidence for the 
analysis in this chapter. It will delve into the literature of the three economic schools in 
order to uncover hidden narratives. Revealing how these narratives serve as implicit 
theologies will corroborate the claims of this chapter that capitalism is carrying out the 
task that was classically held by religions. The success of the comparisons between 
economic theology and Christian theology increase the evidence for the primary claim of 
this thesis. Economics does not function in a value-neutral realm that is distinct from that 
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of religion or theology. Rather economics is value-laden and propagates its own theology, 
even if it remains unarticulated. The following chapters will attempt to articulate this 
theology, or in Bourdieuian terms, shift economic doxa into orthodoxy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A CAPITALIST THEOLOGY OF ORIGINS 
 
 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
“In the beginning…”, “Once upon a time…,” or “Far away and just as long 
ago…,” these famous phrases point to the beginning of particular narratives, important 
foundation narratives, or maybe more accurately etiologies. Of all the narratives that 
influence the present here and now, one of the most powerful is the story of origins. 
These narratives have the power to define where we come from, and thus who we are, 
how we should live, and where we belong. 
This chapter will attempt to peel back the veneer of capitalism’ s objectivity. It 
will show that capitalism’ s assertions about current realities reveal a powerful implied 
origins narrative, or “implicit pedagogy.” While this narrative may not result in an 
intriguing novel, threads woven throughout different theories of capitalism will emerge to 
tell three important stories related to origins: who/what humans are, what kind of world 
humans live in, and how humans relate and interact with that world. 
Charles Long notes that creation narratives “perform an explanatory role in the 
life of the society which believes in them.”104 When capitalism functions as a Sorelian 
myth, it has embedded within it an implicit anthropology and cosmology. These origin 
narratives could also be compared to etiologies, which “explain specific aspects of 
life.”105 Steven L. McKenzie, a biblical scholar, describes the importance of these 
narratives for the identity formation of not only individuals but social groups as a whole. 
                                                 
104Charles Long, Alpha: The Myths of Creation (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1963), 15. 
105David Adams Leeming, Creation Myths of the World: An Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. Vol. 1 (Denver: 
ABC-CLIO, 2010), 327.  
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He describes an etiology as a “story that ‘renders an account’  by offering some 
explanation of the present conditions and circumstances based on the past causes.”106 
What is perhaps obvious at this point is that capitalist theories have not articulated 
any such etiologies. There is, of course, no narrative discussing from where homo 
economicus has come. The importance of these narratives is highlighted by McKenzie’ s 
conclusion about biblical narratives, “[h]istory was theology.”107 Capitalism’ s untold 
history, or origin narrative, is also its untold theology. The contention of this chapter is 
that while capitalists’  theorists have not articulated any origins stories, the “render[ing] of 
account” of the present economic conditions can be traced to common assumptions 
related to theological anthropologies and cosmologies. In Christianity, these theological 
doctrines are explicitly supported by an origin narrative. This study will compare 
capitalism’ s assumed anthropology and cosmology with three central aspects of the 
Christian origin narrative. The similarities between Christianity and capitalism support 
the thesis that capitalism promulgates its own theology, despite not overtly articulating it. 
Three tenets of a theology of origins will be addressed. The first is that 
humankind is consistently and unavoidably self-interested. This foundational 
characteristic of humanity is the starting point for all economic analysis. Second, the 
market serves as an ordering mechanism whereby the world is structured and chaos is 
conquered. While order is aided by humanity’ s reason, it is ultimately a feature of the 
world beyond humanity. Finally, humans are the keepers of the world. The world and 
                                                 
106Steven L. McKenzie, How to Read the Bible: History, Prophecy, Literature – Why Modern 
Readers Need to Know the Difference and What It Means for Faith Today (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 30. Both McKenzie and Leeming point to Rudyard Kipling’ s Just So Stories such as “How 
the Camel Got His Hump” as an example of etiologies.  
107McKenzie, How to Read the Bible, 31.   
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everything in it is theirs. Each of these tenets will be discussed, noting the specific 
nuances within the three schools of capitalism. While the details vary in these schools, 
the overall thrust of these theological doctrines is present in each. 
 
 
II. Homo Economicus: Gravity Makes Humans Fall 
 
The individual can identify himself with a role only insofar as others have 
identified him with it. When roles, and the institutions to which they belong, are 
endowed with cosmic significance, the individual’ s self identification with them 
attains a further dimension… He is whatever society has identified him as by 
virtue of a cosmic truth, as it were, and his social being becomes rooted in the 
sacred reality of the universe. 
— Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy 
 
For Christian theology, the most revealing events of the nature of humanity come 
in the first three chapters of Genesis. The creation of man and woman in chapters one and 
two hold importance, but perhaps what has become even more foundational is the fall of 
humanity in chapter three. Humans no longer have the perfect nature with which they 
were originally created. Rather through the deception of the serpent “humans have fallen 
from a state of grace to one that characterizes the actual world we live in.”108 The 
separation that the human person experiences in her relationship with God is explained in 
Christianity with the fall. 
The original sin of Adam and Eve sets the stage for the entirety of the rest of the 
Christian narrative. In the Gospel of John’ s own “In the beginning…” narrative, John 
connects the sinfulness of humanity to the need for the coming of Jesus (Jn 1:1-18). 
Despite the fact that it was the sin of just two people, theologians suggest that the fall was 
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“a decision in which we are all implicated and which we repeat in our own turn.”109 
Humanity, thus, as it exists, according to Christian theology, is fallen, marred by the stain 
of sin and, thus, is in need of redemption.110  
This anthropology is mirrored in capitalism, which also depicts the current 
human’ s state that cannot be escaped. As the theologian Daniel Bell Jr. says, “[t]he 
capitalist individual is one who always acts to maximize self-interest, whether that is 
profit on what I produce, utility in what I purchase and use, or the satisfaction and 
advancement of my interests through interaction with others.”111 While Christianity has 
pictured humanity as bound by the shackles of sin, economics depicts humanity as 
fettered to an ever-present self-interested nature. 
It is, in fact, capitalism’ s assumption regarding humanity’ s self-interested nature 
that undergirds one of the most common arguments in favor of capitalism over socialism. 
Bell provides a version of that argument stating that, “capitalism is an order that 
recognizes that we are not angels; it recognizes humanity’ s persistent struggle with 
                                                 
109William A. Dyrness, Themes in Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1977), 102.  
110This summary of the fall of humankind has provided a pessimistic view of humanity from this 
narrative. There are examples of Christian theologies that view the fall in a much more positive light. See 
for example, Bernhard Lang’ s article that examines three philosophers (Immanuel Kant, Paul Tillich, and 
Paul Ricœur) who produce two different more positive interpretations. Kant sees the “fall” as humanity’ s 
first step toward development and progress. While Tillich and Ricœur view the initial event of the fall as a 
tragedy, it does open up space for the development of humanities potentialities; see Bernhard Lang, “Three 
Philosophers in Paradise: Kant, Tillich and Ricœur Interpret and Respond to Genesis 3,” Scandinavian 
Journal of the Old Testament 28 no., 2 (2014): 298. Regardless of one’ s pessimism or optimism regarding 
the outcome of the fall on humankind, it is undoubtedly a crucial narrative for constructing one’ s current 
understanding of the state of humanity. Thus whether one interprets the fall positively or negatively is not 
crucial for my argument. What is vital though is that one’ s interpretation, no matter what that is, serves as a 
formative narrative for what it means to be human. 
111Bell, Economy of Desire, 102. Bell develops portions of a theology of capitalism in this work. 
He outlines his own anthropology of Homo economicus, which he says is exemplified by six 
characteristics: individuality, freedom to choose, interest maximizing, insatiable desire, agony of 
competition, and commutative justice.   
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selfishness and greed and so avoids the oppressive and deadly results of naively trusting 
in the virtue of socialist planners.”112 This is not simply a caricature of this argument by a 
theologian. Deirdre McCloskey would agree whole-heartedly, expressing “that socialism 
works for an impossibly ideal Socialist Man” but not for the rest of the world.113 
Thus the current state of Homo economicus, the modern economic person, is 
depicted through the undefeatable characteristic of self-interest. Just as the Christian 
origin narrative points to the fall as an etiology for the current state of humankind, so too 
economics, has its own untold etiology in which humanity has somehow come into its 
own current, unwavering state of self-interest.114 While different schools of economic 
thought have dealt with this nature of Homo economicus differently, all acquiesce to this 
anthropology.  
Classical: The Soul of the Modern Economic Person. Milton Meyers has 
provided an incredible study of the intellectual milieu into which Adam Smith interjected 
his landmark Wealth of Nations in 1776. During Smith’ s time the formal field of 
economics did not exist. Rather, Smith lectured in the fields of moral philosophy, natural 
                                                 
112Bell, Economy of Desire, 91.  
113McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtues, 27.  
114An anecdotal confirmation of economic’ s role in defining the nature of humanity is recounted 
by Peter Berger, who recalls a meeting in which there were sociologists, anthropologists, as well as 
economists discussing the topic of economic culture. Berger recounts how there was rising frustration as 
every statement had to be translated into the language specific to one’ s own field or framework. Finally 
someone asked exasperatedly to the economists, “Don’ t you accept that some people act for reasons of 
conscience?” To this the economists replied, “Oh yes. Conscience – we call it internal price controls”; see 
Berger, Adventures of an Accidental Sociologist, 214. Conscience serves as an example of a determinant of 
value-rational actions whereas price controls hinge upon marginal utility and direct instrumentally rational 
actions. However, the point of the present argument is that the economist’ s view of human nature in this 
anecdote is no less formative for constructing a reality of the present world than the person who believes in 
a conscience. 
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theology, or ethics.115 The pressing issue that consumed moral philosophers and 
theologians was dealing with social welfare in light of Thomas Hobbes’ s assertion in 
Leviathan that self-interest was the most powerful driving force of humanity. This self-
interest is what Meyers refers to as “the soul of modern economic man.”116  
What emerged, however, was not an attempt to rebut the centrality of 
humankind’ s self-interested nature. In fact, comparisons began to emerge to the field of 
physics. Self-interest in the human person was considered a constant in the moral arena, 
equivalent to the constant of gravity in the field of physics.117 Without this self-interested 
bent, the identity of the human person would no longer exist as a modern economic 
person. From this environment arose Smith’ s economic solution to what had previously 
been a moral problem.  
Smith’ s solution hinged upon economic laws that revealed that self-interested 
pursuit actually resulted in a more beneficial result for society as whole than conscious 
attempts to act on behalf of society’ s best interest.  
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, every individual 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as 
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no 
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.118 
                                                 
115Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, 42. It should also be noted that just as the field of 
economics had not developed at this point, neither had anyone utilized the term “capitalism.” Its application 
to Smith is thus anachronistic, but his economic principles undoubtedly laid the groundwork for what 
would later develop into capitalism.  
116Milton L. Meyers, The Soul of Modern Economic Man: Ideas of Self-Interest Thomas Hobbes 
to Adam Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 2.  
117Ibid., 4.  
118Smith, Wealth of the Nations, 572; emphasis added.  
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This solved the tussle between self-interest and broader social welfare. In this 
light, self-interest, according to Meyers, “gradually developed into an acceptable and, 
eventually, into a highly commendable drive for modern man.”119 Smith’ s conclusion 
was thus a clear affirmation of the incontrovertibly self-interested nature of humanity. 
His solution rested on the foundation that the inherent self-interest in Homo economicus 
could not be dampened. Hope for the betterment of society as a whole is only possible 
through acquiescing to the indefatigable reality of humanity’ s self-interest and harnessing 
it to ameliorate everyone.120 
Smith’ s solution contains what Duncan Foley has coined as “Adam’ s Fallacy.” 
This “fallacy” exists in the dichotomy established by Smith, where the economic sphere 
functions according to laws that cause self-interested behavior to be beneficial for the 
whole, but in the rest of life “the pursuit of self-interest is morally problematic.”121 This 
dichotomy is revised by the Chicago school. For now, however, Smith succeeded in 
finding a way for self-interested nature to be commended within the economic arena of 
                                                 
119Meyers, Modern Economic Man, 2.  
120Karl Polanyi suggests that Smith’ s definition of humanity in his Wealth of Nations was perhaps 
more prophetic than descriptive. While related to humanity’ s bent toward trade, rather than self-interest, 
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existence of markets, or, as he put it, upon man’ s ‘propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for 
another.’  This phrase was later to yield the concept of the Economic Man. In retrospect it can be said that 
no misreading of the past ever proved more prophetic of the future. For while up to Adam’ s Smith’ s time 
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had remained, at best, a subordinate feature of economic life, a hundred years later an industrial system was 
in full swing over the major part of the planet which, practically and theoretically, implied that the human 
race was swayed in all its economic activities, if not also in its political, intellectual, and spiritual pursuits, 
by that one particular propensity”; see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar and 
Rhinehart, 1944), 43-4.    
121Foley, Adam’ s Fallacy, xiv.  
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life. Smith’ s theory proves to be an unwavering story establishing a theology of 
humanity. The Wealth of Nations “is a book on economics but it is also a work describing 
human nature.”122 Smith undoubtedly was instituting his own representation of the 
present state of the world, implying his own origins narrative of how it began.  
Progressives: The Tyranny Continues. The dichotomy caused by “Adam’ s 
Fallacy” reached into the twentieth century and became a crucial issue with which 
economists had to deal. While Foley called this problem “Adam’ s Fallacy,” Robert 
Nelson has referred to this same problem as the “market paradox.” The paradox was quite 
simply that while it was morally reprehensible to act in an overtly self-interested manner 
in other arenas of life, within the market, such behavior was encouraged for the 
betterment of everyone. Twentieth century economists, according to Nelson, filled their 
most significant social role by attempting to justify and assuage guilt for the pursuit of 
self-interest in economic domains, while tightly restraining similar behavior in other 
arenas of life.123 
The pursuit of self-interest was undoubtedly heightened, however, in the twentieth 
century as the human person was thought of more and more as not only pursuing his own 
interests but maximizing his interests. McCloskey actually states that, “Economic Man is 
not a Smithian character. It was later economists, especially Paul Samuelson, who 
reduced economics to the reasoning of a constrained maximizer, Seeking Man.”124 Self-
                                                 
122Meyers, Modern Economic Man, 110.  
123Nelson, Economics as Religion, 8-9.  
124Deirdre McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1998), 95. McCloskey also discusses Ronald Coase as a continuation of Samuelson’ s 
thinking in this regard. Coase was, however, an early critic in many regards of the progressive school of 
economics, aligning more with the Chicago school. His description of humankind though follows 
Samuelson’ s portrayal of humanity as interest maximizers as he says, “[t]he consumer [in conventional 
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interest had become embedded in the nature of Homo economicus, and there was no 
question about whether individuals would pursue their own interests. The very nature of 
the being Homo economicus carried with it the assumption that he would attempt to gain 
all he can. Homo economicus’ s interest maximizing, in the early portion of the twentieth 
century, was also evident in the shift of individuals to being primarily consumers. 
Samuelson argued that humanity’ s self-interest was exacerbated by the scarcity of 
material resources. Thus in the struggle to survive, Homo economicus must follow his 
instinct of acting out of self-interest and consuming as many goods as possible as a 
means of survival.125   
A fitting conclusion to a discussion of the progressive anthropology is found in a 
quote by John Maynard Keynes. Keynes claimed that “it is better that a man should 
tyrannise over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens.”126 The human person is 
unable to overcome her nature of self-focus. According to Keynes, the best solution is to 
direct the ever-present self-interest toward its least destructive end. While the picture of 
Homo economicus changed slightly in the progressive era as the focus turned more 
towards her role as a consumer and interest maximizing, the underlying story regarding 
her unrelenting self-interested nature was still ever present in this theological 
anthropology.  
                                                                                                                                                 
economic theory] is not a human being but a consistent set of preferences…”; see Ronald H. Coase, The 
Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3 quoted in Deirdre 
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125Robert H. Nelson, “Economic Religion Versus Christian Values,” Journal of Markets and 
Morality 1, no. 2 (October 1998): 144.  
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Chicago: Economics and Beyond. The continued theological description of 
human nature continues with the Chicago school, which is perhaps the most resolute in 
its depiction of humankind as self-interested. Nelson in fact states that “[a]t the heart of 
the Chicago project is an assumption – an article of faith, really – that all the world is 
driven by self-interested rationality.”127 The description of humanity as self-interested is 
by this point not surprising, however, the Chicago school intensified their emphasis upon 
this fact. In the two earlier schools, the dichotomy of the economic and other realms had 
ruled the day under “Adam’ s Fallacy” or the “market paradox.” The Chicago project, 
however, sought to break down this barrier.  
The mantra of the Chicago project for the liberty of the free markets is rooted in 
part by a distrust of government programs since self-interest would reign over human 
decisions in the realm of government policy, just as it does in the economic realm.128 In 
fact, there is no place that Chicago economists look without seeing self-interest. They 
assume that if specific behaviors cannot be adequately explained by self-interest it is due 
to a lack of sufficient equations or a complete understanding of all of the benefits of those 
behaviors. Thus things such as family, health, and education are explained utilizing self-
interested economic rationality. Gary Becker became renowned for his ability to describe 
family decisions as no different from any other market decision. As an example note how 
he depicts the family in economic terms, which he then compares to the exchange of 
commodities. Becker says,  
useful implications about the number of children in different families have been 
obtained by assuming that families maximize their utility from stable preferences 
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subject to a constraint on the resources and prices, with resources and prices 
partly determined by the gestation period for pregnancies, the abilities of children, 
and other noneconomic variables. Similarly, the rate of adoption of hybrid corn in 
different parts of the United States has been neatly explained by assuming that 
farmers maximize profits…129 
 
The derivation of every act from individual, self-interested, economic rationality 
means that “[t]hough homo economicus can evince altruistic behavior, it will do so only 
as a means of self-satisfaction.”130 One cannot help but think of Pierre Bourdieu’ s 
analysis of gift giving. Bourdieu’ s theory assumes that each individual actor is working to 
gain as much capital (economic, social, political, etc.) as she can at all times. Thus for 
Bourdieu, even the act of giving a gift is done with a (perhaps unconscious) calculation of 
what is to be gained. Every action ultimately can be explained through “the objective 
‘mechanism’  of the exchange.”131 So too is the Chicago school unwavering in its 
depiction of the nature of humanity. Even actions such as giving a gift are best explained 
via an underlying principle of self-interest. 
The regularity with which each of these economic schools have described the 
nature of humanity makes it easy to forget that as Nelson says, “[t]o understand human 
                                                 
129Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 13-4. Richard Posner, another member of the Chicago school, provides a similar analysis 
regarding the comparison between marriage and prostitution. The following excerpt from his book Sex and 
Reason provides a good example of the relentless adherence to the principle of self-interest within the 
Chicago school. “In describing prostitution as a substitute for marriage in a society that has a surplus of 
bachelors, I may seem to be overlooking a fundamental difference: the “mercenary” character of the 
prostitute’ s relationship with her customer. The difference is not fundamental. In a long-term relationship 
such as marriage, the participants can compensate each other for services performed by performing 
reciprocal services, so they need not bother with pricing each service, keeping books of account, and so 
forth. But in a spot-market relationship such as a transaction with a prostitute, arranging for reciprocal 
services is difficult. It is more efficient for the customer to pay in a medium that the prostitute can use to 
purchase services from others”; see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), 131.  
130Samuel Gregg, Economic Thinking for the Theologically Minded (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 2001), 13.  
131Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 6.  
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nature is to answer a central question of traditional religion.”132 Framing self-interest as 
an objective reality makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that discussions of what 
humanity is and “[t]he truth of the human condition is, of course, the subject matter of 
theology.”133 Thus across all three of these economic schools an implicit theology of 
humanity is evident. While Christian anthropology traces its heritage back to the fall, 
economists trace their anthropology to humankind’ s endless attempt to maximize her 
own self-interest as an immutable law similar to that of gravity. Their assumption 
regarding this foundational theological doctrine serves as an etiology that can justify the 
identity and behavior of self-interested consumers.  
 
 
III. Cosmology: The Defeat of Chaos 
 
The cosmos posited by religion thus both transcends and includes man. The 
sacred cosmos is confronted by man as an immensely powerful reality other than 
himself. Yet this reality addresses itself to him and locates his life in an ultimately 
meaningful order… The sacred cosmos emerges out of chaos and continues to 
confront the latter as its terrible contrary. This opposition of cosmos and chaos is 
frequently expressed in a variety of cosmogonic myths.” 
— Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy 
 
                                                 
132Nelson, Economics as Religion, 193.  
133Nelson, Economics as Religion, 229. Relating the nature of humanity to act in a constantly self-
interested fashion opens the possibility to attempt to describe economics as objective, or exemplified by 
instrumentally rational actions. In other words, if economic decisions are based upon self-interest, are they 
not perfect examples of Weber’ s instrumentally rational actions that are grounded in the principle of 
marginal utility? While at first glance that may appear to be the case, the quality of economics’  social 
function is actually much different. That is to say, as economics engages in the task of describing human 
nature, or what it means to be human, it is naturalizing, and also defining, what actions result in the highest 
fulfillment of this nature. Thus self-interested actions, in the view of capitalism, become more than just an 
attempt to maximize marginal utility, and instead, are imbued as desirable because they fulfill humanity’ s 
purpose. Thus the structure and form of capitalism, self-interested exchanges, has actually shaped the 
content of beliefs, namely, that humanity’ s highest realization comes through acting in self-interested 
fashion. This then is clearly closer to value-rational actions that presuppose certain ends as good or 
desirable.  
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If a doctrine of origins can establish answers to inward facing questions such as 
“Who am I as a creature or a person?” it can also expand to answering questions about 
how the world itself works. The sacred cosmos, according to Berger, which would be the 
world as portrayed by religions, and as this paper contends, by capitalism as well, must 
be depicted in an ordered fashion so as to conquer the surrounding chaos. This section 
will focus on capitalism’ s cosmology.134 
Christian theology widely holds creation to be ex nihilo.135 And while arguments 
have been made that the use of “formless void and darkness [that] covered the face of the 
deep” (Gen 1:2) could be interpreted as comparable to primordial waters, that discussion 
is a tangent to the object of the present argument.136 My use of chaos is much more 
generic, thus saying that the cosmos is established through the defeat of chaos does not 
preclude the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Rather as Long states, a cosmogonic narrative 
“always expresses power in one form or another, for creation must be understood as 
creation ‘over against’  something. In the most general sense this ‘something’  is often 
referred to as chaos or the void.”137  
                                                 
134The discussion of cosmology naturally continues the anthropology started in the previous 
section, because as philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre states, “the nature of the world is such that in 
discovering the order of things I also discover my own nature”; see Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Marxism and 
Christianity (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 124.  
135See for example Daniel L. Migloire who contrasts Christian creation to Plato’ s Timaeus where 
order is imposed upon pre-existing matter; see Daniel L. Migloire, Faith Seeking Understanding: An 
Introduction to Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2004), 100.  
136For an example of such an argument see JoAnn Scurlock, “Searching for Meaning in Genesis 
1:2: Purposeful Creation out of Chaos without Kampf,” in Creation and Chaos: A Reconsideration of 
Hermann Gunkel’ s Chaoskampf Hypothesis, eds. JoAnn Scurlock and Richard H. Beal (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2013), 48-62. All biblical quotations come from the New Revised Standard Version unless 
otherwise noted. 
137Long, Alpha, 30.   
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The importance of creation being emphasized here in Christian theology is the 
designed order of the universe. This is reinforced in chapter one of John’ s gospel through 
his use of the word logos, which “in Greek philosophy, was cosmic order or reason, the 
creative force behind cosmos (universal order).”138 The world is one of reason and order, 
rather than chaos. It follows certain patterns and rules. Old Testament theologian Walther 
Eichrodt draws the same conclusion explaining, “[t]he world of creation has its own laws, 
which regulate the marvelous play of forces among the elemental powers, as well as the 
life and activity of the animal world, and are far beyond man’ s understanding.”139 
Humanity lives in a world that is governed by these natural laws of order and 
reason rather than pure chaos. Capitalism makes similar claims regarding the fact that the 
world, especially the market, is driven by order and reason. And much like Eichrodt’ s 
claim that the universe’ s workings are beyond the understanding of humanity, so too 
many economists feel that the, at times, apparently irrational workings of the market are 
the result of the failure of human comprehension, not a lapse in the ordered nature of the 
market.140 The economic world is vastly complex, especially in this modern, global era. 
The market accomplishes the task of a “central intelligence,” according to Paul 
Samuelson, that orders all of the dynamic demands being placed upon the economic 
system.141 
                                                 
138Leeming, Creation Myths, 87.   
139Walther Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, trans. K. and R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM 
Press Ltd., 1961), 31.  
140Undeniably this conclusion of economists is another reminder of the characteristic of 
unfalsifiability in Sorel’ s myth present within capitalism.  
141Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1961), 38.   
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This section will explore capitalism’ s doctrine of the world. It will explore how 
chaos has been defeated by the ordered universe of the market. Examining perspectives 
from the classical, progressive, and Chicago schools will reveal nuances in this 
fundamental belief.  The overwhelming reliance upon the ordered reality of the market 
against chaos is a foundational narrative for each. 
Classical: A New Newtonian Physics. Albert Hirschman, focusing more on 
political rather than economic theory at the time of capitalism’ s nascence, describes the 
importance of what he calls the passions of men, which were destructive, unpredictable, 
and uncontrollable. These passions drove the behavior of individuals at this time and 
could not be repressed. Hirschman says the goal became to harness these passions. Thus, 
“the idea of engineering social progress by cleverly setting up one passion to fight 
another became a fairly common intellectual pastime in the course of the eighteenth 
century.”142 The unpredictable passions of men serve as a comparison to the chaos that 
needed to be overcome.  
The ordering mechanism that served as the perfect constrainer of all other 
passions was self-interest. Focusing upon self-interest in capitalistic theory would 
hopefully help to “fashion a less multifaceted, less unpredictable, and more ‘one-
dimensional’  human personality.”143 For not only was self-interest as inherent to nature 
as gravity, as shown in the previous section, it was also just as predictable.144 This 
predictability gave a sturdy foundation upon which the market mechanism could be built. 
                                                 
142Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before 
Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 26.  
143Ibid., 132.  
144Ibid., 49-50.  
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It was a constant that could be used in the scientific equations to solve the problems of 
economics. Thus humankind’ s self-interest allowed for integration of humanity into the 
perfectly ordered structure of the world that existed outside of itself.  
This ordered concept of the world was common at the time of Smith as Meyers 
notes what he calls the “principle of design,” which at its core was based upon the belief 
that the world was operating in a “precise and dependable pattern.”145 Humanity is only 
one component that fits within this all-pervading structure. It was a group of French 
economists in the eighteenth century, the Physiocrats, who established the idea that “the 
economy [is] an intricately built mechanism or machine that functions independently of 
men’ s will.”146 The pursuit of economic knowledge then aims at understanding how this 
“intricately built mechanism” works and orders society without human aid. A new order 
of physics was founded searching out the orderly patterns not of the physical world but 
the economic world. Both worlds are grounded in a constant.147 Newton’ s physics is 
build around the constant of gravity, while economics has substituted self-interest as its 
constant upon which it can uncover the order of the universe.  
The concept of an “invisible hand” fits perfectly in this framework. It represents a 
mechanism working in a perfectly ordered fashion that is beyond humanity’ s full 
comprehension, much like the laws of physics. Capitalism’ s cosmology is thus one of 
order and design, far surpassing humanity’ s ability to fully comprehend. Being governed 
                                                 
145Meyers, Modern Economic Man, 3.  
146Hirschman, The Passions, 94, emphasis added.  
147Nelson, Economics as Religion, 282.  
71 
by underlying notions of the “principle of design” the soul of Homo economicus had 
become the constant needed to uncover the rational world of economic reason.  
Progressives: The Experts of Efficiency. The idea of the market as an intricate 
machine continued even into the twentieth century. Samuelson describes that machine as  
a competitive system of markets and prices – whatever else it may be, however 
imperfectly it may function – is not a system of chaos and anarchy. There is in it a 
certain order and orderliness. It works. A competitive system is an elaborate 
mechanism for unconscious coordination through a system of prices and markets, 
a communication device for pooling the knowledge and actions of millions of 
diverse individuals. Without a central intelligence it solves one of the most 
complex problems imaginable, involving thousands of unknown variables and 
relations. Nobody designed it.148  
 
The orderliness of the world was intensified by the progression of scientific 
rationalism in the nineteenth century. This heavily influenced economic theory in the 
twentieth century. The classical conception of a designed world outside of humanity was 
amplified by reliance upon, and faith in humanity’ s ability to use, “scientific reason.” 
What became of preeminent importance to progressive thinking was efficiency, 
understanding the inner workings of the world in order to harness them for the greatest 
possible productivity to defeat material scarcity.  
This scientific approach is foundational for economists. The emphasis upon logic 
and mathematics has been recognized by McCloskey who points to economists’  
assumption that “once you have reduced a question to numbers you have taken it out of 
human hands.”149 This cosmology built by capitalism, one of a world built upon perfect 
reason and order, has become so ingrained into the thinking of economists, that it is no 
longer viewed as a particular cosmology. The fact that this cosmology has been 
                                                 
148Samuelson, Economics, 38.  
149McCloskey, Rhetoric of Economics, 100.  
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constructed and externalized and is now assumed as objective sits at the heart of the 
entire argument of this thesis. For while the present discussion is exploring how 
economists have established a highly structured and ordered cosmology, their view of the 
world is not considered to be “built.” Their cosmology has become so powerful, or thick, 
that its constructed nature is forgotten. In bypassing the need to even articulate their 
cosmology comes the ability to lose sight of it as a theological tenet of capitalism. 
Instead, economists view it as the result of an equation built upon numbers, which 
removes the subjectivity in their eyes. However, the whole mechanism upon which those 
equations rest is the narrative of the world and market as an ordered reality.  
Perhaps the biggest shift from the classical to progressive school in their ordered, 
rational, view of the world is how humanity is integrated into it. In the classical school, 
constant self-interest made the structured world more comprehensible. However, moving 
into the twentieth century, knowledge of the market system could be utilized by humanity 
for its own desires. As Samuelson points out, “in addition to knowledge for it own sake – 
and, to most people, of far greater importance – there is the hope that the findings of 
physics may help engineers make useful improvements, that the study of physiology may 
promote medical advancement, and that dispassionate analysis of economic data will 
enable society to devise ways to impede some of the more unpleasant and debilitating 
economic occurrences.”150 Not only did the progressives comprehend outcomes of the 
ordered system, now they could plan for and enact preferred results. One of Samuelson’ s 
                                                 
150Samuelson, Economics, 9.  
73 
students describes the Keynesian economic system as “essentially a machine which 
grinds out results according to where the several dials controlling the system are set.”151  
The cosmology of natural laws and an ordered structure of the world is thus still 
present. The progressives, based upon their “scientific rationality,” were more optimistic 
about their ability to exert control over the ordered world, ensuring the best, or most 
efficient, results in order to defeat chaos, or in their case, material scarcity.  
Chicago: The Extraordinary Fecundity of the Garden. If the progressives 
were willing to allow themselves as economists to weigh in and turn the “dials” of the 
economic machine, the Chicago school holds a different position. For while the 
progressives asserted that the ordered structure of the market opened up opportunities for 
human manipulation, the Chicago school maintains far too pessimistic an anthropology to 
promote human interference with the market. More reminiscent of the classical school, 
they emphasize the ability of the market to produce the best results given the singular 
character of Homo economicus, self-interest.  
The Chicago project focuses on the power of the market outside of humanity. 
There is perhaps a correlation between the market mechanism and the Garden of Eden. 
For the perfection of the garden was related to its endless supply of lush and ripe fruit. 
Milton Friedman points toward the possibility of this reality in modern times when he 
describes how the market mechanism causes an “extraordinary fecundity.” The market 
releases “one of the most creative forces known to man – the attempt by billions of 
individuals to promote their own interests, to live their lives by their own values.”152 
                                                 
151Lawrence Klein, The Keynesian Revolution, 2nd ed (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 153.  
152Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 14, 
200.  
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Chicago’ s emphasis on the market’ s ability to transform the self-interest of Homo 
economicus into an “extraordinary fecundity” reinforces the powerful effects of the 
ordered structure of the world.  
Consider again Chicago school’ s practice of describing all arenas of life, not just 
economics, through economic analysis of interest maximizing. Their commitment to this 
theoretical framework reveals the devoutness of their belief in the unalterable consistency 
and order of the market mechanism. Thus, according to the Chicago school, if something 
cannot be explained with the assumption of individual self-interest, it is not because the 
world, or market, has ceased to function according to its natural order. The problem 
rather must be a matter of humanity’ s inability to fully comprehend the power of the 
market’ s mechanism.153 The market is still as Eichrodt said of the world in Genesis, “far 
beyond man’ s understanding.” 
One example of this all-pervasive rational order will illuminate the Chicago 
cosmology. Milton and Rose Friedman clarify their view of self-interest saying that 
“[s]elf-interest is not myopic selfishness. It is whatever it is that interests the participants, 
whatever they value, whatever goals they pursue.”154 Building on this statement, 
theologian Michael Novak attempts to uncover how self-interest is compatible with 
benevolent actions. Novak explains that “democratic capitalism as a system deliberately 
enables many persons to do well by doing good (or even purporting to do good). It offers 
incentives of power, fame, and money to reformers and moralists.”155 This reinforces the 
                                                 
153Nelson, Economics as Religion, 168.  
154Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1980), 27.  
155Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Madison Books, 1982), 93.  
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Chicago school’ s view of the world that even those actions that seem selfless are truly 
still rooted in self-interest.156 In the Chicago project, thus, there is no space that is not 
ordered by the rational workings of the market driven by self-interested actions.  
The market for all three schools of thinking is conceived of as one of reason and 
order. While the economists understand this market slightly differently, it is clear that the 
world in which each of these schools of economists live is one created by the theology of 
capitalism. If cosmogonic narratives must tell the story of how chaos has been defeated, 
each of these schools has created a cosmology that is governed by order. The chaos that 
was defeated varies slightly. The passions in the classical school were defeated by the 
“one dimensional” aspect of self-interest. Progressives attempted to defeat the chaos of 
scarcity by maximizing market efficiency through their own inputs. Ostensibly random, 
selfless acts are defeated by the Chicago school through their unwavering assumption of 
underlying, or misrecognized, self-promoting consequences to those actions. The 
economic cosmology of each of these schools is foundational to understanding the nature 
of the world in which humanity lives.  
 
 
                                                 
156This thinking is similar to Pierre Bourdieu’ s concept of misrecognition. Bourdieu would agree 
with the Chicago school that all actions are ultimately self-interested and could be explained through the 
workings of economic analysis.  David Swartz says that the fact that all actions are ultimately self-
interested is “a foundational presupposition not a hypothesis for testing” in Bourdieu’ s theory; see David 
Swartz, “Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’ s Political Economy of Symbolic 
Power,” Sociology of Religion 57:1 (Spring 1996): 76. Thus, for Bourdieu, even the selfless act of giving a 
gift, as mentioned above, truly is self-interested. Bourdieu’ s concept of misrecognition is grounded in the 
assumption that any action that appears to be motivated by something outside of self-interest, is merely 
being disguised, or misrecognized. Certain actions, though, such as benevolent gifts to charity, are 
misrecognized, since if it was known that they were given solely for the honor which the donor would 
receive, it would be considered scandalous. Bourdieu gives a similar example of misrecognition where a 
mason, rather than eating the honorary meal traditionally served after he completes his work, requests 
instead payment equivalent to the meal’ s cost. His request disrupts social protocol and is considered 
disreputable though it is no more self-interested than partaking in the meal. He has, however, made the self-
interest, and economic exchange, more readily evident; see Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 173. 
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IV. Human Exceptionalism: The Keeper of the Garden 
 
There is one final narrative in capitalism’ s theology of origins that this chapter 
will explore. It is the narrative that orders and arranges characters within the world. Susan 
Niditch notes that a central aspect of cosmogonic narratives is the “emergence of 
discriminated features of the cosmos, a natural order of animals, vegetables, and 
minerals.”157 This arranging, for capitalism, establishes the narrative of humankind’ s 
place at the top of the world’ s hierarchy.  
From the Genesis account of creation it is clear that “[m]an and woman are the 
crown of creation.”158 In the Genesis narrative, while humans are still part of the created 
order, they are made distinct from the rest of creation in some significant ways. Dyrness 
notes the importance of the fact that humans are created out of dust rather than out of 
animals. This maintains a separation between humans and animals. Also, there is 
undoubtedly a relationship between humans and the rest of creation, but the primary 
relationship of humans is with God, rather than with creation.159  
The human’ s dominion over other aspects of creation is reinforced in Gen 2:15 
where God puts humankind “in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it.” The instruction 
to care for, or “keep” the garden endows humanity with an authority over the rest of 
                                                 
157Susan Niditch, Chaos to Cosmos: Studies in Biblical Patterns of Creation (Chico, CA: Scholars 
Press, 1985), 27.  
158Dyrness, Themes in Old Testament, 79.  
159Dyrness, Themes in Old Testament, 79-80. Dyrness does not make any comparisons to the 
Enuma Elish, but any comparisons between the two stories highlight further the importance of humans in 
the Genesis narrative. Whereas humans were made almost as an afterthought in order to serve the gods 
through menial tasks in the Enuma Elish, humans are established as the climax and pinnacle of creation in 
Genesis.  
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creation.160 In keeping the other creatures, the human person is given the power to name 
each animal, again a sign of his authority. Perhaps, the most significant indication of 
humanity’ s distinct position in creation, however, is the comparison of humankind to the 
“image” and “likeness” of God (Gen 1:26). No other aspect of creation is compared to 
God in this way. Many interpretations of this comparison have been posited, however, 
some have said that this is a comparison of humanity to God as creator, marking 
humankind as a co-creator.161 The ability of humans to continue to create and develop 
new things is constantly on display. Each instance of a new invention or development is 
grounded in humankind’ s ability to shape and formulate different aspects of the world 
into something new. Creating in this sense inherently includes the authority to reshape 
and remake different aspects of creation. The human person “is more than simply a 
creature of nature or a product of society: he shares with God the ongoing task of 
                                                 
160The notion of humanity as the keepers of the garden has been interpreted in various fashions. 
The level of authority of humanity over the rest of creation is the subject of ongoing discussion. Rosemary 
Radford Ruether discusses how this passage has been pointed to in a condemning fashion in an ecological 
critique of the Bible; see Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” Science 162 
(1967): 1243-48. Ruether notes as well biblical scholars who have highlighted the caring aspect of 
humanity’ s relationship with the garden. They state that human persons were given the role of stewards 
over the garden, while God maintained ownership; see, for example, James Barr, “Man and Nature: The 
Ecological Controversy and the Old Testament” in Ecology and Religion, edited by David and Eileen 
Spring (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1974), 48-75. Ruether herself suggests that despite the negative 
view of nature that has been prevalent in modern interpretations of the Bible there are many suggestions 
which show greater concern for nature that have been overlooked. This undoubtedly includes the mitigation 
of humanity’ s “dominion” over the garden; see Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist 
Theology of Earth Healing (New York: HarperOne, 1989), 207-14. Despite the controversy over this 
subject, it is clear that the garden narrative functions in an important etiological manner to help establish 
the order of humanity and the rest of creation.  
161Larry Overstreet provides a brief historical analysis of the views held by some theologians as to 
the meaning of “image” and “likeness”: Philo claimed that image carries no relationship to the body, 
Augustine suggested that it refers to humanity’ s ability to use reason and understand God, Aquinas 
believed that it relates to reason and intellect, Calvin posited that it is the soul of the human, Floyd 
Barackman and Harry Boer see image as personhood, and David Cairns claims it is humanity’ s personality. 
Overstreet himself claims that there is strong linguistic evidence that supports the interpretation of “image” 
and “likeness” as a reference to physical rather than non-physical attributes; see R. Larry Overstreet, “Man 
in the Image of God: A Reappraisal,” Criswell Theological Review 3 (2005): 43-70.     
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creation.”162 While this concept of co-creators is only one possible interpretation of the 
unique comparison of humanity to God’ s “image” and “likeness,” it clearly emphasizes 
how humanity’ s unique relationship endows it with authority over other portions of 
creation. 
The role of humanity as the keeper of the “garden” and the authority that comes 
with that role is maintained in economic theory as well. A fundamental aspect of 
economics is that it is a social science, given that its primary concern is the well being of 
people.163 On this front, environmentalists have criticized economists. These two groups 
are ideologically opposed as philosopher Bryan Norton explains because economists, 
whose focus is satisfying the needs of, and creating wealth for, individuals, are 
“conceptually limited” and “anthropocentric.”164 
Thus the narrative of human exceptionalism in the Garden of Eden is carried 
implicitly in economic theory. The subtle assertion is that humanity has dominion, or 
“consumer sovereignty,” over the rest of creation.165 An example of this reality, which 
this concluding section will explore, is the concept of private property.166 Harvey Cox 
                                                 
162Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach, “The Culture of the Market,” eds., Donald A. Hay and Alan 
Kreider, Christianity and the Culture of Economics (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001), 23. Stephen 
D. Long explores this topic in the works of Michael Novak. Long says one of the key themes in Novak’ s 
work is humanity’ s role as a co-creator with God through its production of wealth. Novak finds, according 
to Long, analogies of this view of humanity in Max Weber, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Novak also 
claims that this view is consistent with the work of Thomas Aquinas, though Long rejects this proposition; 
see Long, Divine Economy, 36-8.   
163Nelson, New Holy Wars, 70.   
164Bryan G. Norton, “Thoreau’ s Insect Analogies: Or, Why Environmentalists Hate Mainstream 
Economists,” Environmental Ethics 13 (Fall 1991): 248. 
165Ibid., 248.  
166Private property has been used in many ways throughout the course of history. John Locke, for 
example, began viewing private property as one’ s rights to that which she had created through her own 
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contrasts modern private property with the situation in the Garden stating that 
economists’  narrative of human exceptionalism is more extreme than one in Genesis. He 
says that in Genesis “[t]he Creator appoints human beings as stewards and gardeners but, 
as it were, retains title to the earth. Other faiths have similar ideas. In the Market religion, 
however, human beings, more particularly those with money, own anything they buy and 
– within certain limits – can dispose of anything they choose.”167 The modern 
development of the theory of property ownership and valuation will thus serve as one 
example in which capitalism, in unarticulated fashion, affirms its etiology of human 
dominion over the garden. 
Classical: Nature(al) Rights. According to John Locke, “the right to property is 
a natural right, and that private ownership is an institution, not of man, but of nature.”168 
The classical school of economists held to this Lockean commitment to understanding 
property as a natural right despite the fact that political theorists cast Locke’ s theory to 
the side by the end of the eighteenth century.169 The primary tension in the eighteenth 
century, however, was the lingering vestiges of the feudal system and the inability to 
                                                                                                                                                 
labor. This section uses the term private property as an expression of ownership over some aspect of nature, 
or parts of the world, which the human owner did not create.   
167Harvey Cox, “The Market as God: Living with the New Dispensation,” Atlantic Monthly 
(March 1999), 23. Cox’ s point regarding the ownership of the land being maintained by God in the Old 
Testament is well taken, especially considering the establishment of the year of Jubilee, which is, in some 
regards, essentially a reminder of the land’ s true ownership (Lev 25:8-55). Other commands such as the 
requirement to allow the land to lay fallow on the Sabbath year is another mitigation of human dominion 
over land in the Old Testament (Lev 25:1-8). The comparison then to the modern concept of private 
property and land ownership is not exact. However, the underlying narrative of human exceptionalism in 
Genesis, which has been clearly presented above, can be paralleled to the modern concept of land 
ownership since both are examples of humankind’ s dominion over other aspects of the world. This 
comparison, however, should not be taken as a lack of nuance regarding the place of land in the Old 
Testament, though a full exploration of that topic is not possible given space constraints.  
168Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of an Idea (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1951), 152.   
169Ibid., 181, 249.  
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purchase or divide many large family estates under this system. This restricted the 
“ownability” of land. Smith advocated these lands be opened up to sale and purchase. 
Smith’ s belief in exclusive private property was based in viewing natural resources as 
originating from a “common fund upon which all persons have some claim.”170 This 
“claim” represents an assumed right of humans to hold dominion over land. 
The extent of humanity’ s authority displayed through ownership is evidenced in 
the language used by Smith and his contemporaries. For instance in Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, Smith states that “[t]he very notion of property implies that he may abuse, 
give away, do what he pleases.”171 Earlier conceptions of land from those such as 
Thomas Aquinas were focused on caring for the land. Entrusting land to one individual 
was done out of the belief that land would be better cared for if entrusted to one 
individual than left in communal ownership.172 The principal of care is clearly no longer 
central given Smith’ s allowance for “abuse.” The individual owns and can dominate the 
land in any way “he pleases.” 
Smith’ s contemporary William Blackstone also emphasizes the authority of 
individuals over property in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. He describes the 
“right of property” as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
                                                 
170Ursula Vogel, “When the Earth Belonged to All: The Land Question in Eighteenth-Century 
Justifications of Private Property,” Political Studies 36 (1988): 104-5.  
171Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), 63, quoted in Vogel, “Earth Belonged to All,” 102.   
172Aquinas’ s understanding of property also maintained space for property to be reclaimed by the 
community in times such as famine. Thus, ownership still truly resides with God, and individuals are 
thought of as stewards; see Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: 
An Introductory Essay,” in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, eds. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 27.  
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individual in the universe.”173 The human person is thus more than just the keeper of the 
garden. She maintains “despotic dominion” over land. It is clear that Smith and his 
contemporaries’  views were moving to a more pointed concept of “ownership,” 
emphasizing humanity’ s hierarchal authority in the world. While this individualistic 
mindset was challenged slightly by the progressives, the debate was not whether the land 
belonged to humans, but rather to which humans. The natural right to private property 
was assumed without any need of justification for the human person’ s role as its keeper. 
Progressives: The Pursuit of Happiness. The Lockean conception of property as 
a natural right shifted in the nineteenth century leading into twentieth century progressive 
economic thought, which was rooted in utilitarian theories of those such as John Stuart 
Mill. Property was a tool that individuals could use to satisfy their desires. Thus the 
heightened sense of self-interest in the progressive’ s Homo economicus, characterized as 
an interest maximizer, centered on using materials for a person’ s pleasure. The ownership 
of land was grounded in the belief that a “consumer’ s needs and wants should be satisfied 
and that the consumer is king.”174 
The chaos, or inherent scarcity in the world, defeated by progressive economics 
reveals another aspect of human exceptionalism. Emphasizing that there is not enough 
land to fill human desire is another indicator of humankind’ s assumed authority over 
land. Land is measured in terms of human desire. Overcoming this scarcity in the 
progressive era led to a slightly more communal mindset than seen in Smith. This is not 
                                                 
173William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 12th edition, edited by Edward 
Christian (1794), quoted in Schlatter, Private Property, 164.  
174Douglas M. Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 163.   
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to say that private property was not owned by individuals, but with that property came an 
obligation to serve the common good, at least in part. Certain political and legal 
institutions, such as progressive taxation, served as a way to redistribute wealth in order 
to serve the communal welfare.175 
The utilitarian mindset undergirding progressive economics is laden with the 
assumption that land and property should be used to satisfy the interest maximizing 
Homo economicus. Property was held, and consumed, for humanity’ s happiness and 
pleasure. And even though there may have been some restrictions on one’ s use of 
property, mainly requiring some level of benefit to society as a whole, the discussion 
assumed property was for humanity’ s utility. The human owner was not only a keeper of 
the garden, she was to be benefitted by the garden. The debate centered on which 
individuals were to benefit from the land and how that profit could be maximized. 
Human exceptionalism was taken for granted. 
Chicago: The Existence of Final Frontiers. The Chicago school’ s beliefs 
regarding private property are often in tension with the progressive schools. The tension 
is again unrelated to whether humans can own property, that is assumed for both, as is the 
fact that land and property should be used for human’ s benefit. In fact, the very driving 
ethic behind private property for the Chicago school is the maximization of economic 
efficiency through property rights.176 The protection of private property is tied to 
improving humankind’ s well being. Thus while the progressives and Chicago school may 
                                                 
175Ulrich Duchrow, “Private Property,” Ecumenical Review 54, no. 4 (October 2002): 474.  
176Hans-Herman Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political 
Economy and Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 9n14. Hans-Herman Hoppe, 
whose larger project is concerned with the issue of ethics, notes that the Chicago schools views on private 
property are irrelevant to his discussion since the only “ethic” with which they are concerned is economic 
efficiency. He points to members of the Chicago school such as Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.  
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disagree on how sovereign an individual’ s private property rights are, they are actually 
striving for the same ends of wealth creation for humans and share the assumption that 
humans can and should hold dominion over the garden.  
Rather than focus on the unquestioned commitment of Chicago to a libertarian 
ideal of private property, this section will briefly look to a method of valuing land 
developed in the late 1960s to emphasize the extent of the narrative of human 
exceptionalism. For while economists were busy valuing forests, plants, etc. through 
traditional utilitarian models (i.e., their use as raw materials in the production of goods), 
environmentalists were pressing for the consideration of an intrinsic value of nature. 
What developed was a method of valuing nature by its “existence value” instead of its 
use value. Existence value is the value estimated to result from the enjoyment of persons 
knowing that a particular aspect of nature exists. These persons need not use or 
experience nature firsthand; simply knowing that it exists is of value.177 
Existence value has been integrated into policy decisions where calculations 
represent significant figures. For example, the preservation of the spotted owl in the 
Pacific Northwest, according to one study, accounted for an existence value of $8.3 
billion per year.178 Integration of existence value into economic calculations exemplifies 
the human exceptionalism that has been laden through each of the schools of economics 
examined. For while existence value was rooted in the consideration of an intrinsic value 
to specific aspects of nature, existence value ultimately allows humans to usurp value for 
                                                 
177Nelson, New Holy Wars, 58-60. The examination of existence value stretches the definition of 
private property laid out above. However, while existence value may not be related to legal ownership of 
any aspect of nature, I am suggesting that its methodology, while not legally, implies an expression of 
ownership over nature.  
178Nelson, New Holy Wars, 61.  
84 
their own calculations. The existence value of the spotted owl does not reflect the belief 
that there is something intrinsically good and meaningful about the existence of this 
creature. Its value is that humans know that it exists. That value is, of course, expressed 
in dollars. Perhaps nothing implies control and dominion quite as effectively as utilizing a 
human unit of measurement to value every other feature of the garden.  
Humans exert their natural and/or utilitarian right of property ownership, which 
gives them the authority to do whatever they please with the garden. Property serves as 
but another means by which Homo economicus, the interest maximizer, can succeed in 
his pleasure seeking. And what is more, that pleasure need not only come through the 
action of consuming creation. Humanity’ s authority over all of creation is so pronounced 
that human’ s knowledge of nature, unobstructed, unmodified, and not individually 
owned, can be valued in human-made units of measurement. This brief examination of 
the views of land and private property has uncovered that the human exceptionalism 
present in Genesis’ s account of humanity in the Garden of Eden is also present 
throughout capitalism’ s implicit narrative of the relationship between humanity and the 
garden. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The importance of origin narratives as etiologies has been emphasized throughout 
this chapter. And while capitalistic theory is lacking in its ability to tell an engrossing 
story, its tenets are aligned with many aspects of the doctrinal foundations of Christianity 
that stem from its origin narrative. Capitalism clearly perpetuates an unarticulated 
cosmogonic narrative, as it answers the key questions of who humankind is, how the 
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world works, and humanity’ s place within that world. Examining three schools of 
capitalism has provided breadth to this study, revealing that there is not simply one 
school that is dogmatic in its underlying beliefs. Rather, while there are evident shifts and 
nuances in the different doctrines of origins examined in this chapter between the 
schools, it is clear that each of the dogmas explored are held by each school.  
The human person is thus defined as the creature Homo economicus. This creature 
is self-interested to its very core, according to the Chicago school, even those actions that 
appear to be benevolent are actually still a rational means towards maximizing self-
interest. The establishment of the world in the face of chaos as an ordered system abiding 
by rational laws is also an underlying narrative of capitalism. While each school 
attempted to use the market mechanism differently, all of them were certain that the 
invisible hand, reaches far beyond the abilities and comprehension of humanity. It is 
constantly working to solve the infinitely complex problems of the economic realm in the 
most satisfactory way possible. Finally, humanity is the pinnacle of creation. Humans 
hold a seat of exceptionalism in relationship to the rest of the garden. The ownership of 
land and private property explored in the last section showed how this narrative is woven 
into the justification of humankind’ s uses (or non-uses) of land.  
Capitalism thus is far from silent when it comes to the theological realm of 
origins. It holds its own clear anthropology and cosmology. Both of these provide value-
laden discourses that define what goals and aims of humans align with origins, and are 
thus desired. The next chapter will uncover that capitalism not only holds a narrative of 
beginnings, but it also holds a vision of how everything will end.  
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CHAPTER THREE: A CAPITALIST ESCHATOLOGY 
 
 
 
Thus Vice nurs’ d Ingenuity, 
Which join’ d with Time and Industry 
Had carry’ d Life’ s Conveniences, 
Its real Pleasures, Comforts, Ease, 
To such a Height, the very Poor 
Liv’ d better than the Rich before 
— Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The temptation when reading any novel is to flip to the back of the book and read 
its final pages, allowing the denouement to console one’ s mind while working back 
through the heightening tension and conflict in the story’ s body. Life has not been so 
neatly bound, however, so the task of discovering the mysteries of the end has been left to 
arenas such as theology. Just as the previous chapter revealed that the origins of humanity 
and the world have a profound impact on shaping the present, the same is true of end 
things. Discovering how the history of humanity and the world will culminate proves to 
be formative for the present. 
The era of global capitalism, where markets reach instantaneously around the 
world transforming countless communities, cities, and countries, has gained recognition 
for its similarities to an eschatological movement. Graham Ward, speaking specifically 
about globalization, says, “[a]s a myth [globalization] governs and generates cultural 
imaginings; it fashions hopes, beliefs, dreams and desires.”179 The Christian hope, which 
                                                 
179Graham Ward, “Religion after Democracy,” in After Modernity? Secularity, Globalization, and 
the Re-enchantment of the World, ed. James K. A. Smith (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008), 206. 
It is worth noting that Ward specifically identifies his use of the term myth as stemming from Georges 
Sorel’ s definition of the term.  
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hinges upon the second coming of Jesus and the establishment of a new heaven and new 
earth, is thus not the only hope.180 The desires of humankind can be satisfied through 
avenues other than the full institution of the Kingdom of God. Global capitalism has 
become its own mythogenic manufacturer of eschatologies. 
Both Christian theologians and scholars of religion have recognized and noted the 
connection between global capitalism and eschatology.181 Religion scholar Manuel 
Vásquez claims that “neo-liberal capitalism is often sacralized, presented as a this-worldy 
eschatology in which endless consumption is the mark of grace.”182 Jean and John 
Comaroff discuss “millennial capitalism,” which they define as “capitalism in its 
messianic, salvific, [and] even magical manifestations.” Comaroff and Comaroff 
                                                 
180There are countless views regarding the details of the Christian hope. There is thus no single 
monolithic hope that encompasses the views of all of Christendom. I have purposefully been vague in 
describing the Christian hope in order to encapsulate the ethos of most Christian eschatologies. The second 
coming of Jesus will lead to the fullness of the Kingdom of God and as Rev 21:1 states, the coming of a 
“new heaven and a new earth.” Different strands of Christianity have focused more upon the new heaven. 
Dispensationalists, for example, emphasize the rapture of believers away from this earth. Others, however, 
have focused more upon a renewing, and redemption, of the present earth. There is not adequate space, nor 
is it the point of this essay, to examine the merits of every view. Each of those views, along with many 
others fit within the Christian eschatology in this paper that is intentionally nondescript in order to 
encompass broad tenets of a Christian eschatology that are widely held. 
181While I am focused more on similarities, some Christian theologians consider capitalism to be 
an adaptation, or warping, of a Christian eschatology. William Cavanaugh, for example has compared the 
“universal gaze of economic globalism” to a “mutation of Christian eschatology”; see William T. 
Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy: God, State, and the Political Meaning of the Church (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 78. Vincent Miller speaks also of how consumer desire, as the result of economics in 
a post-Fordist culture, “reduce[s] eschatological hope to an impotent desire for improvement that, because 
it is by nature not invested in any particular object or program, can envision nothing new, only endless 
superficial changes in the present order”; see Miller, Consuming Religion, 130.  
182Manuel A. Vásquez, More than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 306.  
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elucidate how “capitalism presents itself as a gospel of salvation” that “is invested with 
the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered.”183  
Each of these could be considered a depiction of a “secular eschatology.” Ward, 
in his exposition on global capitalism, actually provides a definition of “secular 
eschatology.” He says, it produces an “immanent teleology of history and economics” 
that maintains “absolutism” and “utopianism.”184 History’ s aim, or telos, then becomes a 
major focus of a secular, or an economic, eschatology. As Paul Samuelson says in his 
introductory textbook, “[e]conomic activity is future-orientated.”185 Along the path of 
this “future-orientated” field, an economic-created utopia will begin to emerge through 
“magical manifestations” and the fulfillment of “dreams and desires.” That is, economics 
provides a vision for how the world could, and should, be, and through transcendent 
means helps to realize these aspirations. 
There will be two main explorations in this chapter. The first will continue the 
structure developed in chapter two, utilizing the three schools of economics to see how 
the presence of an eschatology in capitalism is not something new. The analysis will 
examine how each school has constructed an eschatology. The second section of the 
chapter will move away from this framework and return to a focus on the work of Peter 
                                                 
183Jean and John L. Comaroff, “Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism,” in 
Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, ed. Jean and John L. Comaroff (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2001), 2.  
184Ward, “Religion after Democracy,” 204. While Ward is undoubtedly working from a position 
in which “immanent” is contrasted to a transcendent God, one needs not take up such a framework for this 
definition still to be helpful. Casting a vision of a telos establishes a value-laden goal for history requiring 
actions to be ordered by this presupposed end.  
185Samuelson, Economics, 49. 
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Berger. A detailed analysis of Berger’ s descriptions of “development” will uncover how 
even Berger’ s own views of capitalism are fraught with theological underpinnings.    
 
 
II. Realized Capitalism 
 
Future-hope is a vital aspect of Christian eschatology. Christian eschatology is 
enthusiastically expectant and brimming with anticipation. The Kingdom of God, which 
was inaugurated through Jesus, is in a stage of “already-but-not-yet.” For while the 
Kingdom has “already” been initiated, there is anticipation of a full consummation of the 
Kingdom of God that has “not yet” occurred. According to Daniel Migliore, the Christian 
hope “eagerly awaits the completion of the creative and redemptive activity of God.”186 
The New Testament is “saturated with a spirit of expectation,” and that anticipation was 
present even in the Old Testament prophets’  visions of a perfected future time.187 The 
forthcoming time spoken of by the prophets, the full realization of the Kingdom of God, 
rang of utopia. Isaiah, for example, declared that nations “shall beat their swords into 
plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against 
                                                 
186Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, 330. How the completion of this activity will occur has 
been widely debated in history. From early in church history that has been a variety of views posited: from 
the view of Montanus (late second century) of a soon coming New Jerusalem in modern day Turkey, to 
Jerome (342-420) who thought that the millennial reign was a spiritual reality, or to the Dontanists (fourth 
century) who thought that the millennial reign had already begun. Disagreement has continued through the 
early church to the great reformers into the modern era of John Nelson Darby and Cyrus Scofield; see Craig 
R. Koester, Revelation and the End of All Things (Grand Rapids, MI: William Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2001), 1-26. Robert Clouse, in the introduction to an edited collection of four interpretations on 
the millennium says that, for example, “[t]he kingdom expected by the premillennialist is quite different 
from the kingdom anticipated by the postmillennialist, not only with respect to the time and manner in 
which it will be established but also in regard to its nature and the way Christ will exercise control over it”; 
see Robert G. Clouse, “Introduction,” in The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 7. However, that the second coming of Jesus, in the future, 
will bring about redemption, the creation of the new heavens and new earth (Rev 21:1), and the 
establishment of the Kingdom of God is fairly consistent. 
187Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, 331.  
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nation, neither shall they learn war any more” (Isa 2:4). Eschatology then centers on the 
narrative of the kingdom that has “not yet” arrived in full.  
The role of foretelling and anticipating such a kingdom has become a task shared 
with economists. As Daniel Bell Jr. states, “Adam Smith, and modern economists” have 
become the “heralds of the good news of material redemption.”188 The need for 
redemption is evident in the present war-torn, violence-filled, and disease- and hunger-
ridden world. Throughout the world, societies long for material redemption hoping that 
banishing scarcity will eradicate the evils in the world. Romans 8:22 presses the point 
saying, “the whole creation has been groaning” as it waits for redemption. The day when 
evil will be stricken and lack conquered has not yet arrived and is eagerly awaited.   
The correspondence of the defeat of both evil and scarcity does not seem to be 
coincidental. An interesting connection exists between the presence of evil in the world 
and the economic problem of scarcity. Economics is, by Samuelson’ s definition, “the 
study of how men and society choose… to employ scarce productive resources to 
produce various commodities… and distribute them for consumption.”189 Vivian Walsh 
provides a philosophical analysis of the role that scarcity plays in moral discussions. 
Walsh notes that many actions that are morally pardonable stem from the presence of 
scarcity, or the actor’ s lack of some resource. Scarcity, however, is also at the root of 
many actions that are morally unacceptable. The moral distinction between actions that 
are reprehensible and those that are pardonable, according to Walsh, is not related to 
whether or not they stem from scarcity. They both are connected to scarcity. Instead, the 
                                                 
188Bell, Economy of Desire, 117. 
189Samuelson, Economics, 6. 
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moral distinction is tied to the obviousness of the action’ s connection to scarcity.190 The 
moral shortcomings of humanity and the evil in the world are thus intimately connected 
to the world’ s lack and scarcity. The desires of all in society cannot be fulfilled due to 
scarcity, causing some individuals to take unsanctioned measures in order to ensure their 
desires are met. Presumably removing the problem of scarcity would solve the problem 
of evil that arises in the conflict over limited resources available to fulfill desires. 
Overcoming evil in the world then is a matter of conquering the stranglehold of 
scarcity. This scarcity has left the world to cry (quite literally) in Rom 8 for freedom from 
its bondage and futility. The full realization of the Kingdom of God, a place absent of 
death, mourning, crying or pain (Rev 21:4) is the ever-desired future utopia of Christian 
eschatology. Economics can also lead to redemption as “economic progress has 
represented the route of salvation to a new heaven on earth, the means of banishing evil 
from the affairs of mankind.”191 The economic goal of material wealth and defeating 
scarcity is closely linked to an economic eschatology as removing scarcity becomes a 
crucial step in eliminating evil from the world and instituting a future utopia. The 
connection between evil and scarcity links the task of economic eschatology and 
Christian eschatology as both are ultimately envisioning a world rid of evil. This section 
will turn now to each the three schools of economics to see how they reflect a capitalistic 
eschatology. 
Classical: Future Affluence Amidst Folly. The teleological aspect of Adam 
Smith’ s Wealth of Nations is evident as it comes from a long line of moral philosophers 
                                                 
190Vivan Charles Walsh, Scarcity and Evil (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 7.  
191Nelson, Reaching for Heaven, xxii. The attempt by economists to bring heaven to earth is a 
theme to which Nelson focuses on in his project.  
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responding to the problem presented by Hobbes in Leviathan. If humanity is essentially 
self-interested, how can general social welfare be made possible? Smith’ s economic 
response to this moral problem begins to unveil the hope of future social structuring 
where constant amelioration of social welfare is possible despite the intrinsic self-interest 
of humankind.  
A. M. C. Waterman, a formally trained economist and theologian, uncovers 
Smith’ s establishment of future goals by differentiating Smith’ s use of the word 
“natural.” Waterman argues that, at times, Smith uses the word “natural” as a synonym of 
“necessary.” That is to say, economic laws recognize how certain behaviors “naturally” 
or “necessarily” lead to specific outcomes. However, in other instances, Smith uses the 
term “natural” in a normative fashion, denoting something as “good” or “desirable.” The 
“natural” progression that Smith speaks of frequently throughout Wealth of Nations 
carries with it, the weight of teleological expectations. Waterman compares Smith’ s view 
of natural progress to a theodicy.192 Solving the problem of evil, through its connection to 
scarcity, was no longer just the task of moral philosophy. It was now a primary goal of 
economics as well.  
The amelioration of society thus pervades Smith’ s work as he discusses how “the 
private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual, and 
uninterrupted effort to better their own condition… has maintained the progress of 
England towards opulence and improvement in almost all former times, and which, it is 
                                                 
192Waterman provides a complete discussion of the distinction between the different uses of 
“nature”; see A. M. C. Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology Since the Enlightenment: 
Essays in Intellectual History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 90-5, 99. 
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to be hoped, will do so in all future times.”193 Smith points to certain features of what this 
coming kingdom will entail. It will, for instance, lend to a “universal opulence which 
extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people,” or the growth of wealth that is 
accompanied by the often longed for companion of equality.194 It is clear for Smith that 
the standard of living made possible through capitalism far exceeds any apart from the 
market system as he states that, “even the lowest and the poorest order, if he is frugal and 
industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it 
is possible for any savage to acquire.”195 The expectation of such ever-increasing wealth 
develops from Smith’ s understanding of the causes of wealth, which as Bell states, 
“shattered the zero-sum vision” that had previously dominated economic thought and 
served as a means by which society could transcend scarcity.196 That is modern 
economics is no longer just a matter of trading different forms of wealth in transactions. 
Rather wealth is created, seen most clearly in current banking practices, where a bank can 
loan (or create) one hundred dollars for each ten dollars in its vaults. Money in banks is 
not merely being transferred from a depositor to the bank to a creditor in a “zero-sum” 
fashion. Rather new wealth is being created expanding exponentially. 
What is striking about Smith’ s eschatological hope, however, is not the specificity 
with which he depicts a utopian society, but rather the idyllic fashion in which the telos is 
achieved by the invisible hand. The power of the market to continue the desired progress 
                                                 
193Smith, Wealth of Nations, 441.  
194Smith, Wealth of Nations, 18-9. Smith also describes how “produce is naturally distributed 
among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society”; see Smith, Wealth of Nations, 2-3.  
195Smith, Wealth of Nations, 2.   
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of humankind, for instance, can overcome humankind’ s own shortcomings and 
corruption. Smith says that, “public and national, as well as private opulence” and 
“natural progress” are maintained “in spite of the extravagance of government, and of the 
greatest errors of administration.”197 Waterman summarizes this point saying that the 
laws of the market “act in various ways, but always wisely and well, so as to make 
creative use of human folly and wickedness in ways that bring good out of evil.”198  
The market mechanisms are clearly invested with an aura of superhuman 
intelligence and power. Consider the ubiquitous reference to an invisible hand. Or 
elsewhere, Smith says that the market “is not originally the effect of any human 
wisdom.”199 It is hard to imagine the mechanism of the invisible hand as anything less 
than an eschatological hope, as it has the authority to reach into history and ensure the 
desired end without human aid. Not only will it fulfill all desires and dreams but it does 
so through “magical manifestation[s]” of the market’ s powers. 
The classical school of economics then envisions the possibilities of a future that 
previously had been, and is still presently for “savages,” out of reach. The natural 
progression toward wealth represents a vision of the end. The desired kingdom may only 
be roughly outlined, but the supernatural works of the market draws humanity out of its 
                                                 
197Smith, Wealth of Nations, 438.  
198Waterman, Political Economy, 105. One cannot help but think of the beginning of the 
establishment of God’ s people in the Genesis story even before they entered the promised land, when at the 
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own “folly” and shortcomings. These powers from on high promise a world of opulence 
to both the nation and individual, the rich and poor alike. 
Progressives: The Fulfillment of a Visionary Hope? Nearing the conclusion of 
his groundbreaking work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, John 
Maynard Keynes asks, “Is the fulfillment of these ideas a visionary hope?”200 It is a 
question that he declines to answer, though the argument made below presents a strong 
case that it is. Keynes clearly asserts that regardless of whether he does espouse “a 
visionary hope,” the crux of his theory lies in its effects on the future. He claims that if 
his theories prove true, “their potency” will be undisputable “over a period of time.”201 
Keynes’ s future-orientation resonates with Samuelson’ s forward-looking view of the 
field noted above. In a speech given to the Council of the Royal Economic Society in 
1945 Keynes explicitly stated that, economists “are the trustees, not of civilization, but of 
the possibility of civilization.”202 
The view of the end times and the hope of the things to come are placed into the 
hands of economists. Economists prophetically proclaim a future of constant growth and 
improvement. Samuelson says quite bluntly that there are many reasons why people 
would want economic growth in society, but he notes that, “even if more material goods 
are not themselves important, nevertheless a society is happier when it is moving forward 
and is unhappiest when it stagnates.”203 As was seen in the previous chapter on origins, 
the ability to define reality, whether that is the nature of humanity or the world, becomes 
                                                 
200Keynes, General Theory, 383.  
201Ibid.  
202Roy F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, 1951), 193-4.   
203Samuelson, Economics, 803.  
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a fundamental aspect of capitalism’ s theologizing. Here, Samuelson’ s assertion as to the 
irreplaceable aspect of growth in a “society [that] is happier” defines the goals and 
aspirations of society. In tasking themselves with envisioning society’ s possibilities and 
future, economists structure a theology of what “the whole creation has been groaning” 
(Rom 8:22) for in its anxious awaiting of a new eschaton. Establishing the form of social 
aspirations results in populating a vision of its hopes and dreams. 
The progressive school not only defines the path of growth needed to arrive at a 
future utopia, but it also renders an image of this new reality. Robert Nelson summarizes 
the ethos of their thought saying that, “if evil actions are grounded in poverty and 
competition for resources, but scarcity is now effectively to be abolished salvation must 
be at hand.”204 Keynes describes the power of manipulating the market in order to be able 
to “cure the disease [of unemployment] whilst preserving efficiency and freedom.”205 
The effects of the economic arena then spill over into other utopian possibilities. For 
example, Keynes suggests that allowing the market to work at full capacity is “more 
favourable to peace.” War has many causes, according to Keynes, but the most 
fundamental are “the economic causes of war, namely, the pressure of population and the 
competitive struggle for markets.”206 The ability of the market to overcome scarcity then 
quite literally can create peace. “[I]nternational trade would cease” to be “a desperate 
expedient to maintain employment at home” at the cost of neighboring countries.207 Is 
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there a better example of a visionary hope than an economic solution leading to the 
exchange of swords for plowshares? 
Any system that can achieve such romantic results is pushing its way into the 
realm of eschatology, but what is worth noting is that even though the progressive school 
comes a century and a half after Adam Smith, the incomprehensible nature of the market 
is still exalted. Even while progressives are attempting to manipulate the market 
mechanism, they still pay homage to the market’ s supra-human power. Samuelson, for 
instance, describes the economic recovery of western Germany in 1946-7. Following his 
description of the economy’ s turnaround he states, “[t]he fact to emphasize is that such 
so-called miracles are going on all around us all the time–if only we look around and 
open our eyes to the everyday functioning of the market.”208 Comaroff and Comaroff 
were right to note the “magical manifestations” of capitalism, which Samuelson asserts 
result from the prosaic workings of the market that are beyond human comprehension.  
The progressives shift away from a total laissez-faire disposition toward the 
market, yet still find the power of the market awe-inspiring. The task of the economist 
becomes finding a way to harness this magical force and unleashing its power on the 
future “possibility of civilization.” That future includes nothing less than the eradication 
of evil through defeating scarcity. Removing unemployment while maintaining efficiency 
and freedom pave the way for a world without war. The progressives have taken their 
turn describing their hopeful vision of the redemption of the world. 
Chicago: The Invisible God Defeats the Visible Hand. The Chicago school’ s 
foundational cornerstone that views every arena of life governed by economic laws 
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continues to be crucial. Nelson says that economists following World War II thought that 
the reason they had yet to “emerge victorious” was because they “had failed to live up” to 
the necessary “scientific aspirations.” What was needed was “a rededication to scientific 
rigor and a more strictly enforced use of the scientific method.”209 The renewed 
application to “scientific rigor” would hopefully increase efficiency and continue, if not 
hasten, the arrival of the coming kingdom.  
Economist Gary Becker provides an interesting example of this style of analysis 
in his examination of crime and punishment. Becker concludes that within a society the 
question to be asked is “how many offenses should be permitted and how many offenders 
should go unpunished?”210 While this question seems to imply a society that is far from 
utopian, assuming the inevitability of a certain amount of crime, the uncompromising 
commitment to efficiency displayed by Becker’ s analysis points to the importance placed 
on future outcomes. In other words, the current state of society is working towards future 
improvements. This step along the way may require the acceptance of some evil, but 
extended devotion to efficiency will eventually eradicate scarcity. 
Frequently one’ s commitment to efficiency, however, has a more immediate 
effect on producing utopian conditions. For example, Milton Friedman states that, “[t]he 
man who objects to buying from or working alongside a Negro…limits his range of 
choice. He will generally have to pay a higher price for what he buys or receive a lower 
return for his work.” Quite simply, “[t]he man who exercises discrimination pays a price 
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for doing so.”211 The ending of discrimination would not be the first major social shift 
toward a more utopian world made possible by capitalism. Deirdre McCloskey makes no 
reservations in saying that, “[c]apitalists ended slavery and emancipated women and 
founded universities and rebuilt churches, none of these for material profit and none by 
damaging the rest of the world.”212 
Capitalism’ s commitment to material wealth creation may seem to leave anything 
beyond “material redemption” out of its reach. The goal of wealth creation through 
efficiency, however, is tied to a utopian vision beyond just material improvement. 
McCloskey notes how wealth is not only nourishing “for stomachs” but “for brains, [and] 
for souls… The poor person wants the fruits of capitalism, first the material fruits and 
then the spiritual fruits.”213 Friedman notes that capitalism is more likely to foster 
societies that are not materialistic. He states that free, capitalist societies allow for giving 
“great time and effort to charitable, educational, and religious activities.” Activities that 
ameliorate society in ways beyond just wealth creation are made possible because society 
has been liberated from the pressing concern of “narrow materialistic interests.”214 
The Chicago school clearly asserts that economic efficiency can bring about 
redemption to all arenas of life and remedy all social ills. Chicago’ s eschatology is 
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similar to the eschatology of the other two schools in its awe-filled reverence for the still 
mysterious power of the market mechanism to help realize the coming kingdom. Pushing 
against the progressives, who according to the Chicago school, tinker far too much with 
the market, Friedman calls attempts to manipulate the market the “deadening effects of 
the visible hand.”215 These should be abandoned in favor of firm commitment to laissez-
faire policies that free the market to fulfill its greatest potential. The hope for the future 
rests in “the invisible hand” which is “potent for progress.”216 
The Chicago school has cast its vision of a future society rid of social tensions 
and discrimination. Again what is striking about the anticipation of their future hope is 
that it is tied up in the market mechanism’ s “miraculous manifestations.” Continued, and 
nearly unstoppable, progress flows from the hand above, which is directing society, 
righting wrongs, and conquering scarcity in order to eliminate evil from the world. 
Each of these schools has an undeniable eschatological aspect. Just as John 
recorded his vision of the future on the isle of Patmos (Rev 1:9-10), these economists 
have recorded their own visions of the possibility of the world to come. Their theories are 
a meticulous meting out of the details needed for the realization of their final kingdoms. 
The task of these economists is clearly far from just an objective description of the laws 
of the market. Each of the schools place unwavering faith in the ability of the market to 
fashion a future, redeemed world, even if their understanding of the market’ s forces can 
only be described as if “seen through a glass, darkly” (1 Cor 13:12 KJV). They eagerly 
await the future. And just as they have revealed how the story began by defining the 
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nature of humanity and the world, they have also now unveiled the story’ s ending by 
defining how the kingdom will be ushered in and what it will look like when fully 
realized.  
It is striking that despite Peter Berger’ s depiction of capitalism as void of any 
“mythic potency” that these economists describe repeatedly the potential of the market to 
bring about previously impossible realities, even when such workings are “magical 
manifestations.” Having suggested that these three schools of economics engage in myth 
making by fashioning their own eschatology, a question arises worth considering for the 
remainder of the chapter: does any of Peter Berger’ s own work on capitalism contain any 
mythic representations of an eschatology? It is to that question that the chapter now turns.  
 
III. Development of the Third World or Eschaton? 
While the analysis of capitalism’ s theology has been based primarily on literature 
produced by formal economists, this section will return to the work of Peter Berger. It is 
Berger’ s framework, after all, that has been used to compare the function of religion and 
capitalism. It is also his suggestion that socialism maintains its own systematic theology 
that has been extended to capitalism. Given that Berger is a sociologist, much of his 
discussion of economics takes place in the realm of public policy. One economic issue 
that Berger spent considerable time addressing in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the 
issue of development in underdeveloped nations. Traveling frequently to locations such 
as Latin America and South Africa, Berger was intent upon finding the best ways to spark 
development. 
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In Berger’ s own work on development, it is quite clear that there is something 
much more to the process of development than simply an improvement of economic 
standards. The world is being re-created, or made new, aspiring for a utopian existence. 
Berger’ s location of capitalism within a realm of sheer facticity becomes dubious in his 
analysis of development. This section reveals how Berger, in his descriptions of 
capitalism and its role in the process of development, conjures up his own eschatological 
hopes.  
The analysis of capitalism and development will begin by problematizing 
Berger’ s stark separation of the categories of development and capitalism. In other words, 
Berger’ s positing of capitalism as the factual foundation upon which development’ s 
eschatology is built will be questioned. The structure of the relationship between 
capitalism and development is similar to the relationship that Berger posits between 
capitalism and other “myth-prone realities of life.”217 That is, capitalism has a tendency 
to rely upon other myth laden institutions, while itself remaining entirely absent of any 
mythic potency. This section will reveal that holding development, as a myth, as clearly 
distinct from capitalism is not possible. Their relationship is too convoluted. Thus while 
there is not space to address capitalism’ s relationship with other mythic institutions, this 
discussion of capitalism’ s relationship to development as a mythic entity will serve to 
challenge the argument made by Berger that despite receiving support from many mythic 
entities, capitalism itself is distinct from them.218 Calling the structure of capitalism and 
development into question provides adequate grounds to rethink capitalism’ s relationship 
                                                 
217Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 206.  
218This is one of the main points in Berger’ s discussion of capitalism and myth; see Berger, 
Capitalist Revolution, 194-209.  
103 
with all mythic entities. The section will conclude by unveiling Berger’ s utopian vision of 
development. Given the inseparability of capitalism and development that will be shown, 
this utopia is nothing shy of envisioning a new eschaton of capitalism. 
Capitalism and Development Conflated. The overt eschatological depictions of 
development that will be revealed below are admittedly described as value-laden by 
Berger. However, he maintains that economic growth, which is the product of capitalism, 
can remain value-neutral. Thus capitalism’ s concern with economic growth is value-free, 
according to Berger, despite its role in development’ s value-driven project that relies on 
growth. Berger says, “development means good growth.”219 “[G]ood growth” moves 
beyond “an economic system” and implies “a comprehensive view of human society” and 
a vision of the good life.220 Development resides in a value-laden realm by describing 
what kind of growth is good. For instance, Ann Bernstein, Peter Berger, and Bobby 
Godsell say that “development is the process in which the fruits of economic growth are 
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104 
used to uplift large numbers of people from great poverty to a level of relative decent 
material life.”221 The distinction between capitalism and development is that capitalism is 
only concerned with growth, regardless of whether it is good or desirable. Theoretically 
one could have unlimited growth but not good growth. The rise in a particular country’ s 
Gross Domestic Production, a measure of purely economic growth, does not ensure that a 
country has developed an environment where the good life is increasingly present and 
accessible. Capitalism thus is not ostensibly value-laden, but rather focuses only on 
maximizing “marginal utility” and growth. Development, on the other hand, is “a 
particular kind of progress, dependent upon but not identical to economic growth.”222 It 
seems possible then to have growth but not development, or good growth. The goal of 
development is based upon the establishment of a value-laden vision of the desired telos.  
There is a clean distinction at this point between Berger’ s descriptions of 
development and capitalism. Berger has intimated that capitalism functions as a factual 
foundation of growth upon which value-laden development is able to stand. All of this 
makes growth sound as if it were unaffected by development. However, in clear 
Weberian fashion, Berger establishes a two-way causal relationship between capitalism 
and development. “The linkage between growth and development policies is important. If 
the social side of development requirements are neglected, the consequences of this 
neglect will have economic effects.”223 The success of growth then is in part related to 
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development. For if the “social side of development” or those things that are key to “good 
growth” are not taken care of, then ultimately this failure will have “economic effects,” or 
will cause economic growth to falter. If development halts, economic growth will also. 
Just as development will be hampered by “economic systems that stultify growth and 
impede productivity,” so too will growth be obstructed by a stagnation of 
development.224  
In the same way that Weber’ s Protestant Ethic was key to the success of 
capitalism in the West, so too, for Berger, value-laden development is necessary for 
continued growth in the developing world. The assumption that must underlie this 
relationship though is that growth is only important in so far as it makes the telos of 
“good growth” possible. That is, growth cannot become the end in and of itself or dictate 
the final telos. To do so would be for growth to become the measure of the good life, far 
from a purely economic proposition. The remainder of this section reveals though that the 
relationship between capitalism and development is far from one in which capitalism is 
only serving the value-laden goals of development. Rather the two are interacting in ways 
that share the role of casting the vision of what is good. That is, economic growth at 
times usurps the position of the final telos and in doing so becomes the vision of what is 
good. If this is true, the relationship between capitalism and development is not as clearly 
distinct as has been posited by Berger. Rather than inhabiting purely separate arenas the 
division between these two is far less neat. Breaking down the barrier between these two 
categories again reinforces the thesis of this essay that capitalism should not be seen to 
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inhabit a purely value-inert realm separate from other value-laden institutions. Even 
Berger, who so strongly supports treating capitalism as an “economic system and nothing 
else” succumbs to allowing capitalism shape and mold the telos of society. 
Consider, for example, Berger’ s conclusion regarding attempts to achieve 
development in the most efficient and effective way, where he says that “successful 
development is much more likely to occur under capitalist than socialist economic 
arrangements.”225 In fact, he says that, “there is not a single non-capitalist case of 
successful economic development in the Third World.”226 Saying that capitalism is the 
best way to achieve development does not make the two synonymous. However, what 
becomes clear is that development, or “good growth,” actually is synonymous for Berger 
with capitalistic growth. For example, Berger says that, “development, in any meaning of 
the term, cannot be the result of juridical and political arrangements between states 
(though such arrangements can be useful in particular instances). Development is the 
result of the sustained economic activity of large numbers of people, the result of effort, 
hard work, and ingenuity.”227 Essentially, in instances where the state is the primary actor 
of growth, development cannot occur. “Development is invariably the fruit of individual 
and small-group effort.”228 Perhaps more succinctly put, development is the product of 
entrepreneurs, or capitalists. 
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What previously had the empirical ring of stating that only capitalist economies 
had achieved development, is now stated in the prescriptive sense that only capitalism, or 
what sounds like the hallmarks of capitalism, can create development. It appears that far 
from simply providing value-neutral growth, capitalism has produced a certain 
framework of growth that has become the model of “good growth.” This is clear in 
Berger’ s proposition that “[d]evelopment is the process by which people in the poorer 
countries are to reach the levels of material life achieved in the countries of advanced 
industrial capitalism.”229 In this instance, “advanced industrial capitalism” has actually 
become the measure of development, or “good growth.” Capitalism’ s ability to shape the 
vision of “good growth” is similar to its shaping of other theological tenets discussed 
above. The structure of capitalism, for example, shaped the doctrines of who humankind 
is and the features of the world in which humankind lives. Just as the structure of 
capitalism was able to inculcate a theology of origins, the ability to define “good growth” 
and the ultimate telos leads to eschatological doctrines. Capitalism is subtly asserting its 
theology by envisioning development’ s future aspirations.  
In 1974, Berger published a book titled Pyramids of Sacrifice in which he 
examined models of development. There were two primary Sorelian myths that he 
explored: capitalism’ s myth of growth and socialism’ s myth of revolution. Both of these, 
according to Berger, can bring about development, however, the cost (a generation of 
lives) is too great in both instances. What makes this work fascinating is Berger’ s 
willingness to depict capitalism in a mythic role. He has since rejected this position and 
openly states in his later work that he is far less evenhanded in his evaluations of 
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capitalism and socialism’ s effects on development.230 Berger’ s depiction of capitalism 
related to this myth of growth, however, is convincing, and there appears to be less 
departure in his later work from this myth than he might suggest. Note, for instance, how 
Berger’ s explanation of the power of capitalism’ s myth in this passage from Pyramids of 
Sacrifice still resonates with the points made above about the relationship between 
capitalism and development.  
There are theories that view economic growth under capitalist market conditions 
as the fundamental “engine” of development. These theories are linked to policies 
intended to create, maintain, or improve this “engine.” The common assumption 
of these theories and policies is that development, the desired goal, depends on 
this kind of economic growth getting ever “bigger and better”–and the last two 
adjectives are often treated as synonyms. The more growth there is, the more 
development there will be–if not right away, then in the long run. In this 
perspective, the problem of underdevelopment is primarily, if not exclusively, 
economic. Since the malady is essentially economic, so is the treatment, even if 
the noneconomic values are part of the projected future.231  
 
In this passage, this myth has defined the problem as economic. This is similar to 
how, in Berger’ s more recent work, “advanced industrial capitalism” has become 
shorthand for the goal of development. In other words, just as the myth of growth 
described by Berger in Pyramids of Sacrifice was able to define the problem of 
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underdevelopment as an economic issue, so too has Berger more recently defined the 
goal of development as capitalistic growth.232  
Berger, however, overlooks the importance of this economic defining of reality. 
Ann Berstein, Peter Berger, and Bobby Godsell posit how their view of growth produces 
good ends in a morally neutral way saying,  
We have tried to show that business, simply by doing what it knows how to do–
generating profits for itself and its shareholders, and creating wealth for the 
general society–will unleash processes favouring modernization and development, 
and indirectly facilitate moves towards democracy. To say this is to reiterate 
under present-day conditions Adam Smith’ s seminal insight that morally 
laudatory consequences can follow from morally neutral actions.233 
 
We have seen in chapter two, however, how Smith’ s move to solve the ethical 
issue of self-interest with an economic solution was not value-neutral. Rather it 
proliferates a theological anthropology and cosmology by defining what it means to be 
human and how the world works. Similarly, this value-neutral view of business and 
capitalism’ s role in development defines the problems and goals. In defining the goals, 
capitalism begins to take part in the theological task of eschatology.  
Viewing business’ s defining role presents another example of Berger’ s 
description of a myth. He states that, “[b]ecause myth fosters total commitment… people 
who are so committed tend to be blind to the mythologically inconvenient facts and 
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indifferent to the human costs of their mythologically legitimated programs.”234 
Unfortunately, Berger’ s own description of multinational corporations falls under this 
category when he states that, “[m]ultinational corporations, whatever sins they may have 
committed here and there, are the most important vehicles for the transfer of capital and 
technology to Third World countries, for training of indigenous personnel in modern 
economic occupations, and, last not least, for reliable tax revenues in Third World 
treasuries.”235 Striving to bolster economic growth is the clear vision and goal in this 
quotation. The light dismissal of “sins” seems to be exemplary of “inconvenient facts.” 
The point here is not whether or not the bad of multinational corporations outweighs the 
good. What is far more important is that any discussion of the good and bad results of 
multinationals has been framed by the assumed structure and value-laden goals of 
economic growth.  
Berger continues his discussion of the myth of growth in Pyramids of Sacrifice 
saying, 
This does not mean that noneconomic factors are ignored by either the 
theoreticians or the practitioners of this model, but rather that noneconomic 
factors are generally understood as conditions or aids to the underlying economic 
process. For example, it may be admitted that a particular political system or a 
particular set of cultural values may either be conducive to development or serve 
to inhibit the latter. But the political or cultural factors will be viewed in relation 
to the economic process that is deemed primary, and will generally be evaluated 
in terms of their helping or hindering this process. Conversely, the idea that the 
economic process itself might be evaluated as a help or a hindrance for certain 
political or cultural purposes is unlikely to be conceived at all. It follows that the 
policy “recipes” emerging from this view of things are economic first, and only 
secondarily political, social, or cultural. Wherever this viewpoint is established, 
the pronouncements of economists tend to have oracular status. Since these 
pronouncements primarily refer to the prognostication of economic growth, any 
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policies that might hinder the latter will be ipso facto ruled out of order. In this 
universe of discourse to question the value of economic growth itself is to 
question the basic operative definitions of reality. At that moment, the whole 
universe of discourse is shaken.236   
What is foundational to this discussion is the primacy of achieving economic 
goals. The dialectic relationship of the success of capitalism and development mentioned 
above is an excellent example of this. While it could be argued that growth is ultimately 
in service of development, the fact that development has been defined as the success of 
capitalism makes the economic process primary. Growth is the ultimate goal, and with it 
comes development, which in turn aids in insuring “bigger and better” growth. Here, 
again, it is evident that the economic construction of reality has served to legitimate its 
viewpoint in an uncontestable fashion. It has shaped the world, defined the problem, and 
as the primary focus of this chapter, it has envisioned the future solution. The form of 
capitalism has imposed its own definitions and legitimations of reality so that successful 
development has to be cast from a capitalistic mold. Rather than simply serving 
development’ s vision of what is good, capitalistic growth has asserted its own telos. 
The goal of this discussion has been to question Berger’ s positioning of capitalism 
as a value-neutral component of a value-laden development. The relationship between the 
two has been muddied, and the clean distinction between value-neutral and value-laden 
qualities of these categories has been problematized. Problematizing this distinction is 
important for two reasons. First, one of Berger’ s arguments to support his claim that 
capitalism is incapable of legitimating itself directly is that it leans on the support of other 
myths, for example the myth of progress, myth of equality, myth of liberty, and the myth 
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of personal liberation.237 With the initial framework posited by Berger between 
capitalism and development, one could easily add the myth of development to that list. 
However, problematizing the relationship between capitalism and the myth of 
development raises questions about holding such a stark dichotomy between capitalism 
and these other myths. If capitalism and development cannot be neatly divided by a 
bright line that places capitalism in a value-neutral realm and development in a value-
laden realm, can that type of relationship be uncritically accepted between capitalism and 
other myths? While addressing each of these myths is far beyond the scope of this present 
project, the examination of the relationship between capitalism and development should 
serve as brief response to Berger’ s argument on that point. Secondly, and more 
importantly, revealing a conflation between capitalism and development opens up the 
space to picture Berger’ s visionary hope of development as capitalism’ s own 
eschatology. That task is the focus of the next section. 
The Horn of Plenty and the Hope of Many. Berger argues that capitalism, 
through the industrial revolution, has created a material abundance that is unmatched in 
history. The poverty of many in the advanced industrial capitalist nations could be 
compared to the extravagance of royalty in previous centuries. Berger utilizes analysis by 
Joseph Schumpeter to point out ways that modern life is far superior to the past, such as 
modern dentistry, or the ubiquity of silk stockings, which were once reserved for the 
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York: Hamilton Press, 1987), 13. 
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queen.238 Berger describes the overwhelming material wealth produced by capitalism as 
the material horn of plenty.  
However, silk stockings and modern dentistry are hardly the stuff of a hope-
inspiring future. The finest of silks on one’ s feet does not evoke images of singing angels 
ushering in a new heaven and earth. As one moves past this factual increase in wealth she 
begins to reveal a redemptive vision of future transformation. As Berger says, “[t]he 
capitalist horn of plenty is an image of hope, a promise of wealth and well-being.”239 The 
vision of the horn of plenty is the goal of the developing world.  
It is this role of serving as the hope of humankind that puts capitalism in a 
position to establish its own coming kingdom. Berger pushes development into this 
category when he says that, “[d]evelopment is not just a goal of rational actions in the 
economic, political, and social spheres. It is also, and very deeply, the focus of 
redemptive hopes and expectations. In an important sense, development is a religious 
category.”240 Thus, this idyllic state is not just something to be materially envied, but is 
something that is religious. It transcends just the maximization of “marginal utility” and 
creates a value-laden depiction of “dreams and desires.” This capitalist revolution can 
redeem all of the imperfections that beleaguer the current order of the world.  
The power of this eschatology resides in its ability to define what the redemption 
and perfection of the world should look like. Those who adhere to this vision would not, 
like Christians do, look and wait for the second coming of Jesus. They are concerned far 
                                                 
238Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 42.  
239Ibid., 115.  
240Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, 18.  
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less with what will occur “in the twinkling of an eye” when “the trumpet will sound” (1 
Cor 15:52), instead they are attentively awaiting the sounding of the horn of plenty. It is 
after all, capitalism that is “the best guarantor of the deepest human aspirations and 
hopes.”241 
The ability to fulfill the deepest human aspirations, to carry a “heavy freight of 
redemptive hope,” and accomplish “transcendent social purposes” all point to something 
far beyond a realm of pure facts.242 Capitalism has found a way to paint a picture of its 
coming kingdom. The “transcendent social purposes” of capitalism allude to the fact that 
not only is material wealth promised, but it is “a vision of economic plenty in the context 
of political democracy and a dynamic class society.”243 Many debates between socialism 
and capitalism hinge upon whether one wants equality or liberty. Capitalism is often 
portrayed as maintaining one’ s individual liberty in a way that is not possible in a 
socialist context, allowing for one to receive what she earns. Socialism on the other hand 
may require the more pervasive presence of authority, however, the distribution of 
society’ s resources will be far more equitable. This discussion is often presented in a 
fashion that requires choosing either liberty or equality, assuming that the two are 
mutually exclusive.244 Berger’ s vision of the future of capitalist development then has its 
own “marriage supper” (Rev 19:9) as these two features come together. A free 
democracy filled with equality, or dynamic classes, is truly a visionary hope of 
                                                 
241Berger, “The Serendipity of Liberties,” 17.   
242Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, 19; Berger, “Speaking to the Third World,” 8-9.  
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overcoming a persistent trial of the present age. Berger points as well to the effect that 
capitalists’  businesses had on diminishing apartheid, emancipation of women, and aid in 
the establishment of peace in the South African context.245 Thus just as the economists in 
the different schools of economics envisioned how the eradication of scarcity would 
move into the establishment of a utopian society, Berger establishes his own vision of the 
new heavens and earth. Piling such lofty expectations upon an economic system clearly 
reveals capitalism’ s own this-worldly eschatology.  
Just as the different economic schools were comparable to a Christian 
eschatology, so too is Berger’ s vision of capitalism’ s myth of growth. In fact, Berger 
goes so far as to say that the myth of growth is a “secularization of Biblical 
eschatology.”246 Even in Berger’ s own writing it is clear that the task of theologizing is 
not one reserved for those within religious arenas. Capitalism promulgates its own mythic 
hope and vision of the future, redeemed heaven and earth. 
This section has returned to a direct interaction with Peter Berger’ s own vision of 
capitalism. After using Berger’ s work to establish a connection between the social 
functions of religion and capitalism in chapter one, chapter two and the first half of this 
chapter have focused upon revealing the theology, or legitimating myths, that 
inconspicuously underwrite different schools of capitalism. This brief revisiting of 
Berger’ s own work has been helpful to continue to solidify the overall thesis. While 
Berger argues for a distinction between capitalism and other mythogenic powers, such as 
development, the above argument has problematized that clear distinction. Berger’ s own 
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discussion of the eschatological nature of a capitalistic development reinforces the claim 
that capitalism has a second theological tenet: eschatology.   
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The task of writing about the future culmination of history is no longer reserved 
for those explicitly involved in the task of theology. Rather, economists have established 
their own eschatology. It, like Christian theology, highly anticipates the future 
redemption of the world. It anxiously awaits and looks beyond this “already” stage of 
groaning (Rom 8:22) and longing for the “not yet” arrival of complete renewal. Each of 
the economic schools’  teleological vision of history varied, however, all seem intent upon 
removing evil from the world through the conquering of scarcity. Berger’ s future vision 
was also made possible through economic growth and development. 
What is perhaps the most fascinating aspect of each of the economics’  schools 
eschatological vision was not only how economics is the source of “dreams and desires” 
but also the “magical manifestations” through which the new heavens and earth are 
realized. Each of the schools are committed to a vision of history, that despite a lack of 
full comprehension of how it will come to pass, can be relied upon due to the invisible 
power from on high. These economists have expressed their own form of faith, for they 
are “sure of what [they] hope for and certain of what [they] do not see” (Heb 11:1 NIV). 
If the task laid out at the beginning of this project has been to draw a connection 
between Christian theology and capitalist economists as promulgating similar views of 
origins and end times, these past two chapters have brought to the fore countless 
similarities. Holding economics, even capitalism, to be entirely value-neutral is a tenuous 
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proposal. However, one could suggest that the cause of the similarities between the 
underlying values of capitalism and Christianity stem from the pervasiveness of both in 
the western world. The next chapter will thus turn to a final segment of Christian doctrine 
in order to highlight places where capitalism’ s theology varies from Christian theology. 
This concluding chapter then will serve as the final evidence of the fact that capitalism is 
perpetuating its own unarticulated theology. It will confirm that this theology is not 
simply an imposition of Christian values on the economic system in the western world 
that capitalism is simply mirroring. Rather these two systems are constructing their own 
individual metanarratives.247 And while the previous two chapters have focused on their 
similarities, or where they overlap, the final chapter will reveal how they at times also 
diverge. 
                                                 
247Metanarratives will be discussed more in the final chapter. It is worth mentioning though that in 
this essay, both the Christian and capitalist narratives have been viewed within the western world. Both 
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Categorizing these narratives, something that I do not attempt to do, then becomes very difficult. I prefer to 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A CAPITALIST PNEUMATOLOGY 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
I have explained how capitalism and Christianity both promulgate their own 
theology, constructing narratives that shape present social realities. The previous two 
chapters have shown how these two organizations actually develop quite similar 
narratives at many points. In light of that, it is easy to see how Weber’ s thesis could 
easily place Christianity as the originator of the ethos of capitalism. Having rejected 
Weber’ s framework for the relationship between economics and religion, however, 
capitalism need not rely upon Christianity for its theology. Capitalism has been shown to 
be capable of producing its own. In fact, reframing the relationship between the two 
institutions helps to make more sense of the times when these institutions posit diverging 
narratives.  
Despite the fact that both Weber and myself have pointed to an affinity between 
the narratives of both of these institutions, there is undoubtedly a tension as well. This 
chapter will show how viewing capitalism as the creator of its own theology makes sense 
of its concomitantly shared and diverging narrative with Christianity. Both capitalism and 
Christianity are responsible for metanarratives, under whose umbrella meaning is made 
and significance is derived from events and social structures. Understanding capitalism as 
a parallel (or competing) contractor with Christianity in the social construction business 
provides a framework in which similarities and differences between the two make sense. 
If neither relies fully upon the other, points of contrast require no special explanation. 
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This final chapter then examines a third theological tenet, but it does so as 
exemplary of how the grand narratives of capitalism and Christianity diverge. What 
makes Weber’ s thesis so counterintuitive is that it is often assumed that the narrative 
underlying capitalism is foundationally different than the one underlying Christianity. 
Ostensibly they hold entirely different values. Weber’ s claim that a Christian, Protestant 
ethic is the driving force for capitalism, instigated pushback, or recoil, considering this 
common assumption. While we have examined small portions of the Christian narrative 
thus far, it is worthwhile to consider for a moment the major themes that weave 
throughout the fabric of the entirety of Christianity’ s metanarrative.  
The fact that Christianity’ s story is one that is grounded in historical claims about 
specific individuals that lived in specific times and places distinguishes it from 
capitalism’ s ahistorical narrative.248 The Christian story centers on the first century figure 
of Jesus, especially his death and resurrection, but those events are not the beginning. 
One of the first actors in the Christian story is Abraham, who sets the stage for God’ s 
covenant “whose purpose was from the beginning the saving call of a worldwide family 
through whom God’ s saving purposes for the world were to be realized.”249 The 
anticipation of this redemption is laced throughout ancient Israel’ s history. Thus the 
ancient first century story of Jesus’  life builds upon the history of ancient Israel that was 
already long in the making. New Testament scholar James G. Dunn writes that, “unless a 
NT theology both recognizes and brings out the degree to which the NT writers saw 
                                                 
248The importance of this historical aspect of Christianity can be seen as it develops its own 
“holy” history. While both capitalism and Christianity carry out similar social functions through the 
establishment of a metanarrative, it is worth noting this point that Christianity’ s narrative does make a 
claim to be rooted in actual historical events, something that capitalism’ s does not do.  
249N. T. Wright, Justification: God’ s Plan and Paul’ s Vision (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 
2009), 12.  
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themselves as in continuity with the revelation of the OT and as at least in some measure 
continuing or completing that revelation, it can hardly provide a faithful representation 
of what they understood themselves to be about.”250  
N.T. Wright notes this vision of Jesus as a continuation of the story of ancient 
Israel. He says, “[w]hen we see the story of Jesus as the climax of the story of Israel, we 
should not be surprised to discover that the suffering of Israel and of Israel’ s supreme 
representative is to be understood as part of the longer and larger purposes of Israel’ s 
God, in other words, the establishment of his worldwide healing sovereignty.”251 God’ s 
redemption and healing result from the sending of Jesus to the world, which God did, as 
the famous gospel passage says, because He “so loved the world” (Jn 3:16). The victory 
of Jesus, his redemptive work, is born out of love expressed through suffering, not power.  
The suffering of Jesus is tied not only to the prior story of Israel, but also to the 
future story of the coming kingdom. Thus, the church “will comprehend the meaning of 
its commission in the light of its hope and it will interpret the sufferings of the time in the 
light of the coming kingdom.”252 Suffering for Christians is not simply a by-product of 
their faith, rather “the suffering of Jesus’ s followers is actually, like Jesus’ s own 
suffering… part of the means by which that purpose is to be fulfilled.”253 The 
establishment of the kingdom through the community of believers is achieved through 
suffering. The Christian, in following the steps of Jesus, is not one who lords his power 
                                                 
250Dunn, New Testament Theology: An Introduction (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2009), 23.  
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over others, but rather “overcome[s] evil with good” (Rom 12:21). The Christian 
community attempts to “take over the world not with the love of power but with the 
power of love.”254 The healing and redemptive work of God, visible from the first scenes 
of this drama, continue to be realized because of and through God’ s love.  
The Christian community formed around that narrative is one that is grounded in 
love, expressed through sacrifice, exemplified by Jesus’ s suffering on the cross. The 
narrative of the community of Christians shaped by these overarching themes will be the 
focus of this final chapter. This doctrinal area could be considered an ecclesiology, but I 
have chosen to primarily refer to it as a pneumatology. My reasons for doing this require 
clarification. The use of pneumatology immediately evokes thoughts of the Holy Spirit. 
However, rather than focusing primarily on doctrines regarding a member of the 
Godhead, the emphasis here remains on narratives. Chapter two highlighted the 
beginning of the narrative and chapter three highlights the end, so this chapter will attend 
to the middle portion. 
There are two primary reasons why I have denoted this middle narrative as a 
pneumatology. The first relates to the eschatological tension between the “already-but-
not-yet” noted in the previous chapter. Chapter three focused on the “not-yet,” or future-
orientated eschatology; the focus here is the “already” aspect. Theologian Amos Yong 
has said that the present time within “the eschatological context of the already-but-not-
yet” is what “the Christian theological tradition calls the ‘age of the Spirit.’ ”255 The 
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apostle Paul notes the connection of the first fruits of the already-coming Kingdom with 
the Spirit whose arrival proves its inauguration (Rom 8:23). There is thus precedent to 
connect this middle narrative to the Spirit.  
The second reason for describing this chapter as a pneumatology is in recognition 
of the importance of the day of Pentecost on shaping “redemptive events embodied in a 
human community.”256 As Moltmann says, “the Spirit leads to the fellowship of Christ 
and consummates the messianic kingdom.”257 Thus, according to the ancient Christian 
narrative, the church is born out of the Spirit and is tied to the kingdom. The strong 
attention on Pentecost and the Spirit for the formation of a redemptive community in the 
“age of the Spirit” makes for good reasons to call these doctrines pneumatology.258 
Pneumatology thus retains a strong narrative aspect consistent with the other theological 
doctrines explored thus far.  
Examining the wider scope of the Christian narrative is helpful, not only because 
it aids in situating the term pneumatology, but it also elucidates some of the broader 
themes in the Christian narrative that help clarify the distinction between Christianity and 
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capitalism made in this final chapter. Despite the very close similarities between 
Christianity and capitalism’ s narratives discussed in the previous two chapters, this 
chapter will tease out the paradox of stark contrasts in the primary tones in both of these 
narratives. For if the Christian narrative is grounded in the giving up of self, love, and 
sacrifice, the economic narrative never breaks free from self-interest. The importance of 
these overarching themes in these narratives is crucial to the type of worlds that they are 
constructing and the meaning that can be made out of them.259 This chapter builds on the 
conclusions thus far that capitalism and Christianity carry out similar social functions, but 
it brings to the fore the paradox that though the results of their narratives are similar at 
times, such as in the previous two chapters, at other times they could not be more 
different. Thus while their social functions may be similar, these two institutions 
represent different alternatives in the current social milieu for how to understand and 
make meaning out of the world. Christianity and capitalism are both powerful institutions 
in the current world and the objective of this final chapter is to aid in understanding how 
they are both constructing diverging metanarratives that structure the world differently 
and draw different meanings out of it.  
The three sections of this chapter thus attempt to make two major points. The first 
section will examine a specific manner in which both capitalism and Christianity carry 
out the task of world-maintenance. Their pneumatologies include a paradoxical 
confluence of the particular and abstract that, in the fashion of a Sorelian myth, plays a 
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vital role in imbuing meaning to life through the mechanism of transcendence. Through 
this paradox, both institutions draw individual experiences into a grand metanarrative. 
However, differences in those narratives will be made evident. The following two 
sections form the second area of focus, which will emphasize the differences between the 
theologies of capitalism and Christianity, focusing first on what they say about equality, 
or open access to power, and then upon community in general. 
It is not surprising that Christian and economic theologies both speak to these 
same aspects that have been lumped under a pneumatology. That is because these points 
(connecting particular experiences to a broader narrative, deciding who gets access to 
power and authority, and defining community) represent important social functions. 
While the first section will reveal that not only are they performing the same function, but 
both systems are carrying it out in a similar manner, ultimately it will be clear that these 
two systems, at times, develop conflicting narratives. This whole essay then is not simply 
an exploration of capitalism’ s and Christianity’ s theologies in order to reveal that 
capitalism, and more generally economics, functions in a value-laden fashion. Rather this 
chapter explores how these two institutions are creating metanarratives, that are, in this 
age of the Spirit competing to order and shape the present social reality by authoring 
meaning and significance.  
 
 
II. The Price of Experience and the Value of Metaphysics 
 
The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not 
know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of 
the Spirit.  
 
John 3:8 
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In trying to describe the Holy Spirit, the metaphor of a blowing wind is one that is 
often used. This metaphor points to two paradoxical, but crucial, aspects of a 
pneumatology. The blowing wind is an experience to which everyone can relate, and the 
“sound like the rush of a violent wind” was a significant part of the day of Pentecost. 
However, the wind eschews any corporeal form. That is, while its presence is made 
known through specific, tangible experiences, it also remains unencumbered by any of its 
own matter. It is abstract. 
Dunn notes that it is “[t]oo little appreciated… that when we speak of the Spirit in 
biblical theology, we are speaking in the first instance about experience.”260 Yet Dunn 
also notes that Spirit comes from the Hebrew ruach, “which denotes the breath of life, the 
life force of God… Common to the range of usage was evidently the sense of an 
invisible, mysterious, awful force.”261 Individuals encounter the Spirit, in a particular 
moment in time and space, as something invisible and infinite, transcending any singular 
time or place.  
Daniel L. Migliore even suggests that the Spirit serves as a way to re-present 
Jesus in the present saying, “the Spirit spans the gap between the then and there and the 
here and now.”262 Through a particular encounter of the Spirit one can experience Jesus, 
which can draw an individual into the grand Christian narrative of which Jesus is the 
center. One is experiencing the wind with her senses, yet finding the wind still both 
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“invisible” and “mysterious.” The coupling of these two qualities relates one’ s experience 
to a broader narrative that transcends particular circumstances. The invisible quality of 
the Spirit allows it to transcend any and all particular locations and times. Thus an event 
of the Spirit, is personal in its particularity. The personal aspect of that event, however, is 
integrated into the wider story of the world. The Spirit transcends any temporal or spatial 
restrictions allowing connections far beyond any one particularity. 
Capitalism shares this transcendent ability to pull particularities into an 
overarching metanarrative. Consider briefly the ability of the market to make any one 
item commensurate with anything else in the world. For example, James Fulcher 
describes how both capital and labor are abstracted in a capitalist system. Capitalism 
gives them “an abstract and disembedded quality since both are separated from specific 
economic activities and are therefore able in principle to move into any activity that 
suitably rewards them.”263 Capital and labor in this abstract form then can be used to 
measure anything and everything. Yet it is obvious that each and every body represents a 
particularity. No body can be in two places at once; it is constrained to one place and 
time. Still, somehow, within the market bodies can be abstracted and “disembedded” and 
used to measure any item around the globe. Thus both capital and labor, while particular 
by nature, have been abstracted in the capitalist system. 
This section will briefly examine this pneumatological paradox of the particular 
and abstract within the market by looking at the use of money and value. Philip 
Goodchild, who has provided an extensive study on the theological implications of 
money, notes that “[v]alue is an abstraction that derives from representing nature in terms 
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of money.”264 The ability to quantify each and every aspect of nature through some 
representative value is a core function of money. Goodchild describes this task of 
representation as “a process of abstraction that reproduces forms without their material 
substance. It separates forms from the context in which they dwell and function.”265 
This section will examine the way that systems of valuation in economics play a 
similar role to the Spirit, in that they connect particularities, or experiences, with abstract 
and global comparisons. While both Christian theology and capitalism have this 
paradoxical pairing, the conclusion of this section will highlight how this method of 
meaning-making is ultimately used to create different social realities. Before making this 
conclusion though the three economic schools will be briefly evaluated to see how this 
paradox of the particular and abstract plays out in each of them.   
Classical: Real and Nominal Prices. The issue of price theory, or how to value 
certain goods, is one to which much time and energy has been devoted. Adam Smith’ s 
Wealth of Nations contains the beginnings of a development of such a system. And while 
his system is incomplete, it reveals the initial threads of a two-part system with a foot in 
two worlds: the real or particular and the nominal or the abstract.266 As an example, 
Smith posits labor as the foundational aspect of his system of valuation.  He says that, 
“labour… is the only universal as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only 
standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities at all times and 
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all places.”267 This conclusion is surprising due to some of Smith’ s earlier observations. 
He, for instance, notes that commodities are “more frequently exchanged for, and thereby 
compared with, other commodities than with labour.”268 The reason for this comparison 
of commodities, according to Smith, is that commodities are “plain palpable object[s].” 
Labor on the other hand is “an abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently 
intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.”269  
This progression highlights the tension between the tangible and the abstract. The 
very concept of labor is an abstraction of an individual’ s body. Yet despite this, it is labor 
that serves as the foundational bedrock upon which value can be asserted. It “is alone the 
ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and 
places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price 
only.”270 The final phrase points to a profound insight that money is of no value, it is 
purely abstract. It is, however, connected to labor. And while labor is an abstract term 
itself, any person who has done any amount of physical labor recognizes that there is 
nothing abstract about the straining of muscles while under the oppressive rays of the sun 
bearing down on a hot summer’ s day.  
The paradoxical pneumatological convergence of the particular with the invisible 
plays out in Smith’ s analysis of money and a system of valuation. It provides a clear 
picture of the tension between tangible and abstract. The ability for the sweat on one’ s 
brow to somehow be universalized into comparison to any good available in the market 
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becomes an important aspect of capitalism’ s framework of meaning for the particular 
experiences of each and every body. 
Progressives: Present and Future Money. Moving into the twentieth century 
many vestiges of the more basic bartering economies present in Smith’ s time no longer 
remained. Systems of value were indelibly connected to money. Paul Samuelson says 
that, “ours is a system that makes extensive use of money. The flow of money is the 
lifeblood of our system. It also provides the measuring rod of values.”271 Money stands as 
representative to make anything and everything commensurate with each other. It is 
fascinating how prices are set though. For ultimately, while price is the correspondence 
of a product to money, an abstract “measuring rod of values,” price is also “the signal that 
consumers use to indicate how much they value various goods.”272 Thus price, in this 
regard, is boiled down to each particular moment when a consumer purchases a good. 
The value of items is necessarily tied to these experiences, specific to time and place, 
when a good is purchased. Price is grounded in these moments, while at the same time 
abstracted into a measurement of all values.273  
The final insight about money worth mentioning in the progressive school is 
Keynes’ s assertion that “the importance of money essentially flows from its being a link 
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between the present and the future.”274 The combination of both the particularity of the 
present and the abstract of the future is again clearly evident in this statement. Keynes’ s 
insight shows a connection to a Christian pneumatology. For as noted, a Christian 
pneumatology is focusing upon the “already” portion of the “already-but-not-yet” period 
of history. There is a connection with how both pneumatologies connect the present to 
the future. Money, according to Keynes, is the present representative of a future reality. 
This mirrors the Kingdom of God, whose inauguration has already been marked by the 
coming of the Spirit, yet is still eagerly awaiting its full realization in the future. The 
Spirit connects the already present Kingdom of God with its future reality just as money 
represents future possibilities in the present.  
The importance of both the abstract and the particular has been emphasized in the 
progressive school. The coupling of these two features provides meaning for particular 
moments. It makes individual actions and experiences intelligible amidst the enormous 
global milieu through the power of the decentralized market. 
Chicago: This System of Pricing, That Style of Hermeneutics. Similar to the 
previous two schools, the Chicago school continues to emphasize the paradoxical pair of 
experience and abstraction. Milton Friedman describes what he calls “Adam Smith’ s 
flash of genius,” which is essentially that this entire decentralized network, while able to 
function in the abstract, is still ultimately grounded in the individual “voluntary 
transactions between buyers and sellers.”275 No matter how powerful the market, nor how 
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effective it is for synthesizing “the activities of tens and hundreds of millions of people 
all over the globe,” it is ultimately contingent upon individual, particular transactions.276  
Friedman goes so far as to say that the “standards of the society,” an abstract 
concept, are derived from “[t]he votes of the members of a free-enterprise exchange 
economy [that] are manifested through prices.”277 Again the function of price and valuing 
connects particular moments of exchange to a wider narrative of abstract social standards. 
The paradoxical connection between particular experiences and abstractions sheds light 
on how each experience fits within the broader narrative.  
The Chicago school thus does not vary in any significant regard to the 
concomitant reliance upon experiences and the ethereal. Each economic school seems to 
function with the same pneumatological paradox that is present in Christian theology. In 
a particularly Pentecostal pneumatology, Yong points to what he calls a “this is that” 
style of hermeneutic, where “contemporary experiences of the Holy Spirit… resonate 
with the biblical narratives.”278 “This” experience reminds the Christian of “that” biblical 
narrative. “This” experience is made intelligible or meaningful based upon its connection 
to “that” abstract, or broader narrative.279 Price theory also connects “this” transaction to 
“that” wider “standard of society.” A Christian theology can tie a present event to 
something that occurred in the biblical narrative, embedding it in a grander context, 
which imbues it with meaning. Economics performs the same task of meaning making as 
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particular experiences of use and exchange are abstracted into the complex and 
decentralized market that is able to stabilize the pricing of all products giving them value 
and making any and everything commensurate. 
Scarcely Similar. This section has illuminated a specific process whereby both 
Christianity and capitalism engage in the task of meaning-making. Earlier chapters have 
provided many examples of these institutions carrying out this social function, but this 
section has drawn out similarities not only in what they are doing but in how they are 
doing it. Relying on one of the primary characteristics of a Sorelian myth, transcendence, 
this method reveals the importance of transcendent narratives to the meaning and 
significance that result from the connection of particularities to a grand metanarrative.  
There is a stark contrast in the underlying assumptions of these two 
metanarratives, however, that highlights a divergence in their theologies. Their stories are 
quite different. Pointing briefly to their distinction confirms that both institutions are 
legitimating the world, but their worlds are not identical. In the realm of economics, each 
particular experience is marked by scarcity. The experiences that were the building 
blocks for the abstract system of pricing and valuing were every individual consumer 
transaction. Each transaction is shrouded in limitations, for one always enters an 
exchange with scarce goods. By definition, economics is the allocation of scarce 
resources. There is not enough for everyone to have what she desires. The connection of 
particular exchanges to the possibility of purchasing every other possible good around the 
world is always handcuffed by the limitation of one’ s current possessions. What one can 
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exchange for is always restricted by what one already possesses. Economics’  
pneumatology is thus governed by a spirit of scarcity, or a metaphysics of scarcity.280  
The spirit of scarcity “hovering over the waters” (Gen 1:2 NIV) of economic 
transactions then is a constant reminder of the absence of other goods. The Christian day 
of Pentecost as described in Acts, on the other hand, is not governed by the same 
metaphysics of scarcity. Each experience with the Spirit was marked not by absence, but 
by presence. The Holy Spirit’ s arrival on the day of Pentecost restored the presence of 
God following Jesus’ s departure, or ascension. According to Christian tradition, the love 
of God evidenced through the sending of his only Son was extended further when Jesus 
did not limit his expression of love to the world, but “poured out himself to death” (Isa 
53:12) as a sacrifice for others. This did not mark the end of the love of God though as it 
is still found in abundance through his Spirit, re-presenting the love shown in Jesus.281 
What Jürgen Moltmann calls “the church in the power of the Spirit,” or the community 
established through the pouring out of the Spirit, continues the presence that overcomes 
any metaphysics of scarcity.282 Particular experiences with the Spirit in Christian 
theology emphatically highlight continued presence. This starkly contrasts an economic 
pneumatology that is shrouded in scarcity. While these two pneumatologies are similarly 
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constructing worlds and metanarratives, the worlds and metanarratives they are 
constructing are quite different.  
The paradox examined in this section is present in both theologies and gives 
insight into how both are shaping meaning and significance. These systems develop a 
narrative upon which meaning can be built in the age of the Spirit. The spirit of scarcity 
that underlies the economic story is opposite of the Christian narrative of abundance. The 
next two sections will reveal how this difference results in different prescriptions for the 
present social order. These differences highlight how capitalism and Christianity can both 
develop their own unique, and at times, diverging theologies.  
 
 
III. Power Upon All Flesh 
 
The importance of the day of Pentecost can doubtfully be overemphasized when it 
comes to its role in establishing the ongoing existence of the Christian community. It 
defined who could belong to the Christian community as well as who had access to 
power and authority. The apostle Peter addressed the crowd on the day of Pentecost after 
the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Peter explains the day’ s events by quoting the prophet 
Joel, perhaps engaging in his own this (particular experience) is that (abstract concept or 
idea) theology. His selection of Joel’ s passage establishes the rubric for who will be 
allowed among, and empowered, in this fledgling community. 
In his sermon, Peter states that the Spirit will be poured out “upon all flesh, and 
your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and 
your old men shall dream dreams. Even upon my slaves both men and women, in those 
days I will pour out my Spirit” (Acts 2:17-18; Joel 2:28-9). This list slices across any neat 
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demographic segments regarding gender, age, or socio-economic status. The importance 
of Pentecost for ethnic inclusion was also vital. Dunn asserts that “[i]f it is true that 
Christianity would not have begun without the resurrection of Jesus, it is equally true that 
Christianity would have not become a religion for non-Jews without the outpouring of the 
Spirit.”283 While the inclusion of non-Jews was not immediate, it is noteworthy that a 
crucial event for their acceptance was the narrative in Acts 10 where the Spirit is poured 
out again, this time in the house of Cornelius, a non-Jew. 
The access available to the Spirit shapes the community in this narrative in a 
fashion that highlights equality. This does not mean that there was no hierarchy, but the 
outpouring of the Spirit revealed that each person, whether they were a child or elderly, 
man or woman, Jew or non-Jew, had the opportunity to experience the Spirit and the 
power and authority that came with it. The community, or church, shaped by the Spirit is, 
according to Moltmann, “an ‘open’  church.”284 The outpouring of the Spirit tempered the 
development of any monopolies on access to the power of God. There is a similar 
equality touted by proponents of the market. Peter Berger points out how “[t]he market 
has often been depicted as a perfectly democratic, even egalitarian system, with prices 
recording the ‘votes’  of all the participants. Insofar as capitalism is market economics, 
capitalism then can be defended on democratic or even egalitarian grounds.”285 
Goodchild explains this by saying that within the market everyone has the “same 
freedom of voluntary contracting, and the same obligations to honor contracts and to 
                                                 
283Dunn, New Testament Theology, 33.  
284Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, 2.  
285Berger, “Introduction: America and the Myth of Inequality,” 9. 
136 
respect property, all people may be regarded as equal in the marketplace.”286 The extent 
of this equality then covers its own variety of demographics, for the market is blind with 
regard to who is entering into those contracts. This section will briefly examine this idea 
of open access to the market that parallels how Pentecost was accessible to “all flesh.” 
After briefly looking at how each of the schools highlights this equality, the distinction in 
their larger narratives will be examined to display the different social reality that these 
two institutions actually construct related to equality and access to power.  
Classical: Profits and Prejudices. In Albert Hirschman’ s discussion of the 
attempt by Adam Smith and his contemporaries to calm some of the more erratic and 
violent passions through steady and constant self-interest, he notes how Smith’ s 
contemporaries recognized that commerce had a polishing effect on individuals that led 
to further politeness and gentleness. This politeness led to being far more accepting of 
others in general. For example, Hirschman points to an insight by Scottish historian 
William Robertson in 1769. Robertson states that, “[c]ommerce tends to wear off those 
prejudices which maintain distinctions and animosity between nations.”287  
Smith notes some of the prejudices, or at the very least hesitations, of dealing with 
those in foreign countries rather than in the domestic market. Yet in response to each of 
those reasons for preferring domestic trade, Smith offers a rebuttal by changing the 
perspective, asserting instead that, “it is only for the sake of profit” that any man works or 
invests his capital.288 From this vantage point, it becomes obvious, that despite any 
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preferences toward avoiding trade with any foreign nation, the only criterion for making 
that decision should be based upon one’ s profit. Thus just as Pentecost opened up an 
outpouring on members of all ethnicities, so Smith has suggested that each nation be 
equally considered in search of a waterfall of profits. 
Progressives: Money Speaks for Minorities. The shift in perspective 
highlighted by Smith, focusing solely upon profits, is continued by the progressive 
school. Samuelson notes that in the American society, which puts less emphasis upon 
tradition, instead caring almost exclusively about profits, foreigners are more welcomed. 
Quite bluntly, “[b]ecause ‘money talks,’  it is easier for outsiders to break into the upper 
crust.”289 Samuelson does not deny that there are still inequalities that exist in society, 
many of which relate to minorities. However, according to Samuelson, when the market 
is running at full capacity, no consideration of ethnicity is taken and individuals will be 
fully employed. The progressives agree with Smith that in a perfectly functioning market, 
profits will be the only concern creating inclusivity by overcoming various prejudices. 
The progressive critique of the economic theory prior to them was that the market 
needed certain conditions in order to be able to run at full capacity. Their goal was to 
maintain the market in a way in which access to the upper echelon is based purely on 
profits. It is for this reason that Samuelson condemns anyone who causes an imperfection 
in the competitive market through means such as monopolies or oligopolies. The way to 
combat these “economic evils” is to “make sure that barriers to entry are kept to a 
minimum.”290 Thus the importance in the progressive school of equality of access is vital. 
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Eliminating barriers that are blocking people from entering the market inhibits 
monopolies and oligopolies. Preventing the development of these forms of imperfect 
competition will help the economy run at full capacity which will cause decisions to be 
based on economic reasons only, opening the door for outsiders and minorities.  
Chicago: Monopolizing Discrimination. Despite the fact that the Chicago 
school and the progressives have vehement ideological disagreements over how the 
economy should be run properly, the concern for the negative effects of a monopoly are 
shared. In fact, Friedman pairs monopolies with inequality saying that areas “of 
discrimination in any society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, 
whereas discrimination against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas 
where there is the greatest freedom of competition.”291 For this reason Friedman notes 
that “[i]t is a striking historical fact that the development of capitalism has been 
accompanied by a major reduction in the extent to which particular religious, racial, or 
social groups” have been “discriminated against.”292 Friedman’ s explanation for this is 
quite similar to the previous two schools’  explanations. For those who are concerned only 
with profits, or purchasing items at the cheapest price possible, matters of race and 
religion no longer rule the decision making process. The “free market separates economic 
efficiency from irrelevant characteristics,” such as those that might be associated with a 
minority group.293 
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Friedman also points out how the price system, where prices are based upon the 
purchases made by individuals, is essentially a voting system. Everyone then can vote 
forming “a system of proportional representation.”294 This system of representation 
allows for “minority groups in the society” to “make their wishes felt.”295 Each of the 
three schools then highlights the ways in which the capitalist system of economics 
appears to tout a similar theme of equality and open access to authority that appears in a 
Christian pneumatology.  
Scarcely Accessible. Though it seems that an economic pneumatology is very 
similar to a Christian pneumatology on this point, the differing underlying metaphysics in 
the two pneumatologies provide a stark distinction regarding equality and open access to 
power. The resulting present social reality is thus quite distinct. The spirit of scarcity 
undergirding capitalism is evident upon further analysis of the economic literature. Smith 
notes that “[t]he general industry of the society never can exceed what the capital of the 
society can employ.”296 For Smith, the amount of national production is based upon the 
maximum amount of labor that can be put to work. However, the amount of labor is 
limited by the amount of capital available to “employ” that labor.  
The foundation of Smith’ s economy is based on the amount of capital available. 
This capital, or wealth, is power.297 Thus capital gives one the power or authority to 
employ labor, or as Smith says, “a certain command over all the labour, or over all the 
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produce of labour which is then in the market.”298 The assertion that those with wealth 
maintain the power to command labor results in a differentiation of access to power. For, 
as Goodchild notes, “[i]f there is to be one who commands…there is also one who 
serves.”299 The lack of capital available in any given market obliges that, while everyone 
can participate freely in the market, only a limited number can hold positions of 
command. The experience of power between those commanding and serving is quite 
different. For each person experiencing wealth’ s power from a position of command, 
there must also be someone who is experiencing that power from a position of servitude. 
Friedman’ s suggestion about minorities in light of the rampant underlying scarcity 
raises another issue. For while he suggested that minorities are able to make their voices 
heard through their purchases, it should be immediately evident that some individuals 
have more votes than others. Some voices then can be effectively excluded from the 
conversation. All of this is caused by a scarcity of wealth. Turning again to Goodchild, he 
says that, “[i]f money promises an ability to participate in market society, it also threatens 
exclusion from access to capital for those who are unable to participate through lack of 
money.”300 Equality and access to power in an economic pneumatology are thus possible, 
and there are certainly some effective systems that provide opportunities for many. 
However, the foundational spirit of scarcity constantly looms over economic theory. Its 
metanarrative forms a world in which concerns of scarcity, the limitation of capital, 
causes a stockpiling of wealth and power that places some in a position of command 
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while leaving others in a subservient position or one of total exclusion. Ultimately any 
ostensible equality of access or power is born out of transactions that at their root are self-
interested, which chains some to the status of servitude or exclusion. 
Thus, while it is possible to compare an economic pneumatology and a Christian 
one on the point of equality and open access to power, the comparison is matched by 
contrasts as well. Access to power in the economy is ultimately limited, and with that 
limitation comes exclusion. Power is considered something to be grasped if one is able. 
The Christian age of the Spirit, however, is not based in scarcity. Rather the access to 
power becomes open and available to an ever-expanding group of people. In the nascent 
stages of Christianity, Acts 1:8 establishes the ideal to which the first century Christianity 
community aspired, stating that power will be provided to those who receive the Holy 
Spirit, which will be spread from “Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of 
the earth.” The progression of the Christian pneumatology is one of continued expansion, 
which knows no limits. The power gained through the Spirit does not lead to dominance 
over others. It is, as Wright said, “the power of love,” something quite different than the 
power asserted through self-interested transactions.301 The meaning of power and the 
significance of its dispersal in society is shaped in two starkly contrasting fashions rooted 
in the differing stories that these two institutions tell about equality and access to power. 
 
 
IV. Community in Common 
 
The discussion of equality in access to power and authority opens up the question 
of how individuals should interact with each other in community more generally. The 
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formation of the early church comes out of the day of Pentecost and is foundational for a 
Christian ideal of community. Not only does the Spirit unite believers to Christ, but also 
to each other. The emphasis upon community in the Acts’  narrative after the day of 
Pentecost is readily visible. The community was meeting together daily, in their homes, 
eating meals together.302 The arrival of the community in the age of the Spirit is viewed 
as a foretaste of the future anticipated kingdom community.  
Migloire describes the ideal community pictured under the influence of the Spirit 
saying, “[t]his uniting or incorporating power of the Spirit is not the power of mere 
togetherness of the like-minded or the kinship of people of the same family, race, 
economic class, or nation. It is the power of new community that unites strangers and 
even former enemies. It creates community where formerly there were inseparable 
barriers.”303 This description of the community aspired to through the Spirit again is one 
that surpasses demographic boundaries and unites individuals across these barriers. Just 
as a Christian pneumatology opens up the opportunity to access power and authority to 
anyone, so too, is the community widely inclusive. The importance of the community 
generated by the day of Pentecost is clear over the narrative of the book of Acts. 
Capitalism holds communal interactions as a central aspect of its pneumatology as 
well. Through the market, countless individuals can be brought into relationship with 
each other in ways that would otherwise have not been possible. These interactions 
become fundamental to the market. The schools of capitalism are not shy in pointing out 
the incredible nature of the community formed by capitalism as well as the astonishing 
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diversity of participants. The aggregate of all of the transactions that are occurring within 
the market build a community.304 In fact, capitalism may be the most effective system of 
bringing diverse individuals together. This section will briefly examine how each school 
of economics informs this vision of a united and diversified community within the market 
before pointing out distinctions from the Christian conception of community. 
Classical: Dividing Labor but Connecting People. The central insight of Adam 
Smith was the importance of the division of labor that allowed individuals to focus upon 
the production of one product (or even just one piece of one product) that paved the way 
for increased efficiency and technological advancement. The division of labor, however, 
was only possible as individuals could come together in order to trade and barter for the 
items they needed for sustenance. No longer did one have to produce every item that he 
needed for survival. The excess of items produced beyond his need could be traded for 
other goods needed. Milton Meyers has shown how the philosophers of Smith’ s time 
understood that, “[c]ommunity living arises due to economic interdependence,” which is 
exactly what capitalism was creating.305  
As for the extent of variety that was included in this community based upon 
economic interdependence at Smith’ s time, Fulcher claims that it is a false claim “that 
global capitalism is something new. Almost as soon at it had come into existence, 
capitalism spread across the world.”306 Smith describes the variety of people that any one 
person must rely upon for the production of all of the goods they own. In discussing the 
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number of individuals required for the production of a basic good such as a woolen coat 
Smith asks the questions,  
How many merchants and carriers, besides must have been employed in 
transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live 
in a very distant part of the country? How much commerce and navigation in 
particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers must have 
been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the 
dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world?307 
 
Thus from the nascent stages of capitalism in Smith’ s time, it is clear that a 
community was developing based upon economic dependence. And even in a world 
before technology, the market was binding individuals across the globe into a capitalistic 
community.  
Progressives: The Community’s Complete Circle. The progressives expanded 
on this concept of society’ s interconnectedness through the market. Samuelson describes 
just how connected producers, consumers, and everyone in between become in this 
system. For “the money that [consumers] pay into business cash registers ultimately 
provides the payrolls, rents, and dividends which consumers receive in weekly income. 
Thus the circle is a complete one.”308 The market orders a community where employers, 
employees, and consumers are all tied to each other, depending upon each individual to 
carry out her role in the community.  
The reliance of the market community upon each other is evident not only in the 
cycle of money, but also in the implicit contracts made among the community through 
each exchange of money. Each transaction becomes a contract for the exchange of a 
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particular good for a set amount of money. Keynes, while discussing money says, “it is a 
peculiar characteristic of money contracts that it is the State or Community not only 
which enforces delivery, but also which decides what it is that must be delivered as a 
lawful or customary discharge of a contract which has been concluded in terms of the 
money-of-account.”309 While Keynes’ s point may not be immediately evident, his 
explanation of the role of money is important. In this quotation, he is explaining the lack 
of money’ s intrinsic value. Thus a collection of individuals, whether that is a formalized 
body, such as the state, or just the community, must establish money’ s usefulness as 
payment. The value of money is ultimately grounded in the agreement among a 
community upon what it should be worth. 
The phrase “money contracts” is thus enlightening for it shows the true character 
of each exchange. The giving and accepting of money as a proper means of “discharging” 
a contract, reveals the good faith in the use of money that must be accepted throughout 
the community. Thus not only does the market function to bring each character into an 
unending cycle of transactions in which each person has her role, but the mechanism for 
those transactions, money, is built upon a community-wide agreement that accepts money 
as a form of payment.  
Chicago: The Marriage Market. The Chicago school, true to form, moves 
economic analysis outside of areas that traditionally fall inside of the market. In other 
words, the Chicago school finds no reason why relationships and community, including 
even the most intimate relationships, such as spouses and children, should not be 
analyzed as standard economic transactions. This also serves as an example of just how 
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important economics can become in shaping a social world. For Chicago has shaped 
every aspect of the world into a marketplace, ensuring that all actions, desires, and 
relationships are significant because of their fulfillment of foundational economic goals. 
Gary Becker thus asserts the true meaning behind a marital relationship. He states 
that, “marriage… can be successfully analyzed within the framework provided by 
modern economics” because it can be assumed that persons marrying “expect to raise 
their utility level above what it would be were they to remain single.”310 If there was any 
doubt as to whether the transactions and economic interdependence examined in the 
previous schools actually constitute a community, it should be erased. Becker actually 
reduces the most foundational familial relationships to economic transactions. Not only 
are individuals engaging in a transaction with their spouses, but they must compete in 
wider society as they are seeking out their mate. Thus “a market in marriages can be 
presumed to exist. Each person tries to find the best mate, subject to the restrictions 
imposed by market conditions.”311 
Capitalism has much to say regarding the structuring of community. The first two 
schools both established wide networks of transactions and economic interdependence 
that formed a community that spanned the length of the globe, even in the eighteenth 
century. Each member of the community depends upon all others to participate in the 
same community circle. And while some may balk at the notion of considering economic 
transactions as the foundation of a community, the Chicago school emphasizes their 
belief that all community and relationships, even the very dearest familial ties, can be 
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reduced to transactions. The community of capitalism then is built upon transactions and 
contracts. 
Scarcely Community. It is clear that capitalism is far from value-neutral in its 
depiction of community as it defines relationships as being grounded in struggle and 
competition. According to Daniel Bell Jr., “[u]nder capitalism people exist for one 
another in an instrumental fashion; capitalism encourages us to view others in terms of 
how they can serve our self-interested projects.”312 Bell’ s point here is certainly 
supported as Smith notes that “man has almost constant occasion for the help of his 
brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.”313 Thus even 
as every economic person is engaged in the market community, it is obvious that each 
enters the community with his own ends in mind. 
The community established by the depiction of Pentecost was built upon more 
than just self-interested interactions. While the community was meeting daily with each 
other, their community was rooted in more than just close proximity. William Cavanaugh 
points out that there is “a profound longing for unity in the Christian tradition.”314 The 
community formed was one that was united in spirit and in actions. They shared a 
common goal and purpose. This common goal was one that led them to not act only in 
self-interest fashion. Following the model of the life of Jesus, not only did they not look 
to optimize what they could receive in every transaction, but they were willing to 
sacrificially give to others, sometimes even to the point of giving their lives. The idea of a 
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shared, or common, goal is one that is entirely foreign to the market community. In the 
Christian community, however, each individual was not simply working in a self-
interested fashion to try and achieve their own desires.315 Rather, they were bound by 
love, and united in their goals, which might partially explain some of the rapidity of the 
first century spread of Christianity. 
In an analysis of a monopolist who is selling items for a price that does not 
optimize her profits Samuelson says that, “[w]hile there is no law against his being such 
an altruist, such as Santa Claus, the betting odds may be against this. And in any case 
such an optimal solution to the problem by chivalry has nothing to do with Adam Smith’ s 
Invisible Hand – which insisted that self-interest (not altruism) would preform the miracle 
of providing for the general interest.”316 The notion of a shared communal good achieved 
through means such as altruism cannot exist within the market context. It “has nothing to 
do with Adam Smith’ s Invisible Hand.” It has nothing to do with the way that capitalism 
has formed communities to exist. At the heart, each relationship in the capitalist 
community must be driven by self-interest because of the looming scarcity. The two 
worlds constructed by Christianity and capitalism thus shape very different realities for 
communities. One is shaped by unity where they “have love for one another” (Jn 13:35), 
while the other is grounded in self-interest.  
These two narratives clearly establish entirely different social orders. Both 
capitalism and Christianity shape models of communal engagement, but examining their 
                                                 
315The Pentecost narrative of community builds on much of what the Old Testament prophets 
outlined about relationships as well. Consider the prophet Hosea who was instructed by God in order to 
marry a prostitute, Gomar. Despite Gomar’ s abandoning of Hosea, Hosea finds her and maintains her as his 
wife. This vision of love, as a picture of God’ s love for Israel, could not be more different than Becker’ s 
depiction of a marriage only grounded in self-interest.  
316Samuelson, Economics, 533-4.  
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metanarratives reveals how significantly they diverge at various points. The absence of 
common ends can be traced backed to the distinction in metaphysics between 
capitalism’ s pneumatology and Christianity’ s, for the relational structuring of the market 
is one of competition and struggle. The limited amount of resources means that the 
success of one individual comes at the loss of another. The only possibility of shared ends 
is if there is a coincidentally overlapping of individuals’  self-interest.317 
Proof that capitalist society is typified by coincidentally overlapping goals rather 
than common ends can be seen in the “proliferation of contractual agreements” that 
results in what Berger calls a “contract society.”318 The self-interested nature of every 
action requires the recording of boundaries for each relationship and transaction. Every 
party must be protected from when their overlapping goals may part ways. The drawing 
of boundaries in such hyper-legalistic fashion has become commonplace, but is necessary 
in order to delineate and protect each individuals’  rights. The effect of capitalism’ s 
theology, which is rooted in scarcity, is authoritative for the structure of present social 
realities. This hyper-contract society, however, starkly contrasts the vision of Christian 
community rooted in shared ends and mirroring the characteristic of love exemplified in 
the life of Jesus and made continually present through the Spirit.319 
                                                 
317Consider as an example of coincidentally overlapping goals how Becker describes a 
corporation’ s role is in carrying out common social goods. “[A]lthough maximizing value, meeting 
contracts, and obeying laws help achieve many of the goals by those claiming corporations should be 
‘socially responsible’ … Still, laws and contracts, and individual use of their own resources, rather than 
corporate behavior, should be the way to implement various social goals.” Thus anything that may appear 
to fit within a vision of a common good, or a wider social goal, is always just the incidental effect of 
maximizing self-interest; see Gary S. Becker and Richard A. Posner, Uncommon Sense: Economic Insights, 
From Marriage to Terrorism (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 191. 
318Berger, Capitalist Revolution, 111.   
319There are several questions raised by this analysis that cannot be addressed due to space 
restraints. How are opposing narratives able to be meshed together as effectively as these two? Does this 
cause a sort of cognitive dissonance for those who are residing in realms governed by both narratives 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has carried out two main tasks. First, it has expanded the comparison 
of capitalism to a third theological tenet of Christianity. As this thesis has focused upon 
the social function of religions, this chapter has revealed the importance of a 
pneumatology for depicting the middle portion of the narrative. Just as the day of 
Pentecost serves as a foundational narrative for a Christian community, this chapter has 
shown that capitalism has its own implied vision of how this middle narrative should 
look. Having established a solid connection between three Christian theological tenets 
and capitalism, there seems to be little doubt that despite the many attempts to deny that 
capitalism has any value-laden, or theological, aspects, it clearly does. Key insights have 
been revealed in each of the economic schools displaying implied narratives and 
theologies.  
The second major task of this chapter was to reveal that while both of these 
systems are constructing social realities, their worlds are not the same. While the 
previous two chapters have focused solely on comparisons, this chapter compared and 
contrasted each theology on different points. It was clear, based upon capitalism’ s spirit 
of scarcity, that its theological vision differs from a Christian theology. While both 
systems ostensibly offer equality and equal access to power, capitalism forms a social 
setting where some are excluded due to the spirit of scarcity, which concentrates wealth 
and power. The communities envisioned by both institutions differ as well. Capitalism’ s 
community is formed through transactions that are grounded in self-interest. Even the 
                                                                                                                                                 
simultaneously? Is this simply a metonym of a wider clash of ancient and modern metanarratives? In my 
opinion, Pierre Bourdieu’ s concept of “misrecognition” is an attempt to explain similar paradoxes, where a 
cultural narrative is not based in self-interest, yet, according to Bourdieu, the actions actually are driven by 
a narrative grounded in self-interest.   
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most intimate relationships adhere to this principle in capitalism’ s grand narrative. 
Christian community, on the other hand, sees the possibility of a community with 
common ends and relationships rooted in love and sacrifice. The narratives formed by 
both of these institutions then have the potential to establish starkly different social 
realities in the present. 
It is evident that capitalism is not simply just perpetuating a theology that 
pervades the culture in which it is embedded. Rather capitalism is creating, developing, 
and propagating its own unique theology. These two systems are creating distinct social 
worlds that are governed by their own value-laden visions, or narratives. Capitalism, just 
like religion, is carrying out specific social functions that provide foundational narratives, 
or theology, to help guide and structure life. The tension that crops up between capitalism 
and Christianity can easily be understood when viewing both institutions as originators of 
their own metanarratives. Since neither is fully reliant upon the other, they can overlap, 
yet distinctions between them do not raise any interpretative problems. The present and 
future social realities ultimately hinge upon the ability of institutions to establish a 
metanarrative that is capable of structuring society according to its vision of the good life.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis began as a challenge to the structure of the relationship implied by 
Max Weber’ s thesis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber held 
economics and religion in two separate realms, where economics was value-free and 
religion was value-laden. And while Weber critiqued Marx’ s reductionist view, the 
division between these two realms present in his own thesis has continued to govern 
much of the study of the interaction of these two fields for the past century. 
Rejecting the relationship that lands economics in the realm of facts as distinct 
from religion in the dominion of values, this thesis asserts instead that economics is not 
value-neutral, but rather that it actually carries out similar social functions to religion. 
These social functions are crucial for instilling values within society. Leaning heavily 
upon Peter Berger’ s social analysis of the importance of legitimations and Georges 
Sorel’ s concept of myth, the first chapter argued that while religion has been traditionally 
one of the most important institutions for carrying out such social tasks, economics is 
also engaged in the same social tasks.  
An important way to make meaning out of the world is the construction of 
narratives. Pulling heavily from three different economic schools, major themes of 
capitalism’ s narrative were compared to a Christian theology in the final three chapters. 
Beginning with a story of origins, chapter two revealed how capitalism asserts a similar 
understanding of who humans are, what type of world humans live in, and how all of the 
characters in the world should be ordered. The third chapter again engaged economists 
revealing how economists hold eschatological hopes and aspirations for the future made 
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possible by economic innovations. This chapter also examined how Peter Berger’ s own 
work on the concept of development blurred the categorization of economics, specifically 
capitalism, as purely value-neutral. The revelation throughout the final three chapters of 
this thesis of the theological tenets of capitalism provided widespread support for the 
argument that capitalism is not merely a value-neutral system, but that it is imbuing 
certain behaviors and systems as the proper way to realize the good life. 
The final chapter continued the comparison between the social function carried 
out by capitalism and Christianity. It, however, raised another issue, namely that despite 
the fact that capitalism and Christianity are similarly engaged in the task of constructing a 
narrative and meaning in the world, their narratives are at times diametrically opposed. 
This chapter pointed to specific instances where these narratives clash, such as how 
communities are constructed, and how power is accessed and spread. Economics, an 
institution that has been held to be purely grounded in facts, eschewing any value claims, 
can actually be seen competing with a Christian narrative in establishing ideals and 
making meaning in the world. The clash of capitalism’ s and Christianity’ s narratives that 
are attempting to construct reality is a significant characteristic of the postmodern milieu 
of current society. Far from the commonly held vision of economics residing in the realm 
of pure facts, avoiding any role in establishing values, it is clear that capitalism is 
promulgating its own theology, or narrative vision of the good life.   
This thesis has thus proved the myth of a secular economy in two senses. Firstly, 
reading myth in the colloquial sense of the word, sound arguments have been provided to 
question whether there is an economy that is value-neutral, or secular, and void of a 
theology. Rejecting the stark distinction visible in Weber’ s analysis of the Protestant 
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ethic, this project has displayed that the fact-value distinction held between the field of 
economics and religion is a false construction. Economics, including capitalism, is a 
value-laden field carrying out many of the same social functions as religion.  
Secondly, understanding myth in the Sorelian sense, this thesis has unpacked the 
mythic potency of capitalism, revealing its implied theology. One of the primary value-
laden activities of religion is instituting a set of beliefs that establishes a vision of the 
good life, or desired ends. Capitalism’ s implied theology reflects the underlying beliefs 
that are inculcated through economic theories. These beliefs form foundational narratives 
that are crucial for shaping present realities and visions of how life should be lived. There 
is no such thing as a secular, or value-neutral, economic system. Rather even capitalism 
has an extreme mythic potency hinging upon the transcendent power of the market. 
The theology of capitalism articulated throughout this project confirms the value-
laden nature of capitalism. It also reveals that though capitalism and Christianity both 
construct social worlds, they are not constructing the same worlds. Their theologies at 
times overlap very neatly, which is perhaps why Weber’ s thesis, at times, is so 
convincing. Yet, at other times, their overarching narratives for shaping social structures 
could not be more different, which is perhaps why Weber’ s thesis, at times, is so 
unconvincing. Capitalism is clearly carrying out the social functions that have 
traditionally been done by religion, but it is doing so in a way that results in its own 
world of meaning and significance.  
Examining these two institutions is really only a microcosm of the proliferation of 
metanarratives in the current postmodern context. Whereas centuries ago, authority was 
far more concentrated, often in religious hierarchies, now the voices of authority are 
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countless. And while secularization theories have been disproved (religion does not seem 
to be going anywhere) it does seem to be the case that religion is now just one of many 
institutions that are creating foundational narratives upon which social realities are being 
constructed in this age of the Spirit. Public policies are more and more frequently trying 
to address the conflicts that come as a result of religious pluralism. The range of 
theologies meeting in the public square, however, does not simply originate from 
religious institutions. Many different social institutions are attempting to shape and form 
a vision of the world. Even economics, an institution that has so often been thought of as 
a fact-based disciplined, is lobbying for its own set of values to structure society 
according to its vision of the good life. There does not seem to be any end to the conflicts 
occurring due to pluralism, but rather there is growth in the number of institutions, not 
just religious, that are creating worlds of meaning and significance.    
For all of these musings, any scholar after a deep discussion of abstract concepts 
will likely face a particular line of questioning. People want to know, Why does this 
matter? or, So what should I do now? The discussion of this unarticulated theology of 
capitalism raises these same questions. Having considered the presence of an implicit 
theology within capitalism for an extended period of time there are a number of 
directions that could be taken in answering this question regarding the present project. 
However, I want to part with just two suggestions for the implications of this study on the 
field of religious studies. The first deals specifically with the study of theology. The 
second will deal with the field of religious studies more generally.  
It has long been recognized that cultural environments affect the theology being 
produced in specific contexts. Analysis of culture often includes dynamics of wealth and 
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other socio-economic considerations. However, the analysis in this project has revealed 
that maintaining a distinction between “economic culture” and “economic laws” is an 
operation in a false reality. The correlation and connection between economics and 
religion that dramatically shifted when Weber critiqued Marx’ s one-sided, reductive 
approach must be again transformed. For despite Weber’ s willingness to examine a more 
dynamic relationship between the two fields, he still held a qualitative distinction 
between the two, viewing economics as a value-neutral domain as opposed to the value-
laden arena of religion. This view, which Peter Berger continued to espouse, recognizes 
an economic culture, but still separates that culture from economic laws. This distinction 
is no longer tenable. 
Maintaining this qualitative divide between these two fields can no longer stand 
as an accurate representation of the nature of each. Economics does not only affect 
culture by the results in its production of wealth and material goods. It also structures 
society in a fashion that forms foundational narratives and tenets of belief. Analysis of 
theology in different contexts then must consider the possible diffusion between 
economic and Christian (or any other religion’ s) theologies. It is no longer adequate to 
view religion and economics as fields that are engaged in two different, or even 
tangentially connected, projects. Both lay the groundwork for theologies that structure the 
lives of individuals. Increased diligence must be taken in considering economics in this 
light, especially given its lack of ostensible theological doctrine. While it is not possible 
for every project to focus as extensively as I have upon the relationship between 
theological doctrines resulting from both economics and religion, reconfiguring the 
relationship between the two fields so that they are no longer assumed to be qualitatively 
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distinct is a necessary starting point for any project relating the two fields, especially 
when considering theology. 
Another crucial component of this thesis for the study of theology is the 
importance of giving adequate attention to the form, or structuring, of certain systems. 
Theology has the tendency to focus upon the content of beliefs that are articulated. Too 
often, however, in the task of theology, these beliefs are divorced from any consideration 
of bodily practices. Economic theology serves as an impressive example of the ability of 
a system to impose a theology without having to articulate specific beliefs. Just as Pierre 
Bourdieu noted the importance for the shaping of the body for the inculcation of 
worldviews and metaphysics, so theology is imbued through physical actions. Proper 
understanding of different theologies must include analysis of the physical actions with 
which stated beliefs are paired, consciously, or not.  
The importance of ritual studies by those such as Catherine Bell cannot be 
overstated on this point. Too frequently theologians have not engaged with this crucial 
area of study, instead viewing theology as merely a cognitive discipline. This thesis has 
continued to uncover the possibility of the production of an expansive theology without 
ever needing to explicitly delineate doctrines. Examining actions that are normalized 
peels back a veil revealing an entire theology behind even the most basic comportment of 
one’ s body. It is easy to recognize how some sacralized rituals, such as how different 
strands of Christianity participate in the Eucharist, forms the content of their beliefs. 
However, economics structures countless practices and habits that could be examined as 
rituals as well, which reveal its implied theology. While these practices have not been 
sacralized, perhaps what makes these actions even more powerful is that they have been 
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normalized. They do not take place within the confines of a religious setting or in any 
context that would be considered holy or sacred. Instead, they are every day actions that 
shape the form that reality takes.  
Using the principles of ritual studies then scholars must consider the mundane 
habits of always buying from the cheapest seller (how quickly people flock to a sale!), the 
commercialization of holidays (including sales that now start on Thanksgiving Day!), or 
the rise in use of plastic/electronic money (who needs a dollar bill when you have 
bitcoin?). These habits shape a way of life that becomes ingrained and contains an 
“implicit pedagogy.” They form a reality of what the good life is. Consideration of 
theology and beliefs systems then must take seriously both sacralized and mundane 
rituals. Ignoring physical movements and rituals disregards Vincent Miller’ s insight 
regarding the importance of the form of beliefs, which as this project has revealed is often 
just as, if not more, important that the actual content of the beliefs.  
The second broad implication of this project is an evaluation of certain methods 
used within the field of religious studies in general. It has become common in recent 
years to use economic logic as an interpretative guide to explain certain aspects of 
religion.320 The evaluation of those such as the Chicago school, who have attempted to 
                                                 
320Roland Robertson claims that Peter Berger was the first person to provide a market analysis of 
religion; see Roland Robertson, “The Economization of Religion? Reflections on the Promise and 
Limitations of the Economic Approach,” Social Compass 39, no. 1 (March 1992): 148. In Berger’ s analysis 
he says that, “religion in our society is a typical consumer product” and that in order to understand the 
concomitant trends of ecumenicity while maintaining denominations one must analyze “denominations 
involved in the paradoxical situation…as economic units which are engaging in competition within a free 
market”; see Peter L. Berger, “A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity,” Social Research 30, no. 
1 (Spring 1963), 88, 79.  
An example of this style of economic logic can be found outside of studies of just Christianity too. 
For example, Hugh B. Urban explores the Kartabhaja sect in colonial Bengal and its place in the broader 
Tantra movement. Urban’ s analysis attempts to uncover how the different positioning of this sect was able 
(or unable) to rise on the social ladder; see Hugh B. Urban, The Economics of Ecstasy: Tantra, Secrecy, 
and Power in Colonial Bengal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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describe every arena of life through an economic lens is similar to other methods. 
Consider as an example Bourdieu, or market theory approaches to the study of religion 
by those such as Rodney Stark.321 Each of these uses a structure, which is quite similar to 
an economic framework. Their attempt is to explain the actions of different religious 
behaviors via this rigid, supposedly value-neutral understanding of life.  
However, the issues with that type of analysis given the present project should be 
apparent. Without even considering whether or not those types of behavioral analyses are 
true (which some have questioned), it should be clear that imposing such strictures upon 
religious environments presupposes the theology of the scholar’ s method upon the 
actions of the subjects.322 Forcing a specific framework for analyzing certain actions can 
be helpful, however, it often assumes that explaining behavior based upon that logic is 
value-neutral.323 This thesis has revealed that an economic logic is far from value-neutral. 
                                                 
321The economic logic used for analysis by Bourdieu is evident in the mentions of gift-giving 
above. It can also be seen more explicitly in his discussion in The field of Cultural Production, specifically 
the chapters titled, “The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods” and “The 
Market of Symbolic Goods”; see Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and 
Literature, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 74-141. 
Rodney Stark’ s methodology can be seen in his A Theory of Religion written with William Sims 
Bainbridge. He notes how his social scientific approach has “ransack[ed] the treasuries of economics”; see 
Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 12. 
Stark’ s method, however, is more frequently classified within rational choice theory, which though it shares 
many elements with a market theory approach, is not entirely the same; see Robertson, “The 
Economization of Religion?, 147 and Rachel M. McCleary, “The Economics of Religion as a Field of 
Inquiry,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion, ed. Rachel M. McCleary (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 6-8. For this reason, Stark, along with anyone else who has been associated 
with these schools of thought must be analyzed individually before judgments can be made regarding the 
presence of an underlying theology in their own methodology. 
322Alles provides some examples of the behavioral disconnect to different methods such as those 
used by the rational choice school; see Alles, “Economy,” 41.  
323A great example of the tension between the use of economic logic and the beliefs that it implies 
for a religious adherent can be seen in William Sax’ s God of Justice. Within this project Sax examines how 
the low-caste Harijans in India use different rituals and interactions with oracles, gurus, and devtas to 
restore justice and bring about social healing. Sax sees these actions as ultimately self-interested, even if 
they are not consciously intended to be so; see William S. Sax, God of Justice: Ritual Healing and Social 
Justice in the Central Himalayas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 198. However, at one point 
in his monograph Sax provides an aside on how he finds it hard to believe, based upon his own 
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Thus the scholar who brings a methodology based upon economic logic, or others similar 
to it, into a study of any particular religious context will possibly miss the theological 
underpinnings of her subjects’  actions. The scholar could be too ensconced in her own 
theological understanding of religious actions that is embedded in her methodological 
logic.  
The use of economic logic, or other methods similar to it, such as market theory, 
should be closely scrutinized within the field of religious studies. This does not 
necessarily mean that these methods cannot be used, but they should only be used with 
upfront acknowledgment that they are bringing their own theological system with them. 
That system is ultimately being mapped on top of the actions of their subjects leaving 
little room for the possibility of an entirely different framework that could be driving the 
subjects. The danger of such an approach can come when, like the Chicago school, any 
action that appears to fall outside of economic logic, is simply written off as not being 
fully understood. Thus any religious action that may appear to be truly sacrificial cannot 
be classified as such because, according to economic logic, it must be self-interested. 
Judgment then is simply suspended in favor of waiting to understand how it is self-
interested. This method, however, fails to engage participants and consider that their 
actions may be driven by a different set of beliefs than those assumed by the researcher’ s 
methodology.  
                                                                                                                                                 
observations, that the behaviors of the oracles or gurus actually bring about personal gain. Rather he feels 
that “they truly suffered from [their calling]”; see Sax, God of Justice, 134. Sax’ s notation on this point is 
inconsistent with his wider analysis. While this brief aside shows his own discomfort with the tension 
between the underlying values of an economic logic and the beliefs of his interlocutors, it would appear 
that Sax is not fully aware of why he feels this tension, or at least he does not articulate why. My hope is 
that recognizing the value-laden aspect of economics would draw out a more self-reflective discussion of 
this tension in analyses that rely heavily upon describing religious activity with economic logic.  
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The above conclusions and the thesis as a whole can be summarized with the 
following statement. The arenas of life void of any theology are much smaller than we 
typically think (if they exist at all), as are the realms in which a value-neutral economics 
exists and dominates (if they exist at all). Economic theology is spread through the 
perpetuation of economic laws in every day mundane actions and purchases. How many 
other actions in life that are ostensibly insignificant also perpetuate a theology through an 
“implicit pedagogy?” Theology thus is not contained within the covers of sacred texts or 
the words spoken in holy places, nor can it even be limited to specific ritual proceedings 
that have been sacralized. It is difficult to find an action in everyday life that does not 
bear with it a theology fitting within a grand narrative of explanation. It is just as difficult 
to find a system of economics, including capitalism, that does not have its very own 
theology.    
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